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Abstract 
 
The study identifies a basic psycho-logico assumption, coined the premise of locality, 
which is postulated by the author to permeate most of historical and contemporary 
psychological, philosophical and scientific thought.  In light of the latter supposition 
the study explores the domain of quantum physics, whence an alternate psycho-logico 
assumption, the premise of non-locality, is conceptualised.  The semantic implications 
of the non-locality premise are elucidated by investigating the meaning, character and 
symptoms of the locality premise.  The indicative factors of the premise of locality are 
enumerated and consequently articulated upon the psychological thought of Jacques 
Lacan.  The study demonstrates how the implicit locality assumptions in Lacan’s 
thinking are the provenance of the incompatibility of his mirror-stage formulation and 
the empirical findings of contemporary mirror self-recognition research.  Assuming a 
premise of non-locality the author develops a psychological perception structure, 
coined dichotomous subject objectification.  Dichotomous subject objectification 
represents the localized experience of the self as subject characterized by the 
capability for mirror self-recognition.  Intuited by the premise of non-locality, the 
author introduces the notion of ‘non-local perceptum’.  The physiological dynamics of 
non-local perceptum is conceptualised by explicating the meaning of ‘absolute power 
states’.  The disposition of absolute power states in terms of dichotomous subject 
objectification is functionalised by correlating the latter with Michel Foucault’s 
conceptualisation of power-relations.  Concerning the latter, particular attention is 
given to Foucault’s understanding of the modern day disparity between disciplinary 
power and sovereign power; the possible influence of this disparity on the 
psychological experience of the localized subject is subsequently investigated and a 
certain ‘cognitive dissonance’ is revealed.  Localized psychological experience 
emanating through non-local perceptum is further illuminated by explicating the 
logical relevance of Socrates’ idiosyncratic flavour of ignorance.  Implementing 
Socrates’ infamous dictum – I know that I don’t know – the study demonstrates how 
gazing through the prism of the locality premise creates scattered patterns of self-
referential paradoxes and self-defeating scientific-logical suppositions.  Subsequently 
the study illustrates that if, conversely, localized thought rather passes through the 
prism of the non-locality premise, the jumbled dissymmetries emanating from the 
locality prism are transfigured into symmetrical patterns of logical beauty.  
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Concerning the notion of symmetry, the study explicates the importance there-of in 
terms of the non-locality premise by defining and differentiating the symmetrical [R] 
and the symmetrical [I].  The study evidences the pragmatic efficacy the notion of 
symmetry has already provided for the domain of physics in the past, and considers 
the vital importance of investigating the clinical applicability this notion might have 
for the domain of psychology in the future.  This preliminary disquisition concerning 
the premise of non-locality is summarized in the conceptualisation of the ‘power to 
will’.  The power to will evinces an alternative approach for addressing the 
paradigmatic reprise (postulated in terms of the ‘brilliant Greek mistake’) that 
confronts the post-modern mind.        
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Opsomming 
 
Die studie identifiseer ŉ basiese psigo-logika aanname, benoem die premis van 
lokaliteit, wat gepostuleer word deur die outeur om die meerderheid van historiese en 
kontemporêre sielkundige, filosofiese en wetenskaplike denke te deur grens.  In ag 
nemend van die voorafgaande supposisie eksploreer die studie die domein van 
kwantum fisika, vanwaar ŉ alternatiewe psigo-logika aanname, die premis van non-
lokaliteit, gekonseptualiseer word.  Die semantiese implikasies van die non-lokaliteits 
premis word uiteengesit deur die betekenis, karakter en simptome van die lokaliteits-
premis te ondersoek.  Die indikatiewe faktore van die lokaliteits-premis word 
aangedui en gevolglik geartikuleer in terme van die sielkundige denke van Jacques 
Lacan.  Die studie demonstreer hoe die implisiete lokaliteits aannames in Lacan se 
gedagte gang die oorsprong is van die teenstrydighede tussen sy spieël-fase 
formulasie en die empiriese bevindinge van kontemporêre spieël self-erkenning.  
Gebaseer op die basis van die non-lokaliteits aanname ontwikkel die outeur ŉ 
psigologiese persepsie struktuur, benoem die digotomiese subjek objektifikasie.  
Digotomiese subjek objektifikasie verteenwoordig die gelokaliseerde ervaring van die 
self as subjek wat gekarakteriseer word deur die vermoeë om die self in die spieël te 
erken.  Geintuïteer deur die aanname van non-lokaliteit, stel die outeur die idee van 
‘nie-lokale perceptum’ bekend.  Die fisiologiese dinamiek van nie-lokale perceptum 
word gekonseptualiseer deur die betekenis van ‘absolute krag state’ te verduidelik.  
Die disposisie van absolute krag state in terme van digotomiese subjek objektifikasie 
word gefunksionaliseer deur die verband daarvan met Michel Foucault se 
konseptualisering van ‘krag-relasies’ aan te dui.  Met betrekking tot die voorafgaande 
word spesifike aandag gegee aan Foucault se verstaan van die dispariteit tussen 
dissiplinêre krag en soewereniteite krag; die moontlike invloed van hierdie dispariteit 
op die individuele psige is ondersoek en ŉ tipe ‘kognitiewe dissonansie’ is 
geidentifiseer.  Gelokaliseerde sielkundige ervaring wat voortvloei uit nie-lokale 
perceptum is verder belig deur ŉ verduideliking van die logiese relevansie van 
Sokrates se idiosinkratiese geur van onkunde.  Deur die implementering van Sokrates 
se berugte uitspraak – ‘Ek weet dat ek nie weet nie’, demonstreer die studie hoe sig 
deur die prisma van die lokaliteits aanname onreëlmatige patrone van self-referentiële 
paradokse en self-ondermynende wetenskaplike-logiese supposisies waarneem.  
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Vervolglik illustreer die studie, in die opsig van ŉ omgekeerde perspektief, dat as 
gelokaliseerde denke eerder deur die prisma van die non-lokaliteits aanname beweeg, 
die deurmekaar dissimmetrie wat deur die lokaliteits prisma straal getransformeer 
word in logiese patrone van logiese skoonheid.  Aangaande die idee van simmetrie, 
bestudeer die studie die belangrikheid daarvan in terme van die non-lokaliteits 
aanname deur die definieering en differensieering van die simmetries [R] en die 
simmetriese [I].  Die studie illustreer die pragmatiese werksaamheid wat die idee van 
simmetrie al reeds in die verlede behels het vir die domein van fisika, en oorweeg die 
fundamentele belangrikheid om in die toekoms die kliniese moontlikhede van hierdie 
idee ten opsigte van die veld van sielkunde te ondersoek.  Ten slotte is hierdie 
voorlopige bespreking van die aanname van non-lokaliteit saamgevat in die 
konseptualisering van ‘krag tot wil’.  Die krag tot wil ontbloot ŉ alternatiewe 
benadering om die paradigmatiese herhaling (gepostuleer in terme van die ‘briljante 
Griekse fout’) wat die post-moderne psige konfronteer aan te spreek. 
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“Thus stood the figure of Socrates for Plato – the resolution and 
climax of the Greek quest for truth, the restorer of the world’s divine 
foundation, the awakener of the human intellect.” 
 
       - Tarnas (1991)   
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Section 1 
1.  Introduction 
 
1.1 Objective of the study 
 
The study represents an interdomain investigation directed towards firstly: excavating 
a foundational psycho-logico assumption postulated by the author to permeate most of 
historical and contemporary scientific, psychological and philosophical thought; and 
secondly: positing a new psycho-logico assumption grounded in the empirical domain 
of quantum physics. 
 
The clandestine and deceptive old foundational assumption will be conceptualized in 
terms of ‘the premise of locality’.  The meaning, character and symptoms of the 
premise of locality will be explored, and the author will demonstrate that ‘even’ a 
post-modernistic theoretical and clinical endeavour like that of the French psychiatrist 
Jacques Lacan, does not escape the pseudo-transparent and malleable claws of the 
premise of locality.  Analogously the nature of the study can be envisaged as follows:  
Up until the 17th century astronomers believed that the earth was fixed at the centre of 
the universe and that all the heavenly bodies, including the sun, revolved around the 
earth.  The astronomers of the Renaissance had ‘good’ rational and logical reasons to 
adhere to a geocentric view of the universe:  the predominant religious paradigm at 
the time of Copernicus dictated that Man, made in God’s image, was the epitome of 
God’s creation, and consequently it was only rational to suppose that the earth, Man’s 
ephemeral home, was at the centre of the universe; also, if the earth revolved or 
rotated, it is only logical to suppose that man would be aware or feel the movement of 
the earth, in fact, if the earth rotated one would expect to see people falling off and 
pieces of earth flying apart - remember that at the beginning of the 17th century 
gravity had not yet been conceptualized by Newton (Tarnas, 1991)!  Furthermore, the 
Ptolemy astronomical model, describing a geocentric universe, possessed an error of 
approximately 1% (Pine, 1988).  Thus, disconcertingly, the Ptolemy mathematical 
system described the planetary movements 99% accurately, yet the wrong centre was 
assumed!  It took the insight and labour of Nicolaus Copernicus and subsequently 
Johannes Kepler to demonstrate that a heliocentric universe was mathematically more 
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eloquent and predictively more accurate than the geocentric model of Ptolemy - a 
paradigmatic shift stretching over a period of more or less two centuries.  The author 
supposes analogously that modern day psychological and philosophical thought is still 
trapped in a geocentric universe paradigm in the simulacrum of the premise of 
locality.  This study undertakes to describe a heliocentric universe by allowing a 
premise of non-locality to occupy the position of the sun. 
 
To facilitate in the development of a theoretical model for this new heliocentric 
universe, a model that accounts for localized phenomena in terms of non-locality, the 
author will implement a post-structuralist line of thought protruding from the 
intellectual endeavours of Michel Foucault.  Specific attention will be given to 
Foucault’s notion of power relations. 
 
Furthermore, in order to clarify the semantic implications of a premise of non-locality 
and to illustrate the vital importance for mankind to challenge the premise of locality 
and all its faces, the author will draw a comparison between the socio-intellectual 
patterns of Ancient Greece and that of the globalised society of the third millennium.  
The latter will be formulated in terms of ‘the brilliant Greek mistake’ and will be 
expounded in the conclusion section. 
   
The study will employ a methodological approach that acknowledges two key 
paradigms related to scientific investigation, these paradigms are the two archetypal 
patterns distinguished by James Hillman (1967) – senex (Latin for ‘old man’), and 
puer (Latin for ‘young man’).  The archetype of senex represents the wisdom of the 
old man.  It is a mental approach characterized by a need for order, a definite 
preference for tradition, and a quest for rules and regularities.  This archetype 
emphasizes an appreciation of history and of the past, and evinces a slightly 
depressive undercurrent.  The archetype of puer represents the spontaneity and 
idealism of youth.  It involves a need for change, experimentation and adventure.  The 
puer focuses on the here and now, envisages the future, and emphasizes the 
transcendence of tradition, laws and rules.  According to Hillman both paradigms 
should be used in any attempt to study and understand human beings.  He proposes a 
paradoxical reconciliation between the scientific thinking of the senex and the poetic 
thinking of the puer, with neither paradigm dominating the other.  This thesis will 
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utilize the framework of the senex to explore and discover the possibilities of the 
puer. 
 
1.2 Outline of the study 
 
Section 2 will sketch the birth and development of the concept of non-locality in the 
world of quantum physics.  The author will demonstrate how, over the course of the 
20th century, various empirical experiments, thought experiments, mathematical 
formulae, and theorems converged to produce the notion of non-locality. 
Section 3 is an exposition of pertinent Lacanian theory that will provide a rational 
matrix upon which the premise of locality will be articulated.  This matrix of 
Lacanian thought will as such establish an alternate frame of reference to facilitate an 
illumination of the gist of the premise of non-locality.  Beyond rendering a premise of 
locality intelligible and exposing the multifarious faces there-of, the latter exposition 
will also serve as a base whence possible conceptual errors related to Lacan’s 
description of the mirror stage will be investigated (see section 4). 
 
Section 4 begins by examining the physiological human brain to substantiate the 
extrapolation of two distinct yet intricately intertwined functional dynamics of the 
human psyche - the rational-element and the emotional-element.  The conditioned and 
contingent nature of rationality will be explicated, and the ‘amalgamated relation’ of 
the rational-element and the emotional-element will be conceptualized.  The 
developmental process of becoming aware of the self as a subject will be analysed by 
considering contemporary research findings related to self- and other-awareness, and 
by examining the implications of the human cognitive capability to recognize the 
mirror image as one’s own.  The investigation of the research domain of mirror self-
recognition will consequently be implemented to critique Lacan’s formulation of the 
mirror-stage.  The critique will illustrate how Lacan’s non-recognition of the primary 
significance of the cognitive capacity for detecting and producing symmetrical 
movements, erroneously lead Lacan to conceptualize his particular flavour of the 
decentred ego with its nihilistic taste.  A premise of non-locality attributes 
fundamental importance to the principle of symmetry (see also section 6), hence the 
principle of symmetry will be utilized to develop a perception model and to explicate 
the rational and emotional dynamics that fabricate a sense of desire. 
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The developed perception structure is coined – dichotomous subject objectification 
(or just called ‘objectification’).  The second half of section 4 will outline the 
topographical constitution of the latter objectification and describe the dynamic and 
discontinuous processes that drive the form there-of.  For clarification purposes the 
differentiated forms of dichotomous subject objectification will be correlated with 
prominent psychological theory of the 20th century specifically focused on the 
anatomy and physiology of perceptive experience.  Dichotomous subject 
objectification represents a specific configuration of the rational-element and 
emotional-element, and animates, in varying degrees of complexity, the perceptive 
world of all biological species capable of recognizing the self in the mirror. 
Section 4 concludes with the introduction of a third element – the intuitive-element 
([I]-element).  The conceptualization of the intuitive-element is a direct consequence 
of the premise of non-locality.  The intuitive-element dictates a new and peculiar form 
of logic, the semantic status of which will be expressed by means of Socrates’ 
idiosyncratic ignorance. Various traditionally problematic and paradoxical scientific 
and philosophical propositions will be evaluated in terms of the intuitive-element (see 
also section 5.3), thus envisaging the implications of a reality that ascribes to the 
logical inferences of a premise of non-locality. 
 
Section 5 formulates the notion of absolute power states to describe possible 
processes involved in the localized precipitation of non-local perceptum (the concept 
of non-local perceptum is explained in section 4). Dichotomous subject 
objectifications will be correlated with Michel Foucault’s formulation of power 
relations, consequently allowing a particular network configuration of objectifications 
to be depicted.  The latter, through the physical organization of bodies and the 
psychological interpretation of these localized phenomena, will serve as exemplar to 
characterize a possible pattern derived from the intra-relation (specifically not inter-
relation) of objectifications and absolute power states. 
 
Section 6 will diagnose the significance of symmetry, explore the various forms there-
of, and consequently indicate how the notion of symmetry evolves in complexity - 
from animating the basic rational and emotional experience of the self as subject, to 
forming the nucleus of the most brilliant and influential scientific theories of the 20th 
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century.  The principle of symmetry will be implemented (specifically in the form of 
the symmetrical [I]) to throw light on the dynamics of absolute power states.  
Symbolically the symmetrical characterization of absolute power states will provide 
the fertile ground in which various strands of deduction and inference will germinate 
and conjoin to ultimately blossom into the rose of power to will.  The concept of 
power to will provides a novel methodological matrix for the potential development of 
specific therapeutic technologies in the domain of psychology.   
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Section 2 
2.   The Quantum world 
 
Then John the quantum physicist spoke and said unto the people thus: 
 
“In the beginning there was locality - locality was with non-locality and 
locality self was non-locality.  Already in the beginning this was so.  In 
locality there was symmetry and this symmetry was the light for the people.”1
 
The scientific voyage of our species into the unchartered waters of the quantum world 
has exposed human logic to iconoclastic phenomena that mercilessly and relentlessly 
toss the grand ship of rationality amongst the waves of irrationality.  Physicists’ 
journey into the atom has been truly extravagant.  The enamoured notions of classical 
physics have been vehemently deposed from their objective pedestal and relegated to 
the delimiting chairs of subjectivity.  Quantum mechanics has not been a friendly 
science, it has demolished classical concepts such as scientific objectivity, solid 
objects and strictly deterministic laws of nature. 
  
 In quantum physics it is superfluous to consider the scientist to play the role of a 
detached and objective witness observing an independent outside world.  The 
observer becomes involved in the world he/she observes to the extent that he/she 
influences the properties of the observed objects.  John Wheeler (quoted in Capra, 
1999) suggests replacing the word observer with the word participator and regards 
this as the most important feature of quantum theory.  Not only does the act of 
measurement significantly influence the results, but the way the experiment is set-up 
will determine, to some extend, the properties of the observed object.  If the 
experimental arrangement is modified, the properties of the observed object also 
change.  Hence the notion that the description of light as particle-like or wave-like or 
particle-wave-like are not descriptions of the properties of light, rather they are 
descriptions of our interactions with light.   
                                                 
1 Personal formulation by author – alluding to the introductory verse of the book of John (New  
  Testament). 
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At the subatomic level a particle like an electron can’t be said to posses a definite 
position, but rather exhibits ‘tendencies’ to occur at certain places.  These tendencies 
are expressed in the formalism of quantum theory as probabilities and are associated 
with mathematical quantities that take the form of waves.  These waves are not typical 
sound or water waves, they are what might be called ‘probability waves’- abstract 
mathematical quantities with all the characteristic properties of waves which are 
related to the probabilities of finding the particles at particular points in space and at 
particular times (Capra, 1999).   This of course is already a contradiction – describing 
the occurrence of particles using wave characteristics.  To illustrate and make sense of 
such a contradiction the author will describe experiments and principles that are 
fundamental to quantum physics and pertinent to the endeavours of this investigation.  
The author will explicate central findings and deductions that will converge to form 
an understanding of what a premise of non-locality entails. 
 
2. 1   The two-slit experiment. 
 
The two-slit experiment is simple to perform given the right apparatus, and has been 
conducted many times in many different ways (this experiment can be read in most 
books on quantum physics).  It is basically concerned with the nature of light and is 
designed to determine whether light is composed of particles or whether light is wave-
like.  The wave-particle question of light had become a very ambiguous state of 
affairs by the beginning of the 20th century.  Either light is a stream of particles or it is   
wave-like, it can’t be both.   In 1803 Thomas Young had conducted what is now 
called ‘Young’s slits experiment’ and showed beyond doubt (or so it was thought 
back then) that light was a wave.  But then, a century after Young’s experiments, 
Albert Einstein published a theoretical physics paper describing the origin of what is 
known as the ‘photoelectric effect’, which was logical only if light was understood to 
be a stream of particles (a light particle is called a photon).  Thus Einstein’s light-
particle theory contradicted Young’s wave theory without disproving it.  This was the 
background for the two-slit experiment (Zukav, 1991). 
 
First, a beam of light is shone on a screen containing two narrow slits that allow some 
of the light to pass through to a second screen where an interference pattern is seen.  
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This interference pattern (alternating light and dark bands) is indicative of light 
behaving as a wave.  Now the experimenter performs the experiment using a ‘light 
gun’ to fire one photon (a particle) at a time and closes one of the slits.  After a 
succession of these photons have been fired the distribution of spots on the second 
screen resembles a pattern that can be expected if it were particles moving through the 
open slit.  But now comes the interesting part: if the experimenter opens both slits and 
fires one photon at a time (assumed to be a particle not a wave) the pattern that forms 
is again typical of a wave.  What is strange is that the photons never lands in the same 
area as was the case with only one slit open.  Every single photon seems to somehow 
know whether the there are two slits open or just one (Al-Khalili, 2003). 
  
 To reiterate: each light particle fired from the gun leaves it as a tiny ‘localized’ 
particle and arrives at the second screen also as a particle.  But in between something 
mysterious takes place, it seems as if the particle is behaving like a spread-out wave 
that gets split into two components, each emerging from a slit and interfering with the 
other on the other side.  In particle language physicists would have to say that it 
appears as if the photon passes through both slits, which of course does not seem 
feasible.  So what the experimenters now do is to try and determine through which 
one of the slits the photon passes by setting up a photon detector behind one of the 
slits.  Every time a photon passes through this slit it is registered on the detector.  The 
results that follow are spooky.  Once enough photons have registered a signal in the 
detector as they pass through the slit that is under surveillance and it can be expected 
that more or less half went through one slit and half through the other, it is found that 
the interference pattern disappears!  The distribution of spots on the second screen 
now form a pattern typical of particle behaviour, not even remotely resembling wave-
like behaviour.  Thus it would seem that light behaves in a wave-like manner when 
we are not attempting to detect it, but behaves as particles when we do try to detect it.  
Variants of this experiment have been performed to try and ‘catch-out’ the photon, but 
to no avail.  This wave-particle duality has also been found in atoms and large 
molecules (Al-Khalili, 2003). 
 
Quantum mechanics provides a perfectly logical explanation for the two-slit 
experiment.  But it is an explanation that is concerned only with what is observed and 
not with what is happening when the experimenter is not looking – and it is here that 
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we find the rudimentary anticipation of non-locality.  The following sections will 
formulate a condensed exposition of the central quantum mechanics principles 
pertinent to a succinct understanding of a non-locality premise. 
 
2. 2   Probability and uncertainty 
 
In the quantum world physicists are confronted with a very serious kind of 
unpredictability that can’t be blamed on their ignorance of the details of a system 
being studied, or a practical inability to set the initial conditions.  It appears this 
unpredictability is an essential feature of nature self at this level.  Quantum physicists 
can’t predict with certainty what will happen next in the quantum domain, not because 
their theories aren’t good enough or because they lack sufficient information, but 
because nature self seems to operate in a very elusive fashion (Al-Khalili, 2003).  
Quantum physicists have developed mathematical equations that allow them to 
predict the probabilities of certain results provided the experiments are performed in a 
certain way.   The purpose of quantum mechanics is not to predict what happens in 
actuality, but to predict the probabilities of various possible results.  For example – 
Quantum physicists can’t calculate where a single photon in the double-slit 
experiment will strike the photographic plate.  They can however calculate with 
precision the probability that it will strike at a certain place, provided that the 
experiment has been prepared properly (Zukav, 1991).  Quantum probabilities are 
built into the theory itself and physicists can’t, even in principle, do any better. 
 
At the heart of the strange and probabilistic concepts forced upon physicists by 
quantum mechanics, lies the wave function.  The wave function is a mathematical 
quantity obtained by solving Schrödinger’s wave equation that contains all the 
possible information we can obtain about a quantum system - observed system 
interacting with an observing/measuring system (Hawking, 2001).  It is important to 
note that the wave function deals with possibilities and not probabilities.  In the sense 
that it is possible that it might snow in Stellenbosch for the whole duration of winter, 
yet it is not probable.  The wave function is related to probability in the following 
way: once the wave function is calculated a simple mathematical operation can be 
performed on it to create a second mathematical entity called a probability function 
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(technically a ‘probability wave function’).  The probability function conveys the 
probabilities at given times of each of the possibilities represented by the wave 
function (Zukav, 1991).   
 
Take for example an electron in a box: if we know that an electron started off in one 
of the top corners of the box, then its wave function will after a short time have spread 
out to occupy the whole volume of the box.  As such the movement of the particle 
resembles the way a wave evolves.  However, the higher density of probability, 
calculated from the wave function, tells us that the electron is more likely to be found 
near its original location, were we to look for it (Lockwood, 1989).  As time goes by 
the probability cloud – not a physical cloud describing a ‘smeared out’ electron, but 
simply a mathematical cloud of probability – will spread out more evenly and the 
electron will have an equal chance of being found anywhere in the box (Al-Khalili, 
2003). 
 
The wave function development follows an unvarying determinism and since the 
probability function is based upon the wave function, the probabilities of possible 
happenings also develop deterministically via the Schrodinger equation (Hawking, 
2001).  This explains why physicists can accurately predict the probability of an 
event, but not the event itself.  The probability of a desired result can be calculated, 
but when a measurement is made (try to observe the movement of the particle), the 
result may or may not be what we get.  The photon may land in region A or it may 
land in region B.  Which possibility becomes reality is, according to quantum theory, 
a matter of chance. 
 
Before the study investigates how the wave function can be interpreted for example in 
context of the two-slit experiment, the author will briefly enunciate what is called – 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.  This will help provide a background that will 
facilitate a better understanding of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment where 
non-locality was first conceptually deduced.  The uncertainty principle is an example 
of the indeterminacy of the quantum world and states that one can never know at the 
same time, and with total precision, everything about a quantum system, even if one 
tries to measure it.  In its mathematical form it says that the experimenter can never 
know at the same time the precise location and velocity of a photon or any other 
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quantum entity (Lockwood, 1989).  Thus the more the experimenter knows about the 
velocity (momentum) of a photon, the less the he/she will know about its position.   
 
The relation between the uncertainties of a particle’s position is not the only form of 
the uncertainty principle.  Other quantities also demonstrate similar relations, for 
example the time an atomic event takes and the energy it involves (Capra, 1999).  
Events occurring inside a short time span involve a large uncertainty in energy; events 
involving a precise amount of energy can be localized only within a long period of 
time.  To help the reader form a more integrated picture it can be added that 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is a consequence of the relation between two types 
of wave functions – the position wave function (as discussed above), and another 
wave function called the momentum wave function, which describes the particle’s 
possible location and state of motion even before we look (Al-Khalili, 2003). 
 
The discussion will now focus on how one can logically make sense of the reality that 
the wave function describes in context of the two-slit experiment.   
Each photon (or any other quantum particle) fired at the screen with two open slits is 
described by a wave function that evolves in time.  The photon must not be regarded 
as having suddenly turned into a spread-out wave function, the wave function as a 
mathematical fiction serves as the only means for tracking the atom from the moment 
it is fired untill the moment it hits the screen.  The wave function – being spread out – 
splits in two on encountering the slits with each piece going through one of the slits.  
Al-Khalili (2003) notes that this is a description of a changing mathematical entity 
and that it is by solving the Schrödinger equation that one can tell what the wave 
function looks like at any given time.  One can never know what is really going on, or 
even be sure that anything real is going on at all, since this would require making a 
measurement, but as soon as this is done the outcome will be altered.  As the photon 
moves through both slits, its wave function is a superposition of two parts.  
Superposition refers to the process whereby two waves (in this case wave functions) 
are added together (Zukav, 1999).  The movement of the photon must not be regarded 
as typical wave-like movement, because the wave function seems to exist in two 
isolated parts during this phase of the experiment.  So the single particle now behaves 
as though it were two particles that are identical to the original particle.  If the state of 
the photon was described by only one of these parts of the wave function then it 
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would be possible to say that the photon was definitely going through one of the slits.  
But the superposition of the two parts means that there is equal chance of it passing 
through either slit. 
 
On the other side of the slits, each piece of the wave function spreads out again and 
both sets of ripples overlap in such a way that a stripy pattern characteristic of two 
real interfering waves form on the screen (Al-Khalili, 2003).  It must be made clear 
that the pattern is not due to a real wave, but rather a set of numbers that provide us 
with a probability for the arrival of a single particle at a given location.  Of course, as 
discussed earlier, if the experimenter was to try and observe/measure the particle as it 
passes through one of the slits, the interference pattern disappears and a pattern 
typical of the movement one would expect of a particle appears in its place.  
Alternatively formulated: An interference pattern is produced when the two paths are 
indistinguishable, but as soon as the experimenter attempts to detect the particle the 
two paths will produce distinguishable photons and the interference pattern disappears 
(Al-Khalili, 2003).  The moment a photon is detected going through one of the slits, 
the possibility that it would go through the other slit ceases to exist – the probability 
of detecting the photon at the other slit becomes zero.  The wave function is said to 
collapse.  This phenomenon is simply called the ‘collapse of the wave function’ 
(Penrose, 1989).  The probability that the photon passed through the slit where it was 
detected is now one.  Thus, if we do not look to see where the photon is it does not go 
through one slit or the other, but must be regarded as having gone through both slits at 
once.  This is a necessary deduction if we are to explain the interference pattern.  
These results are further supported by experiments using what is called ‘an 
interferometer’- with these experiments the results are only in intelligible if we accept 
that a single particle somehow travels two different paths at once (Al-Khalili, 2003).  
Welcome to the world of non-locality. 
 
What is meant or implied by non-locality?  As a matter of definition the following: 
Instantaneous connections ubiquitous to the physical universe – a network of 
connections unapparent to the sensory experience of the macroscopic world, thus 
permitting one to speak of separate objects and to formulate laws to describe their 
behaviour in terms of certainties.  However, if one looks at the macroscopic world 
through a magnifying lens, or in other terms, if one investigates the atomic world, the 
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influence of non-local connections become more apparent (important to note – not 
stronger), certainties give way to probabilities and it becomes more and more difficult 
to differentiate any part of the physical universe from any other part there-of.  
Physicists are no longer in doubt that instantaneous communication (faster than the 
speed of light) between distant objects, or non-locality, is a fundamental feature of the 
quantum world, and can be traced back to the nature of the wave function (Al-Khalili, 
2003). 
 
Before the author succinctly explicates the notion of non-locality and its conceptual 
origins, it is necessary to distinguish between the following two quantum concepts: 
non-locality and entanglement.  Entanglement can be considered to be a combination 
of non-locality and superposition (Al-Khalili, 2003). Superposition can be considered, 
in context of the wave-particle duality (see also earlier definition), to refer to the 
property of a quantum particle where the particle can exist in a combination of two or 
more states at the same time (Zukav, 1991).  If the idea of superposition is 
synthesized with the non-locality idea of instantaneous connection, the result is the 
dialectical notion of a particle that can exist in two places at once (if we do not 
attempt to observe it) with its different parts being able to instantaneously influence 
each.  Two originally distinct and separate particles can also become ‘entangled’ in 
the sense that their interaction causes them to become correlated in such a way that 
their fates will be intertwined forever, however far apart they get – until, that is, one 
of them interacts with a measuring device.  Consequently it should be clear that non-
locality and entanglement are interrelated concepts and for the purposes of this thesis 
the author will especially make use of the word non-locality.  To be sure, 
entanglement as a phenomenon would not be possible if non-locality was to be 
spurious.  As it is, physicists accept non-locality and entanglement as crucial features 
of the quantum world (Al-Khalili). 
 
Interpreting quantum phenomena is not inevitably delimited to the postulation of non-
locality.  In fact, the first consistent formulation of quantum mechanics assumed the 
form of the ‘Copenhagen interpretation’.  It was developed through discussions that 
took place in the mid- and late-1920s between Niels Bohr and a group of brilliant 
young geniuses, including Werner Heisenberg (recall Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
principle), that were gathered together at Bohr’s then-new science institute.  The 
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Copenhagen interpretation says, in effect, that it does not matter what quantum 
mechanics is about, what matters is that it works in all possible experimental 
situations (Zukav, 1991).  Strictly speaking the Copenhagen interpretation is not a real 
interpretation.  Consider for example the EPR-experiment: the difficulty with the 
experiment is that it represents the experimenter with a set of correlations for which 
there appears to be no classical explanation (including Newtonian and Einsteinian 
physics).  The Copenhagen interpretation represents nothing more than a recipe for 
how to compute what the correlations are.  As such the computational algorithm 
adopts the status of a complete explanation.  The Copenhagen interpretation merely 
provides a set of rules to abide by in order for the experimenter to make use of the 
quantum formalism without being concerned about its meaning.  According to Al-
Khalili (2003), the Copenhagen interpretation not only does not explain how the 
photon/atom goes through the two slits, the interpretation states categorically that 
even to ask such a question is meaningless – denying that an objective reality exists in 
the absence of observation.  Therefore the Copenhagen interpretation succeeds in 
banishing logical contradictions and inconsistencies by only allowing those questions 
to be posed that concern the results of the measurements. 
In context of this thesis, the logical contradictions and inconsistencies of quantum 
phenomena will be addressed and the possible semantic indications there-of 
formulated in terms of the conceptualization of non-locality as premise.      
 
In the following section the author will describe the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen thought 
experiment where Einstein and his two colleagues wholly unintentionally stumbled 
over the notion of non-locality. 
 
2. 3   The EPR experiment 
 
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (1935) published a paper entitled, “Can Quantum-
Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be Considered Complete?”.  At the time 
Einstein was troubled by the concept of indeterminacy, whereby quantum mechanics 
insists that we can’t know everything about a quantum particle at the same time 
(recall the earlier explication of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle).  The thought 
experiment was designed to demonstrate that the quantum theory was not a 
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‘complete’ theory because it does not describe certain important aspects of reality 
which are physically real even if they are not observed, for example: the quantum 
principle that a particle doesn’t have a well-defined position unless we look at it.  The 
ultimate implications of the thought experiment were very far removed from its 
original intentions, and instead a spooky yet fundamental feature of the physical 
world was revealed – non-locality.  The EPR experiment can be regarded as the 
Pandora’s box of modern physics. 
 
The experiment can be described as follows (Einstein et al., 1935):  Consider two 
quantum particles, such as photons, that are simultaneously produced by a common 
source and which move apart with equal and opposite velocities.  In light of the 
foregoing discussion it should be clear that each of the two photons must be 
considered as being like a spread-out wave until it is detected.  This is logically so 
because of the two-slit experiment where the spots on the second screen where the 
photons end up is dictated by the interference pattern in its wave function - each 
photon behaving like a wave before it is detected and like a particle when it is 
detected.  Please appreciate the ingenuity of the argument that follows.  If the 
experimenter chooses to measure the precise position of the first particle then it would 
appear as a localized particle.  The experimenter would also know the precise location 
of the second photon at that moment without looking at it (without any measurement), 
since it would have travelled an equal distance on the other side of the source.  
Alternatively, the experimenter can choose to measure the wave-like properties of the 
first photon, such as its wavelength, calculated from the measured momentum (this 
calculation is done using de Broglie’s formula whereby the momentum of a particle is 
related to its wavelength).  And since the two photons have the same magnitude of 
momentum – but travelling in opposite directions – the second photon’s precise 
momentum can also be known and a precise wave length can be calculated for it.  
Thus both photons can now be described as behaving like waves. 
 
It is clear from the above that what the experimenter chooses to measure of the first 
photon, determines what characteristics are assigned to it.  It is important to note that 
the experimenter has not touched the second photon throughout.  The experimenter 
could have ensured that the second photon is not disturbed by allowing enough time 
to elapse so that the two particles are very far apart.  By doing this the experimenter 
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would have avoided any signalling at the speed of light taking place between the two 
particles (thus avoiding that they disturb each other) – it should be emphasized that 
photons are light particles and thus move away from each other at the speed of light.  
Thus any signal moving at the speed of light would be unable to catch up with the 
photon that is also moving at the speed of light.  This is necessarily so for the 
argument Einstein presents, because according to his ‘special theory of relativity’ 
(which should not be confused with his later general theory of relativity that 
incorporates gravity) nothing can travel faster than the speed of light – the speed of 
light is invariably 186,000 miles per second (in a vacuum – the speed of light changes 
in matter depending on the index of refraction of the matter) (Zukav, 1991). 
 
The major point Einstein wanted to make was that the experimenter could in 
principle, have known either the undisturbed photon’s precise position (particle 
nature) or its precise momentum (wave nature) at any given time without looking at it 
(without making a measurement).  What is important is that, according to Einstein, the 
second photon must have had a definite position and momentum all along.  This 
contradicts the quantum mechanical principle that a particle can’t be said to posses 
any definite position or momentum (never mind a definite position and momentum – 
recall Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle) if one does not perform a measurement –
due to the probabilistic nature of the wave function. 
 
Thus the experiment seemed to demonstrate that quantum theory was an incomplete 
theory.  But such a conclusion could be avoided as Einstein (quoted in Zukav, 1991) 
admitted in the paper with the following ironic aside: 
 
One can escape from this conclusion [that quantum theory is incomplete] only 
by either assuming that the measurement of S1 [1st photon] telepathically 
changes the real situation of S2 [2nd photon] or by denying independent real 
situations as such to things which are spatially separated from each other.  
Both alternatives appear to me to be entirely unacceptable. (p. 305) 
 
Here we have the rudimentary rumblings of non-locality.  What Einstein indirectly 
acknowledges in this paragraph is an implicit assumption in their argument – the 
principle of local causes.  This principle advocates that what happens in one area does 
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not depend upon variables subject to the control of an experimenter in a distant and 
space-like separated area. Einstein explicitly reiterates this principle in his 
autobiography (quoted in Zukav, 1991) written 11 years after the Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen paper: 
 
 …on one supposition we should, in my opinion, absolutely hold fast:  the real 
factual situation of the system S2 [the particle in area B] is independent of 
what is done with the system S1 [the particle in area A], which is spatially 
separated from the former. (p. 304) 
 
So for quantum theory to not be seriously flawed, there would have to be some kind 
of non-local communication taking place between two spatially separated particles, as 
such contradicting the common sense notion of local causes. 
   
Using the idea of the wave function, the EPR experiment can be readily explained: 
once the two photons have interacted, they will thereafter be described by the same 
entangled wave function and their fates will be intertwined however far apart they 
become.  The moment a property of one of the photons is measured, the entangled 
wave function collapses and the other photon is instantly endowed with the 
corresponding property.  This explanation supposes the possibility of non-local 
connections.  And it is exactly these non-local connections that Einstein couldn’t 
accept.  The dilemma Einstein faced was that the statistical predictions of quantum 
mechanics are always correct. Quantum mechanics predicts very precisely the 
properties of atoms and molecules and their constituent particles, it explains 
everything from transistors to radioactive decay to stellar energy (Al-Khalili, 2003).  
If ever there was a successful scientific theory, quantum mechanics is it.  The problem 
with quantum mechanics is that nobody knows why it works! 
 
Then in 1964, John Bell (an Irish physicist) seriously tackled the unresolved issue of 
local causes (Einstein’s argument) versus non-local connections (Quantum 
mechanics) and proposed a way of testing which one of these two notions are correct 
– it was called Bell’s theorem or Bell’s inequality.  It is regarded by many as one of 
the most profound scientific discoveries of the 20th century (Al-Khalili, 2003).  Stapp 
(1975), in a work supported by the U.S. Energy Research and Development 
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Administration, described the theorem as follows,  “Bell’s theorem is the most 
profound discovery of science” (p. 271).  For the purposes of this investigation it will 
be sufficient to outline the basic gist of this theorem without considering the details of 
the experimental set-up required to test Bell’s theorem. 
   
Bell’s theorem is a mathematical proof (Penrose, 1989).  If it is correct then Einstein 
was wrong and quantum mechanics right.  The reason being the following:  Einstein 
was of the opinion that there was nothing strange about the occurrence that the two 
EPR-set-up particles were found to have correlated properties when measured.  After 
all they had been emitted by the same source and had thus been in contact in the past.  
Accordingly, no faster-than-light signalling between them need be invoked if their 
properties had been set from the start (remember that the special theory of relativity 
forbids faster-than-light-movement).  Einstein believed that there was some real 
objective reality out there to measure/discover, and that as a consequence particles 
like photons and electrons must posses real properties even when the experimenter is 
not looking – that an electron particle exists as a definite electron particle without an 
observer needing to observe it.  These well-defined real properties, which quantum 
mechanics does not describe in the absence of a measurement, are designated as 
‘hidden variables’, and do not require any non-locality, a concept Einstein was never 
comfortable with.  Now the question is – Was Einstein correct?  Could ‘hidden 
variables’ explain quantum weirdness? 
 
Bell’s theorem transposed the argument about the nature of quantum reality from the 
realm of philosophy to experimental physics (Al-Khalili, 2003).  Bell derived a 
formula which indicated that if the principle of local causes is valid, and Einstein is 
thus correct, then there would have to be a maximum amount (a ceiling value you 
might say) of correlation between the two particles.  That is, since the particles could 
have no prior knowledge of the type of measurement that would be performed on each 
of them, the conspiratorial preparation that could be built into them was limited.  
Hence in the case of hidden variables that predefine both particles’ properties, there is 
a limit to the synchronization between the results of measurements on the two 
particles.  Alternatively, if quantum mechanics and the concept of a single wave 
function describing the entangled state of the pair were correct, then there would be a 
larger amount of correlation than this maxim.  The results obtained from the 
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experiments performed to test Bell’s theorem are the reason why the reader is reading 
this thesis. 
 
Back in 1964 Bell’s experiment was still a hypothetical construct.  The technology 
necessary to perform the experiment had not yet been developed.  Eventually in 1972, 
Clauser and Freedman (1972) performed the experiment to confirm whether the 
statistical predictions of quantum mechanics or the principle of local causes is false.  
They found that the statistical predictions upon which Bell based his theorem were 
correct, but the experiment did not conclusively demonstrate that these correlations 
were the result of non-local connections (this was due to certain technical 
inadequacies of the experiment).  The experiment that was to deliver the knockout 
blow to the principle of local causes and declare non-locality the winner, was carried 
out in 1981 by a team of physicists led by Alain Aspect (cited in Calder, 2003).  The 
experimental results indicated that Bell’s inequality was violated and consequently 
that non-locality, strange as it may be, was in fact a fundamental feature of nature.  
Almost 50 years after the publication of the EPR-paper, the concept Einstein 
postulated to demonstrate that quantum mechanics was ‘an incomplete’ theory, was 
experimentally substantiated and as a consequence exactly the converse was indicated 
– quantum mechanics really is non-local, or as Einstein preferred to say, it involves 
‘spooky action at a distance’. 
 
Presently the principle of non-locality is utilized in a multitude of technological 
devices – to name but a few: superconductors (utilizing Cooper-pairs), lasers (thus in 
DVD and CD players, eye-surgery), quantum cryptography, and tunnel diodes (used 
as very fast switches in microprocessors) (Al-Khalili, 2003). 
  
Bell’s theorem demonstrates that not only are ‘common sense ideas’ inadequate for 
describing subatomic phenomena, they are also deficient for describing macroscopic 
events, everyday phenomena (Zukav, 1991)!  Essentially there is no such thing as 
separate parts.   
 
Just as certain as the physical brain is related to psychological phenomena (example – 
Altzheimers, brain damage), so unequivocally must the features of the subatomic 
world which essentially constitute the physical brain also be related to psychological 
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phenomena.  Whence non-locality must be related to psychological phenomena.  
Already in Jungian psychology one finds the idea of synchronicity – the notion that 
two events can be a-causally related (non-locally intertwined) in a meaningful way.  
But now, during this theoretical endeavour, the author will descend much deeper, to 
be sure, non-locality will be postulated as the premise for all psychological 
phenomena (all physical phenomena as well).   
 
As fundamental as atoms and molecules are to the brain as a whole organ, so 
fundamental the author postulates non-locality to be to all cognitive experience.  The 
postulate assumes that there is some state of reality, some way of being that allows 
localized perceiving bodies to experience non-local phenomena.  In the following 
sections the author will develop a psychological-model that acknowledges non-local 
experience and succinctly explicates concomitant phenomena. 
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Section 3 
3.   The juxtaposed Lacan 
 
3. 1   Lacan’s decentred ego 
 
Before the study proceeds, an exposition of relevant Lacanian notions will be 
formulated in order to establish an alternate frame of reference that will facilitate in 
rendering a premise of non-locality intelligible to the reader.  If one wishes to grasp 
the meaning of a non-locality assumption it would be necessary to first fathom what is 
implied by locality.  To this end the author will demonstrate that the Lacanian 
decentred ego is rife with assumptions of locality – ultimately the determining 
ingredient regarding the pessimistic pith of this theory.  As the thesis of non-locality 
is developed (in later sections), intricacies of Lacan’s description of the human 
psychological experience will be expounded in the form of a comparative critique.  
Through such a juxtapositioning of Lacan and the non-locality premise, words will act 
as a type of rational sonar that maps the semantic state of these two thought systems 
as the verbal impulses bounce to and fro between them. 
 
Lacan (1966/1977) maintained that his theoretical views were not intended to cover 
the entire range of human experience, but that his theory was developed with the goal 
of reinterpreting Freud’s work.  Accordingly it can be safely deduced that the 
unconscious played a fundamental role in Lacan’s thought.  Lacan believed, however, 
that Freud did not adequately describe how the ego came to be.  Freud of course did 
offer a number of possible answers, like for example: the ego was a projection of the 
surface of the body, or that one portion of the id undergoes a special development and 
as such acts as an intermediary between the id and the external world (cited in Hook, 
Watts & Cockcroft, 2002), also the idea that the ego develops as the child goes 
through a stage of narcissism between the stages of auto-eroticism and object love 
(Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986).  Although Freud’s explanations of ego development 
were logically coherent and mutually supportive, Lacan found them to be insufficient 
in expressing succinctly the precise processes involved in forming the ego.  What are 
the exact psychological experiences and phenomena associated with the construction 
of an ego?  In an attempt to provide a definitive explanation for the ego formation 
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process, Lacan postulated his mirror stage theory of development.  According to 
Lacan that which is formed during the mirror stage will be the rootstock of later 
identifications (Lacan, 1966/2001).  The mirror stage is central to what Lacan termed 
the ‘Imaginary Order’, the first of three distinct yet fundamentally intertwined orders 
envisaged by Lacan.  The other two orders being the ‘Symbolic Order’ and ‘The 
Real’.  The relation of these profoundly heterogeneous orders is illustrated by Lacan 
using the image of a Borromean knot to symbolise their interconnected nature 
(Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986).  The latter description intimates that the three orders 
are linked in such a way that if one order is cut, the other two are set free 
 
The first phase of development, the imaginary order, stretches from immediately after 
birth to round about 18 - 24 months (Meyer, Moore & Viljoen, 1997) – the age when 
in general most infants develop the capacity for language.  The neonate originally 
possesses awareness, but not self-awareness.  According to Lacan (Hook et al., 2002) 
the infant experiences the body in a fragmentary fashion (Corps morcele), having no 
definite sense of where the body ends and where the world begins.  Originally the 
infant does not experience the body as a differentiated whole - Lacan refers to the 
child as the ‘hommelette’, the little scrambled person - and is incapable of properly 
controlling his/her flailing arms and legs.  At this stage Burr (1995) describes the 
infant as a heterogeneous, shifting, and centre-less mass of needs and sensations.  
Lacan postulates that the first awareness of unity only develops during the mirror 
stage, which occurs around six months (Lacan, 1966/2001).  During the mirror stage 
(or primary narcissistic stage) infants are totally self-focused and do not experience 
themselves as separate from their mothers – evincing a perceptive state of symbiotic 
dual unity with the mother.  The mother acts as a kind of mirror, a reflective surface 
in which the infant attempts to discover the self (hence Lacan’s analogy of the myth 
of Narcissus who falls in love with his own image reflected in the water).  The mirror 
stage refers to a particular moment of recognition and jubilation when the infant is 
moving away from the mother’s gaze (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986).  The infant now 
appears to be capable of recognizing the image of his/her own body as a Gestalt in the 
mirror.  Lacan (1966/2001) states the following: 
 
Thus, this Gestalt … by these two aspects of its appearance [appears in 
contrasting size that fixes it and in a symmetry that inverts it], symbolizes the 
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mental permanence of the I, at the same time it prefigures its alienating 
destination; it is still pregnant with the correspondences that unite the I with 
the statue in which man projects himself… (p. 3)  
 
Thus the infant becomes aware of the self as a differentiated whole and so escapes the 
helpless, anxiety ridden and fragmented sense of the body by identifying with the 
external whole image.  In Lacan’s (1966/2001) own words, “We have only to 
understand the mirror stage as an identification, in the full sense that analysis gives to 
the term: namely the transformation that takes place when he assumes an image …” 
(p. 2). 
 
The infant’s mastery of the image fills him/her with triumph and joy as the mirror 
image anticipates the mastery of the body, which the infant has not yet objectively 
achieved.  Hence, narcissism in this formulation becomes a fundamental aspect of 
human psychology – in the sense that the infant now falls in love with the external 
image with which he/she identifies.  Evans (1996) points out that this narcissism has 
both an erotic and aggressive character: 
 
It is erotic, as the myth of narcissus shows, since the subject is strongly 
attracted to the gestalt that is his image.  It is aggressive, since the wholeness 
of the image contrasts with the uncoordinated disunity of the subject’s real 
body, and thus seems to threaten the subject with disintegration. (p. 120) 
 
Lacan points out that identification with the mirror image constitutes a form of 
alienation, since people discover themselves outside themselves, in the mirror.  The 
ego for Lacan is thus formed on the basis of an imaginary relationship the subject (the 
infant) has with his/her own body.  The ego has the illusion of autonomy, existing 
only as such, and so the subject moves from fragmentation and insufficiency to 
illusory unity.  The ego ‘neglects, scotomizes, misconstrues’, it is a form of self-
denial, even self-deception, since it is not the ‘true person’ who forms the centre of 
the personality but a kind of imaginary I (moi) (cited in Benvenuto & Kennedy, p. 
60).  Lacan (1966/2001) refers to the false judgements of the ego as meconnaissance, 
or misknowing.  Whence he suggests that people have an almost infinite capacity to 
deceive themselves, particularly when they are making value judgements about 
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themselves, or when they are contemplating their own image.  Why does the ego lie?  
Why is it necessary for us to cling to the chimera of wholeness and unity perceived in 
the external image?  Evans (1996) explains as follows: 
 
The anxiety provoked by this feeling of fragmentation fuels the identification 
with the image … by which the ego is formed.  However, the anticipation of a 
synthetic ego is henceforth constantly threatened by the memory of this sense 
of fragmentation, which manifests itself in images of ‘castration, 
emasculation, mutilation, dismemberment, dislocation, evisceration, 
devouring, bursting open of the body’ which haunt the human imagination. (p. 
67)  
 
Lacan designates the outside world of reflected images the ‘Other’.  This Other is 
something outside the body, not the differentness of another, but the mirror image of 
the self in the other – it is the Other that is the equivalent of the self.  This Other must 
be differentiated from the Other (small ‘o’) – only during the Oedipal phase of the 
symbolic order does the Other that is distinct and different from the subject emerge.  
The Other may be defined as the totality of alien messages received from the outside 
world (maternal Other, paternal Other, injunctions of the culture), which have come to 
be reframed as the subject’s own, inner and repressed world (Lang, 1995).  The Other 
can as such be likened to a memory-bank of repressed messages, which continues to 
operate its effects on the ego in the unconscious realm.  Hence Lacan’s axiom – ‘I am 
not how I think I am’ but ‘I am how the Other thinks I am’ or alternatively – ‘the 
desire of man is the desire of the Other’ (cited in Meyer et al., 1997, p. 233). 
 
The moment a child becomes a language being, the symbiotic dual unity with the 
mother is broken (Meyer et al., 1997).  Discourse with the other (small ‘o’) shatters 
the mother-child symbiosis.  The child receives a name and identifies with this name.  
Now identification occurs via a word and no longer via an image.  Thus the child is 
separated from the Other (here specifically the maternal Other – the mother image) 
and the dual unity is broken.  In the process of language acquisition ‘lack’ arises (loss 
of unity with the mother), which translates into a desire for that something that is 
lacking.  Hence the pessimistic tenor of Lacan’s theory is declared.  To be sure, the 
original unity is broken forever and will always remain unattainable, thus creating an 
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enduring desire that can never be satisfied.  As such a fundamental ‘lack of being’ 
becomes constitutively cemented in the human psychological make-up, forever 
taunting the subject through unattainable desire. 
 
The ability to interact through symbolic language, signals the beginning of the 
symbolic order.  For the purposes of this investigation the exact processes involved in 
the establishment of the symbolic I (ego) during the symbolic order will not be 
explicated in detail (for example the dynamics of the Law of the father/culture).  Only 
the most pertinent aspects will be explored. 
 
Language belongs to the symbolic order, and in Lacan’s view, it is through language 
that the subject can represent desires and feelings, and so conversely it is through the 
symbolic order that the subject can be represented or constituted.  The symbolic order 
is concerned with the functioning of symbols and symbolic systems, including social 
and cultural symbolism.  Outside this domain of symbolization, hence outside the 
domain of the subject, Lacan conceptualized the ‘Real Order’ (Benvenuto & 
Kennedy, 1986).  The value of this third order lies in its limiting function, in that it 
represents the boundary of the other two orders.  It is linked to the dimensions of 
death and sexuality, and ultimately lies beyond the limits of rational comprehension.  
Consequently not much can be said about it other than it exists and that it is posited in 
principle as the negative of the other two orders (Meyer et al., 1997). 
 
Lacan believed that the individual obtains his or her own identity through language.  
Lacan did not consider people to be free agents who determine their own life paths 
according to their own free will, but as beings with decentred egos who are at the 
mercy of the Other and the symbolic order of language.  Language is of vital 
importance for Lacan as can be derived from his phrase – ‘the unconscious is 
structured like a language’ (cited in Meyer et al., 1997, p. 232).  As such Lacan did 
not recognize the existence of an original or instinctive unconscious, instead he 
contended that all contents of the unconscious derive from the outside world via 
symbolization (Lacan, 1973/1979). 
 
Important to note is the following:  The meaning Lacan ascribes to the linguistic terms 
‘signifier’ and ‘signified’ which are combined to form the concept of ‘sign’.  In 
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language there is a phonetic image such as ‘apple’ (signifier) that signifies a 
corresponding meaning - the concept of an apple (the signified).  The correspondence 
between these two linguistic notions is determined by an arbitrary agreement within 
the language community, and the meaning of the signifier (image or term) is not fixed 
(Lacan, 1966/2001).  Context determines the semantic content of a signifier. 
   
Lacan interpreted these two elements as distinctly separate and in radical opposition.  
Lacan emphasized the primacy of the signifier and subsequently relegated the search 
for the signified or concept to the realm of redundancy.  The signified is forever 
elusive and resists fixating attempts.  The same, according to Lacan, does not apply to 
the signifier.  It is revealed in the signifying chain, which is made up of signifiers 
connected to one another, and it is through this perpetual signification that the subject 
is constructed (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986).  So the ad infinitum quest for the 
concept is vanquished, and is replaced by analysis of the laws of the signifier to 
uncover the knowledge about the subject. 
 
Lacan (1966/2001) explicates these two elements as follows: 
 
The first network, that of the signifier, is the synchronic structure of the 
language material in so far as in that structure each element assumes its 
precise function by being different from the others; this is the principle of 
distribution that alone governs the function of the elements of language at its 
different levels, … (p. 139) 
           
And concerning the ‘signified’: 
 
The second network, that of the signified, is the diachronic set of the 
concretely pronounced discourses, which reacts historically on the first, just as 
the structure of the first governs the pathways of the second. (p. 139) 
 
Lacan notes that the dominant factor here is the unity of signification, which proves 
never to be resolved into a pure indication of the real, but always refers back to 
another signification.  As such the signification is realized only on the basis of a grasp 
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of things in their totality – only the signifier guarantees the theoretical coherence of 
the whole as a whole.  Lacan (1973/1979) asserts that everything emerges from the 
structure of the signifier.  The signifier, producing itself in the field of the Other, 
makes manifest the subject of its signification.  According to Lacan the subject is that 
which is represented by the signifier, and the signifier can only represent something 
for another signifier (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986).  Whence it is deduced that the 
signifier represents the subject (as opposed to the Other) for another signifier (Lacan).  
Consequently Lacan contends that the subject ought to be sought in the very structure 
of the signification chain (sentences, paragraphs, in speech), or indeed, that the 
subject is this very chain.  The subject is propelled forward along the chain of which it 
is part, as the signifiers (by which it is constituted) slide away from the signified, from 
the ‘something’.  To quote Lacan (1973/1979): 
 
But it [the signifier] functions as a signifier only to reduce the subject in 
question to being no more than a signifier, to petrify the subject in the same 
movement in which it calls the subject to function, to speak, as subject. (p. 
207)  
 
Lacan thus enunciates two definite processes involved in the fabrication of a 
fundamental ‘lack of being’ – firstly the lack of being engendered by the subject’s 
alienation in the Other (mirror stage), and secondly a lack resulting from the fact that 
the subject depends on the signifier, and that the signifier is first of all in the field of 
the Other. 
 
To conclude the exposition of applicable Lacanian theory, the author will further 
inform the perspective of the reader by briefly examining what Lacan (1966/2001, p. 
214) designated the L-schema (see Figure 1). 
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Lacan asserts that this schema signifies that the condition of the subject (neurosis or 
psychosis) is dependent on what is being unfolded in the Other.  He describes it as 
follows (Lacan, 1966/2001):  
 
… he [the subject] is stretched out over the four corners of the schema: 
namely, S, his ineffable, stupid existence, o’, his objects, o, his ego, that which 
is reflected of his form in his objects, and O, the locus from which the 
question of his existence may be presented to him. (p. 214)   
 
Note that there are two planes represented here – the Imaginary and Symbolic planes.  
Benvenuto and Kennedy (1986) writes that the Imaginary plane is represented 
between o and o’, the relationship between the ego and its mirror image, the ego’s 
imaginary counterpart, through which the subject is alienated.  The small other (o’) 
can be any other subject in the role of observer or interlocutor.  Although o’ is the 
place from which a given other speaks, the other’s locus is immanent and inherent in 
the quadrature of subjectivity.  Lang (1995) states that the other is a place from which 
any ego projects the ideals (and all the shadings of love and hate) that have been 
introjected to constitute the ego in the first place.  It is the gaze of others (approving, 
guilt-inducing) which trigger unconscious ego affects (the diagonal vector from top 
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right to bottom left) and prompt the articulation of the latter’s self-justification, anger, 
grandiosity, or any other such Imaginary ‘affect’ that rigidly resists knowledge of its 
desire. 
 
The Symbolic plane is represented between S and O.  The letter S refers to the 
analytic subject, not the subject in his/her totality, but in the person’s opening up 
towards his/her own truth when he/she comes to analysis and begins to speak.  The O 
is the absolute Other to whom the subject’s truth is addressed (Lacan called this kind 
of speech ‘full speech’- the analysand’s true speech addressed to the Other), or who 
can nullify the subject.  Lacan describes the relation of the subject to the Other as 
“circular and dissymmetrical, yet without reciprocity” (Lacan, 1973/1979, p. 207).  
Between S and O the symbolic realization of the subject takes place unconsciously.  
The relation between o – o’ (the imaginary relation) forms an obstacle to the subject’s 
symbolic realization.  Benvenuto and Kennedy (1986) elaborates on this point and 
writes that what passes between S and O, for instance in the insistence of the 
signifying chain, always passes through the mediation of the imaginary relationship o 
– o’.  When the subject speaks in analysis, aiming towards the realization of the true 
subject (when he goes from S to O), he/she is diverted into o – o’.  As such the truth 
always remains elusive and the subject is constantly drawn to the four corners of the 
scheme.  This counteractive dynamic between the Other and the Other is basic to the 
structure of the subject. 
 
In the following section the supposition of locality, hitherto implicitly accepted as 
primary to psycho-physiological experience (as postulated by the current study), will 
be explicated by demonstrating the immanent presence there-of in Lacanian theory.  
In the process a more succinct understanding of the premise of non-locality will be 
facilitated. 
 
3. 2    The premise of locality in Lacan 
 
The premise of locality is what you might call ‘common sense’.  It is a rational 
supposition that reminds of the geocentric universe (as discussed earlier), which was 
considered a logical necessity up until the 17th century.  The author asserts that this 
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notion of locality has been a fundamental supposition implicit in much of historical 
and contemporary scientific, psychological and philosophical thought.  The author 
will first describe a few factors indicative of the premise of locality before an 
instructive case study will be made of Lacanian thinking to demonstrate this 
supposition. 
In enumerated format the indicative factors are the following: 
 
1) A fundamental or exclusive here-there/now-then dichotomy.  Demonstrative 
of this idea is the basic subject–object distinction, the acceptance of the 
observer-observed system as being endowed with some sense of ontological 
status.  Also the perception of exclusively opposing/differentiated subject 
positions, be it a person as a subject here on toward a person as a subject there, 
or the self as a subject now and the self as a subject later.  The logic inherent 
to the linguistic system is emblematic of the subject-object locality 
assumption.  The idea that distinct objects are signified with particular 
signifiers, and that the interactive states of these signified objects can be 
described by the use of verbs – expresses the rudiments of the basic subject-
object distinction (example: the boy kicks the ball) or the subject-predicate 
differentiation (example:  I decided what to do – ‘decided what to do’ 
representing the predicate).  If language is accepted as an encompassing and 
base form of logic, the premise of locality is supposed.   
Regarding the now-then dichotomy, the attribution of any form of temporal 
exclusivity to experience, reflects a locality supposition.  The accepted inter-
relatedness of ‘here-there’ and ‘now-then’ in this study is based on Einstein’s 
notion of the space-time continuum (formulated in Capra, 1999). 
2) The instance where the biological body is considered to be the base of being, 
the encompassing locus of experience. 
3) A sense of experience delimited and restricted to localized perception. 
4) This factor represents an extrapolation from factor 2:  A decentred state of 
cognitive interpretation rooted in an original medial position. 
5) To accept rationality, as will be defined later, as prototypical or fundamental 
to existence - as such establishing irrationality and its pathological demeanour.  
Is it not clear that the irrational, through its signifier function, assumes 
sensibility by the agreement of the rational?  The irrational always bumps 
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heads with the rational, but importantly – first there was the bump, then there 
was the opposition (rational vs. irrational).  To be sure, the premise of non-
locality can be considered a signification not of a kind of pre-rationality, but 
rather the signification of a per-rationality2, or specifically coined otherwise – 
the intuitive-element (will be explicated in section 4.5).  This thesis does not 
emanate from rationality, rationality is implemented through its conditioned 
signification function (as such configuring its delimitation) to express the 
‘movement’ of locality, thus rendering the rational and the irrational different 
sides of the same intuitive coin, or formulated otherwise – the rational and the 
irrational are mutually constructing significations signifying its own per-
rational beginning and end.  It is through the intuitive-element that the author 
produces the rationality now interacting with the reader, expressed by way of 
localized language.  Language itself will be used to contradict its own subject-
object configuration (section 4.5).  This will, however, only be problematic if 
a premise of locality is assumed (as will be discussed).  In this way the 
author’s use of language does not fall into the trap of positing a premise of 
non-locality while implicitly assuming a premise of locality.  Through the 
intuitive-element (later designated ‘non-local perceptum’) the local and the 
non-local are experientially united – these two dichotomous concepts also only 
taking shape after the bump.  In the case at hand, the bump assumed the form 
of the pertinent quantum physics experiments. 
6) Professing the ‘I’ to be central and/or causative.  The notion that there is some 
type of central and independent state of self, causing action or thought or 
rationality, and so forth.  See Libet’s experimental results (discussed in section 
4.1), which fundamentally question the validity of a ‘causative I’ or a 
‘causative local consciousness’ – even if a premise of locality is assumed. 
7) Positing a mind-body duality.  A fallacious presumption embarrassed by the 
intuitive-element.  Assuming any duality to be ontological reifies conditioned 
rationality as original and culminates in the premise of locality. 
8) Attributing relational primacy to physical interactions (physics) and/or 
psychological interactions (psychology) without acknowledging the principle 
                                                 
2 Per is Latin for ‘through’: per-rationality refers to that which permeates localized movement and              
   localized thought, that which goes through what is rational.  Will be conceptualized in terms of the  
   intuitive-element.  
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of symmetry in terms of non-locality (the idea of symmetry in context of this 
thesis is defined as the phenomenon that certain aspects remain invariant 
during a given process or procedure, or alternatively, the occurrence that 
certain features remain the same while other features change – the 
symmetrical [R]).  The principle of symmetry in the form of the symmetrical 
[I] is central to the hypothesis of non-locality and will be explicated in detail 
in section 6.  This factor is strongly related to factor one. 
 
The nihilistic nature of Lacan’s thought is due to the miscellaneous forms the locality 
supposition adopts in his theory.  The author will now formulate a compendious 
exposition of the assumption of locality simmering beneath the surface of this 
complex theory. 
 
Making reference to the myth of Narcissus (Meyer et al., 1997), the man who quite 
literally fell in love with his own mirror image reflected in the water, Lacan explains 
how the infant tries to discover himself or herself in the image of the other – for 
example in the voice or facial expressions of the mother.  Similar to the way the 
surface of the water acted as a mirror for Narcissus, so the other acts as a mirror for 
the infant - a mirror image with which the infant falls in love with and in a sense 
adopts as his own.  Lacan explains that this primitive identification/projection forever 
alienates the infant from his or her own true subject position.  Lacan (1966/2001) 
writes,  “…and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, 
which will mark with its rigid structure the subject’s entire mental development” (p. 
5).  This ‘assumption of the armour of an alienating identity’ aptly demonstrates the 
assumption of locality in terms of factor 1 and factor 4 (as enumerated above).  Lacan 
holds that this alienation will form the foundation of the rest of the infant’s 
psychological development, and as such he acknowledges the just mentioned locality 
indicators - if there is a sense of decentralized alienation, by implication there must be 
some central departure point (locality) whence such alienation could occur.  
Concerning this implied central departure point we find substantiation for this in a 
discussion of Lacan by MacCannell (1986),  “The Symbolic replaces the indexical 
topography of the body with the iconic imagery of geometry, the graph, the number, 
etc.  Images displace, replace, the body, but their provenance is from the body…” (p. 
8). 
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Here the author (of this thesis) is also alluding to factor 2.  If the body is posited as an 
original state of being, locality is assumed as premise.  A premise of non-locality, 
through necessity of the very logic by which it is constituted, intimates that every 
bodily form assumes an epiphenomenal dynamic in relation towards every other 
bodily form.  Semantically expositioned, the latter refers (in terms of non-locality) not 
only to a ‘link between bodies’ or exclusive dichotomous inter-relations, but also to 
the ‘link of bodies’ or ‘intra-relation’ – the latter proposition will be explicated in 
detail in later sections. 
 
Furthermore, Lacan’s conceptualization of a ‘lack of being’ depends primarily on the 
subject being alienated in the Other during the mirror-stage.  The central importance 
of the Other in relation to the subject is conveyed in Lacan’s (1979) following 
descriptions, “The condition of the subject is dependent on what is being unfolded in 
the place of the Other (p. 203), and, “The Other is the locus in which is situated the 
chain of the signifier that governs whatever may be made present of the subject – it is 
the field of that living being in which the subject has to appear” (p. 193).  
 
Thus it should be clear that the Other forms a focal point for all perceptual 
experiences concerning human cognition.  In fact, what Lacan essentially describes is 
the substitution of one centre for another – the Other for the individual’s own body 
(alternatively the Other for the ego).  Accordingly, it might be said that a new centre 
has been established that can be understood as decentralised only from the original 
frame of reference on which its formulation is dependent, or described otherwise, 
accepting two differential positions, the subject on toward the Other - from the 
perspective of the other position (note – not Other, but the ‘other one’) each position 
can be regarded as decentralized or alienated as to certain executive functions.  Thus 
factor 1, factor 2 and factor 4 are indicated. 
   
Even if the Other were to be formulated in circular terms to express the signification 
function of a signifier, it must analogously be remembered that strictly speaking, the 
Copernican heliocentric universe was not sun-centred!  In order to account for the 
observation of the sun Copernicus used three circles to describe the motion of the 
earth: one for the earth, one for the central point of the earth’s orbit, and one for 
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another central point for the circle of the central point of the earth’s orbit.  The central 
point for the circle of the earth’s central point in turn revolved around the sun (Pine, 
1988).  Through these deferents and epicycles even the circular Other becomes caught 
in centring.  A dynamic centre placed on the rim of a revolving circle/sphere is a 
centre nonetheless. 
 
The fundamental and ultimately alienating pre-eminence Lacan ascribes to the 
language function is further indicative of the premise of locality (see factor 1).  The 
prototypical importance Lacan attaches to language in terms of the subject-object 
logic (here-there logic) can readily be gleaned from the discussion in section 3.1; his 
emphasis on language formed the foundation of his critique directed towards the 
psycho-analytic establishment for ignoring the nature and functions of the symbolic 
order, specifically the function of language (Lacan, 1966/2001). 
 
From the above it should be clear that the supposition of locality can assume 
multifarious forms, and is not by any means encompassed by the central ‘I’ 
assumption (related to factor 6).  In this category of the locality assumption the author 
pre-emptively postulates that all of the following schools of psychology can readily be 
placed: depth psychological approaches, behavioural and learning theory approaches 
and person orientated approaches.  In all of these approaches the author expects at 
least one of the factors enumerated above to be surreptitiously camouflaged or 
explicitly expounded.  Consider for example Freudian theory.  Freud radically 
undermined the lofty perch on which man had placed the rational self-image, with his 
revelation that below or beyond the rational mind existed an overwhelmingly potent 
repository of non-rational forces (the id).  So already with Freud we find the idea that 
the sense of self (the ego) is a frail and fragile epiphenomenon constituted by a 
convolution of reaction formations and delusions, the notion that the ego is not a 
primary state of being but an illusory derivative (correlate with factor 6).  Thus Freud 
substituted the conscious human ego with a seething caldron of irrational, bestial 
impulses – postulating an unconscious state of determination.  As such the ego was 
dethroned, but the newly inaugurated unconscious forces still accepted their 
provenance from the biological body with its long phylogenetic tail.  Psycho-dynamic 
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theory injected fresh content into the locality supposition, but remained firmly rooted 
in the arid soil of the locality premise (see factor 2). 
 
Whether it is called the ego, the ideal self, organismic potential, the existential self, 
the unconscious or the self-concept, the domain of psychology is rife with the 
assumption of locality.  These multifarious conceptualizations represent out-trodden 
variations of an ancient Ptolemic theme, or described otherwise, forever fumbling 
differentiations of a geocentric universe supposition.  These variations and 
differentiations are conjoined by an assumption thread that accepts the following 
antonomasia – ‘locality centric psychology’. 
 
‘Locality centric psychology’ is ignorant of its own ignorance – she aspires the 
dictum: ‘I don’t know that I don’t know’.  For the one who assumes locality as 
exclusive or original, desperately and frightfully clings to rational ‘knowing’, clutches 
at the objectifications (will be explicated in section 4.4) that allow him the existence 
as subject – even if this subject position impersonates the religious sheep form, 
moreover, especially the bloody kind. 
Alternatively, if such a one has not learnt to cling well, or if the required grasp 
exceeds his reach, the conglomeration of rationality and emotionality has been kind 
enough to lend her its own form of subject – he now becomes designated neurotic, 
psychotic or, if one could imagine – mad. 
 
The Galilean telescope has come back to haunt us, and it has assumed the form of 
quantum physics.  The quantum telescope does not magnify distant localities, rather it 
penetrates the mirage of locality.  This telescope is the harbinger of non-locality. 
Our journey has now reached the fringes of the flat earth. 
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Section 4 
4.   Non-local perceptum 
 
 4. 1   The physiology of locality 
 
Accepting non-locality as premise reconfigures traditional perspectives concerning 
rationality and emotion, consequently unveiling the pre-eminence of a hitherto mere 
fascination of the western mind – the intuitive-element.  In this section the author will 
examine the character of this reconfiguration and the physiological plinth that 
supports the distinction between what will be designated the rational-element 
(abbreviated – [R]-element) and the emotional-element ([E]-element); through this 
explication alluding to the sine qua non of the intuitive-element ([I]-element). 
 
The author posits that the movement of localized form informs the possibility of 
rationality.  Localized patterns characterize the dynamic mechanisms of biological 
matter (interacting proteins and biochemicals) that allow the notion of rationality to be 
conceptualized (the organic brain), indeed, the very suffusion that organizes any 
conceptualization.  These patterns of ‘movement’, often unnecessarily translated as 
causative interactions, provide the ‘common sense’ framework for interpretive and 
communicative experience.  Consider the following instructive elaboration in point. 
 
An infant interacts with the environment.  Say the infant stretches out his/her hand in 
an attempt to grasp a ball, his/her hand bumps the ball and the ball slowly rolls in the 
direction of the force applied by the infant’s arm-hand.  The ball continues to roll until 
it comes to rest against a wall – the wall prevents the ball from rolling any further.  
Thus the essential pith of what is rational becomes established.  This basic sequence 
of events, or any other similar interaction patterns, represents the rudiments of 
localized movement conditioning, it forms the basis of what the matured healthy 
cognition will accept as logical.  From this primitive experience, more elaborative 
patterns of rationality develop – for example: a bowler bowls a ball at a batsman, the 
ball swings in the air as a consequence of air resistance being greater on the rough 
side of the ball, the ball hits a crack in the pitch, thus deviating from its expected 
swinging course – causing the batsman to miss the ball with his bat, which allows the 
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ball to hit the stumps – the force of the momentum uprooting two of the stumps.  All 
this action is then translated into a logical game format expressed in terms of agreed 
number and letter signification.  Ultimately rendering the concepts winner and loser 
rational in their implied meaning. 
 
But our rationality, contingent upon the movement of locality, might have been very 
different.  The infant might have bumped the ball, but instead of the ball rolling in the 
direction of the bump-force, the ball might have moved vertically into the air, 
eventually hitting the ceiling, but moving through the ceiling because physical objects 
sometimes moves through other physical objects (in this other ‘might have been’ 
reality).  Or in terms of the cricket example – it might have been impossible for 
bowled balls to move in any other way except in a straight line, because air resistance 
only allowed bowled balls to move in a straight line.  It might have been impossible 
for any batsman to miss a ball, rather it would have been a question of how inaccurate 
the batsman could hit the ball into the ground, and as spectators we would enjoy 
watching such artistry because seeing balls being hit inaccurately into the ground is 
experienced as fun. 
 
It was Newton’s observation of the movement of localities that provided the guideline 
for his formulation of the three laws of motion.  Consider Newton’s first law of 
motion – every body continues in its state of rest or of uniform speed in a straight line 
unless it is compelled to change that state by a net force acting on it; and his third law 
of motion – whenever one object exerts a force on a second object, the second exerts 
an equal and opposite force on the first.  But what if the physical universe Newton 
observed behaved in a different fashion?  What if Newton had bumped the ball when 
he was a baby and the ball just kept on accelerating without little Newton continuing 
to bump the ball?  What if Newton had picked up an apple and the apple’s weight 
kept on increasing the longer Newton held the apple in his hand?  It would be 
reasonable to expect that Newton would have formulated his laws of motion in a very 
different manner.  For example, the first law of motion might have read as follows: 
every body continues in its state of accelerated speed in a straight line with only 
certain forces capable of decelerating the moving body; and the third law of motion: 
whenever one object exerts a force on a second object, the second exerts an 
exponentially increasing and opposite force on the first. 
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The point is the following: Our sensory experience of the moving world might have 
been very different, we might not even have had such a thing as sensory experience or 
movement of separate bodies!  As it is, the way we have experienced the world, or - 
experienced our experience, has laid down a matrix of expectations that imbue our 
sense of rationality, or more precisely, construct something such as rationality with all 
its pattern and principle configurations.  Rationality is a function of the movement of 
locality, hence the [R]-element. 
 
The pattern of the [R]-element is constructive and pervasive.  Consider the following:  
the double-helix DNA structure appears to be fundamental to most living organisms, 
moreover, genes (and their constitutive nucleic acids) seem to be the basic building 
blocks of all life.  There exists a great deal of similarity in brain organization across 
the various vertebrate species.  All vertebrates have a hindbrain, midbrain, and 
forebrain, and within each of the three divisions, one finds the same basic structures 
and neural pathways (Shepherd, 1983).  The great diversity of life in the physical 
universe is typified by certain common biological adaptive mechanisms– many 
organisms posses a basic respiratory system, be it of a terrestrial or aquatic character, 
most living organisms posses evolved biological mechanisms which allow for the 
uptake and excretion of some form of nutrient; also in order for life to proliferate, 
biological species have developed reproductive systems ranging on a continuum from 
very basic to extremely complex.  The author will now investigate the Homo sapiens 
brain, during which the [R]-element and the [E]-element will be succinctly 
differentiated as to their physiological provenance.       
 
Over millions of years of evolution, the mammalian brain grew from the bottom up, 
with its higher centres developing as elaborations of lower, more ancient parts; the 
evolutionary course of the developing brain can roughly be retraced in the human 
embryo (Goleman, 1996).  At the apex of the spinal cord we find the brain stem, the 
most primitive part of the brain.  This root brain regulates basic life functions like 
breathing and the metabolism of the body’s organs, as well as controlling stereotyped 
reactions and movements.  From this primitive root developed the limbic system, 
constituting the essential (but not encompassing) layers of the emotion-related brain 
(Goleman, 1996).  Key limbic structures are the amygdala (of which there are two) 
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and the hippocampus.  The hippocampus is involved in registering perceptual patterns 
and provides a keen memory for context, which is vital for emotional meaning.  The 
amygdala is the specialist structure for emotional matters, functioning mainly to 
attribute emotional significance to events.  Joseph (1993) describes the case of young 
man whose amygdala had been surgically removed to control severe seizures.  After 
the operation he became completely uninterested in people and distanced himself 
from those around him.  He was perfectly capable of conversation, yet he was no 
longer able to recognize close friends, relatives, or even his mother.  When his friends 
and family became upset about his indifference, he remained apathetic and 
emotionally blunt in the face of their anguish.  He seemed to have lost all recognition 
of feeling, as well as any feeling about feelings.  Accordingly the amygdala appears to 
play a central role in the human experience of the [E]-element.   
 
From the limbic system evolved the neocortex, the great bulb of convoluted tissues 
that make up the top layers of the brain.  The neocortex, the seat of thought, contains 
the centres that put together and comprehend what the senses perceive (Goleman, 
1996).  The neocortex allows us to think about feeling and is the facilitator of art, 
civilization and culture.  As such the neocortex can be considered a major ingredient 
of the anthropomorphized [R]-element, the biological occurrence that allows for the 
formulation of the rational. 
 
Essential to the understanding of localized [E]- and [R]-perception, and 
objectification (will be explicated in section 4.2), are the structural brain dynamics 
involved in stimuli processing.  Concerning conscious action and explicit memory, 
the following neural pathway is involved.  The eye, ear, and other sensory organs 
transmit signals to the thalamus (a type of relay centre), which are then relayed to the 
sensory processing areas of the neocortex, where they are synthesized into the objects 
we perceive.  These representations are then shuttled to the surrounding cortical 
regions, which, in turn send further processed representations to the limbic system, 
specifically the amygdala and the hippocampus.  In this system the amygdala is 
functional in orchestrating a response (due to its ‘emotional’ impetus), while the 
hippocampus is essentially involved in memory formation.  The hippocampus 
communicates back with the surrounding cortical areas, which communicate with the 
neocortex (LeDoux, 1996).  This pathway where the hippocampus is central, is 
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constitutive of explicit (declarative) memory and is mediated by a single memory 
system – the temporal lobe memory-system (Graff, Squire & Mandler, 1984).  The 
maintenance of the memory over the short term (a few years), requires that the 
temporal lobe memory-system be intact, either because components of this system 
store the memory trace or because the trace is maintained by the interactions between 
the temporal lobe system and the neocortex. 
 
With regards to implicit memory and unconscious action, LeDoux (1993) discovered 
a smaller bundle of neurons that lead directly from the thalamus to the amygdala (in 
addition to those going through the larger path of neurons to the neocortex).  As such 
the amygdala can receive direct signals from the senses and start a response before 
they are fully registered by the neocortex.  According to LeDoux the amygdala system 
can act independently of the neocortex – the latter was demonstrated with an 
experiment on rats.  According to LeDoux (1996), the direct thalamo-amygdala path 
is a shorter and thus faster transmission route than the pathway from the thalamus 
through the cortex to the amygdala.  The direct pathway allows the organism to begin 
to respond to potentially dangerous stimuli before it is consciously aware of the 
pertinence of the stimuli; as such obvious survival advantages are conferred to the 
organism.  This pathway represents the origins of a typical fear conditioned response 
exemplified by the following: racing heart, taut stomach, high blood pressure, clammy 
hands and feet, and dry mouth (LeDoux). 
   
In traumatic situations, implicit and explicit memory-systems (the two different 
pathways discussed above), function in parallel.  If a person is exposed at some later 
stage to stimuli that were present during the trauma, both systems will most likely be 
activated.  Through the explicit memory-system (the hippocampal-system) the person 
will remember what he/she was doing, who he/she was with during the trauma, and 
will also remember the impersonal fact that the situation was unpleasant. Through the 
implicit memory system (the amygdala-system), the stimuli will cause the person’s 
muscles to tense up, blood pressure and heart rate to change, and hormones to be 
released, among other bodily responses.  Because these systems can be activated by 
the same stimuli and function at the same time, these two memory functions can be 
considered to be part of one unified memory function (LeDoux, 1996). 
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From the above discussion it appears that the [R]-element, closely linked to the 
movement of locality, accepts an amalgamated relation to the [E]-element through 
their mutual biological substrate (the brain) and shared neurological circuitry, whence 
their conception and experience emanate.  How is the reader to understand the 
author’s notion of ‘an amalgamated relation’?  Beyond a nice formulation, how would 
one dissect its meaning as to a premise of non-locality? 
  
Tooby and Cosmides (1990) argue that emotions involve situations that have occurred 
over and over throughout human evolutionary history (escaping from danger, finding 
food and mates), and cause humans to appraise present events in terms of their 
ancestral past - so the structure of the past imposes an interpretive landscape on the 
present.  From such a line of argumentation, the pivotal role of the conditioning 
dynamics of the movement of locality as to emotion can readily be gleaned.  LeDoux 
(1996) describes emotions as follows, “… I believe the basic building blocks of 
emotions are neural systems that mediate behavioural interactions with the 
environment, particularly behaviours that take care of fundamental problems of 
survival (ex – protection from danger, finding food)”  (p. 125). 
 
Thus a very primitive base for emotional genesis is implied, and from this 
interpretation it can be logically deduced that the myriad forms of emotional 
expression/response is in some definite sense associated with the development of the 
higher areas of the brain (example– the neocortex).  Goleman (1996) writes: 
 
As we proceed up the phylogenetic scale from reptile to rhesus to human, the 
sheer mass of the neocortex increases; with that increase comes a geometric 
rise in the interconnections in the brain circuitry.  The larger the number of 
such connections, the greater the range of possible responses.  The neocortex 
allows for the subtlety and complexity of emotional life, … (p. 11) 
 
Damasio (1994) made careful studies of the precise cognitive functions that are 
impaired in patients with damage to the prefrontal–amygdala circuit (part of the 
hippocampul-system).  The prefrontal lobes form part of the neocortex and appear to 
be nucleic to all emotional experience and interpretation.  The experimental results 
showed these patient’s decision-making skills to be terribly flawed, yet they exhibited 
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no deterioration in IQ or any cognitive ability.  Despite their intact intelligence, they 
made disastrous choices in their business and personal lives; and according to 
Damasio they could obsess endlessly over decisions so simple as when to make an 
appointment.  As such it seems evident that inside the physiological brain the 
emotional circuitry is dynamically involved in the rational circuitry in terms of every 
day decision-making capabilities.  These two circuits are in some sense anatomically 
and physiologically distinguishable, yet are in a very definite sense intricately 
intertwined.  Thus the author’s notion of ‘an amalgamated relation’ is to be 
understood for the formulation of the [R]-element and the [E]-element. 
 
If the premise of locality had been assumed, the biological body would readily be 
posited as the root base that becomes conditioned, the rubicon of experience that can 
never look past its own subjective conditioning, always challenging its conditioning 
from within its conditioning and through its conditioning.  As such presumptuously 
relegating experience to the deprived existence of basic social constructionism tenets. 
 
From the premise of non-locality one is confronted by a very different provenance of 
rationality and emotion.  A provenance of [R]-element and [E]-element that proclaims 
all rubicon and Archimedean points illusory projections of ignorant ignorance.  The 
author is referring to the postulate of the [I]-element.  This [I]-element will be 
elucidated in the following two sections. 
 
But before the author proceeds with this elucidation, an important brain physiology 
experiment performed by Benjamin Libet needs to be expositioned for consideration 
in terms of the premise of locality (specifically certain assumptions of locality that are 
rendered problematic by Libet’s experimental results).   
 
Libet, Wright and Gleason (1982) investigated the ‘Bereitschafts’ – (BP) or 
‘readiness’ – potential (RP), this is a schalp-recorded potential change that starts up to 
a second or more before a self-paced motor act (Gilden, Vaughan, & Costa, 1966).  
This ‘readiness-potential’ appeared to provide an electrophysiological indicator of 
neural activity that specifically precedes and may initiate freely voluntary movement 
(thus implying that voluntary movement is not so voluntary). Plainly stated, they 
investigated what might be called ‘free will’; to what extend does the ‘conscious I’ 
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determine his/her own actions or decisions.  Is the rational ‘I’ causative, or is it in 
some neurological sense ‘caused’?  The study investigated ‘readiness-potentials’ (RP) 
under conditions designed to minimize or eliminate all external factors (example – 
time limit) that might affect the immediate initiation of a freely voluntary motor act.  
The analysis included comparative experiments involving ‘self-initiated’ voluntary 
acts, ‘pre-set’ motor acts, and ‘skin stimuli at unknown times’.  The results were 
astounding. 
 
In the series with ‘skin stimuli at unknown times’, preparation to move was 
eliminated, but all other conditions, including those of changes in processes 
associated with attention and cognition, were as similar as possible to those in the 
self-initiated voluntary acts series.  The results for the ‘skin stimuli’ series indicated 
no or relatively small event-preceding slow potential shifts.  This was in clear contrast 
to the ‘pre-set’ and ‘self-initiated’ series, where the ‘RPs’, generated by neuronal 
processes specifically involved in the preparation to perform a motor act, preceded the 
pre-set and free voluntary act.  Libet et al. (1982) states: 
 
There would seem to be no doubt that an ‘RP’ can precede a ‘freely voluntary’ 
(endogenous) act, one that is essentially free of the external constraints in the 
usual ‘self-paced’ studies, and is independently ‘self-initiated’ and even 
spontaneously capricious in origin. (p. 331) 
 
From Libet’s experimental results the dubiousness of assuming the [R]-element 
conditioned ‘I’ as original to primary being becomes evident (see factor 6 in section 
3.2).  By imposing on the logic of subject-object ontological status and personifying 
causality in the form of the rational ‘I’, we are entangling ourselves in a glutinous web 
of locality.  The latter experiment does not evidence non-locality, instead it questions 
central locality tenets – tenets that bespeak a servile abyss of repetitive circles, 
exemplified by the monotonous history of mankind suffocating amidst thematic 
boredom.     
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4. 2   Birth and the mirror experience 
 
The uneasiness and motor unco-ordination of the neo-natal months is formulated by 
Lacan (1966/2001) as ‘a real specific prematurity of birth in man’ (p. 5).  It appears 
that the infant has no proper sense of being separate from the world or the mother, and 
certainly no clearly identifiable self-reflective state of cognition.  Burr (1995) writes 
that all sensation and experience originally appear as a complete whole for the infant, 
who is still bound up in a symbiotic relationship with the mother, lacking a 
fundamental sense of being separate from her.  Or as Marini (1992) puts it, the child 
has only a very slowly dawning sense of distinction between the world, others, and 
the self.  This notion of undifferentiated infantile experiences is suggestively 
supported by brain anatomical studies, which indicate that certain brain structures, 
particularly the hippocampus (crucial for narrative memories) and the neocortex (seat 
of rational thought), are not fully formed at birth and developmentally lag behind in 
relation to the amygdala, which reaches maturity very quickly in the neonatal brain 
(Goleman, 1996; Rudy & Morledge, 1994).  Furthermore, the phenomenon of 
‘transvitism’, where the child strikes another and says he has been struck, or cries 
when he sees another child fall (Goleman, 1996; Lacan, 1966/2001), can be 
considered to reveal the symptoms of an undifferentiated infant world. 
 
The undifferentiated experience of the flailing infant beautifully correlates 
(importantly - does not ‘equate’) with the basic character of non-locality.  Non-
locality purports no exclusive experience of subject-object, no prototypical different 
or opposing subject forms, rather non-locality includes a Subject – Subject (S – S) 
state of being, simultaneously differentiated and undifferentiated states of localized 
being.  S – S is instantaneously here and there, perfectly self and other – an essential 
infraction of conceptual space-time.  For clarity purposes one might syntactically say 
that the differentiated body of the infant experiences the world in an undifferentiated 
fashion, whereas undifferentiated being experiences differentiated form.  Logically 
formulated, S – S represents rational irrationality or irrational rationality, which by its 
very formulation might perfectly well be described as illogical.  The logic of S – S 
will be explicated in section 4.5 where the nature of the associated intuitive-element 
will be discussed.  In the subsequent disquisition the dynamics of the process of 
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objectification will be investigated.  By objectification the author is referring to the 
cognitive capability clearly evinced by the human species - the ability to recognize the 
self in the mirror, awareness of the self as ephemeral and distinct subject, the 
cognitive capacity that allows for the formulation of ‘observer-observed’ or 
‘participator’ terminology, the unambiguous possibility of self-reflective states.  
Human objectification will be correlated with animal cognition (insofar as we 
interpret animal behaviour in controlled research studies and assume that animals 
experience some form of experience) to determine perceptive/cognitive similarities 
and differences that through comparison draws a more vivid picture of both. 
 
Objectification implies the synchronous emergence of self-awareness and other-
awareness.  This is a point supported by Gopnik and Meltzoff (1994) who argue that 
neither self- or other-awareness precedes the other, but rather that the two forms of 
awareness develop in tandem through the same mechanisms.  The idea of 
developmental parallelism as opposed to the developmental derivation of the concept 
of other from that of self, or vice versa, is also consistent with Lewis’s (1994) 
discussion of the self-socializing role of self-evaluative emotions (e.g., shame and 
pride) that emerge coincident with the first internalisation of social standards.  
Empirical evidence that supports the notion of a synchronous emergence of self- and 
other-awareness rests on cross-sectional findings of a consistency between a) mirror 
self-recognition as an indication of self-awareness, and b) self-conscious behaviour 
when in the centre of other’s attention (Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger & Weiss, 1989), 
empathic behaviour directed toward a victim of distress (Bischof-Köhler cited in 
Asendorph, Warkentin & Baudonniére, 1996; Bischof-Köhler, 1991), and 
communicating with unfamiliar peers via the synchronic imitation (will be explicated 
later in this section) of their object use (Asendorph & Baudonniére, 1993), as 
indications of other-awareness.  These consistencies were found for the age of 18 –20 
months when about half of the children of a normal sample can be shown to recognize 
themselves in a mirror (Asendorph et al., 1996).  Furthermore, Kagan (1981) 
describes a dramatic increase in a child’s social-cognitive competence during the 
second year of life, and according to Kagan these changes are indicative of the onset 
of self-awareness and other-awareness. 
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The developmental formulation of objectification as a dyadic phenomenon, is an idea 
espoused by various prominent theorists of the 20th century, for example:  Vygotsky’s 
(1962) notion of ‘intermental’, Fairburn’s (1954) of the infant’s innate interpersonal 
relatedness, and MacMurray’s (1961) of the field of the personal, as well as Sullivan’s 
(1953) of the interpersonal field.  
 
Thus, through the process of objectification, the infant becomes aware of 
himself/herself as a subject in tandem with becoming aware of other people as distinct 
and separate subjects.  As such S – S becomes differentiated as to the perception and 
conceptualization (in the case of the matured and healthy human cognition) of distinct 
and separate subject positions, which can be encoded into the basic form of S – S: O, 
formulated in words as ‘dichotomous subject objectification’ (any localized form 
represents a differentiation of S – S, here the discussion is specifically concerned with 
localized differentiation through human cognition).  This process of objectification 
during infancy is illustrated in diagram form below (diagram developed by the 
author): 
 
 
 
 
 
Subsequently the author will explore the specific psychological mechanisms that 
might be involved in this process of objectification.  To this end the author will 
examine the research domain of mirror self-recognition, which has received much 
attention as a possible index of self-awareness, self-consciousness, and social 
development in humans and infrahumans (Damon & Hart, 1982; Lewis & Brooks-
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Gunn, 1979, 1984) and is the only widely accepted assessment paradigm in the study 
of the infant’s sense of self (Damon & Hart, 1992). 
 
Research indicates that normal children self-recognize by 18 months of age on 
average (Hart & Fegley, 1994; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Neuman & Hill, 1976).  
Other than the great apes (primarily common chimpanzees and orangutans), non-
human primates have not demonstrated unequivocal evidence of mirror self-
recognition (Anderson, 1984; Gallup, 1991; Parker, Mitchell & Boccia, 1994).  
Various theoretical models have been developed to explain mirror self-recognition, 
for example: Gallup’s self-concept theory, Guillaume’s and Mitchell’s inductive 
theory, Parker’s facial imitation theory, Merleau-ponty’s, Anderson’s, and Loveland’s 
perspective-taking theory, and Byrne’s possible world’s theory (Mitchell, 1993b).  
According to Mitchell (1997a), most of these theories appear to be reducible to two 
theories – Gallup’s self-awareness (self-concept) theory (designated Gallup’s theory), 
and the kinaesthetic-visual matching theory (designated KVM-theory) – or make 
predictions that are contrary to evidence.  Hence the author will commence the 
objectification explication using these two theories as platform.   
 
Gallup’s (Gallup, 1985; Gallup & Povinelli, 1993) theory holds that an organism’s 
self-awareness is an explanation for passing the ‘mark test’ (used as index for mirror 
self-recognition).  The theory assumes that passing the mark test is an indication of 
self-recognition and that self-recognition is an indication that the organism can 
become the object of its own attention and is therefore self-aware.  Gallup 
extrapolates form this basic self-awareness to explain a variety of other psychological 
capacities, including amongst others – theory of mind, empathy and pretending.  In 
Gallup’s view, organisms that are self-aware are aware of their own mental states, and 
model conspecifics’ mental states on the basis of their own mental states.  In section 
4.3 Gallup’s theory will be related to Lacan’s description of the infant’s experience of 
the mirror. 
 
The KVM-theory (as expositioned in Mitchell, 1997b) was initially formulated by 
Guillaume (1926/1971) and elaborated by Parker (1991) and Mitchell (1992, 1993a, 
1993b) – this theory claims that passing the mark test is a result of kinaesthetic-visual 
matching - defined as the capacity for matching between the kinaesthetic, 
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proprioceptive, and somasthetic sensations of one’s own position and one’s own 
bodily feeling, and visual images of one’s own body and others’ bodies.  According to 
Mitchell (1997a) kinaesthetic-visual matching would seem to provide the capabilities 
for activities (in addition to bodily imitation and mirror self-recognition) which 
require matching between self and others, such as bodily pretense, recognition that 
one is being imitated, and planning; and appears to be a necessary ingredient for 
intentional (planned) deception, empathy, and perspective taking.  An organism with 
kinaesthetic-visual matching can not only reproduce other’s actions in pretense, but 
also presumably can translate from its own visual mental images of itself into action 
in planning, and from another’s actions to its own similar actions to recognize that it 
is being imitated. 
 
Mitchell (1997b) analysed the two theories and stated that: 
 
…the kinaesthetic-visual matching model is conceptually coherent and makes 
accurate and reasonable predictions; and that the self-concept model (Gallup’s 
theory) is conceptually incoherent and makes predictions from premises that 
are inaccurate. (p. 18) 
 
In this analysis Mitchell identifies three problems with Gallup’s theory: a) Gallup 
identifies the self-awareness necessary for mirror self-recognition with any and all 
other forms of self-awareness, yet provides no evidence or argument that recognizing 
oneself in a mirror results in or requires being aware of one’s own mental states b) 
Gallup’s model expects that self-aware organisms extrapolate from their monitoring 
their own mental states to others’ mental states, yet does not specify which mental 
states are monitored c) Gallup’s model assumes that simply being self-aware (in the 
form of self-recognition) necessarily leads one to extrapolate from one’s own mental 
states to understand other’s mental states.  Mitchell then discusses evidence which is 
at variance with the predictions of Gallup’s theory, for example: chimpanzees who 
self-recognize fail to show signs of attribution of even the simplest mental states (e.g., 
seeing) and normal children generally pass the mark test well before they attribute 
mental states to others (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Parker et al., 1994; Povinelli & Eddy, 
1996).   
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Mitchell (1997a) focuses his evaluation of the two theories on a little discussed group: 
autistic children.  According to Mitchell autistic children present a good test case for 
the theories because they frequently pass the mark test and have been tested on 
measures of imitation (of various forms), recognition of being imitated, pretense 
(bodily and other), intentional deception, empathy, theory of mind, planning, 
perspective-taking, and theory of mind.  Mitchell demonstrates through the 
predictions from the two theories and evidence of the predicted psychological 
concomitants in autistic children, that Gallup’s theory is inaccurate and that the 
KVM-theory is accurate.  Gallup’s theory predictively attributed the psychological 
capabilities ‘theory of mind’, ‘intentional deception’, and ‘empathy’ to autistic 
children, thus being at odds with the empirical research findings.  KVM-theory was 
consistent with research findings. 
   
Mitchell (1993a, 1993b) writes that the KVM-theory is, of the two, the only 
theoretical viable one.  Swartz (1997) holds that Gallup’s requirement of ‘self-
awareness’ for mirror self-recognition is an extreme and unwarranted position.  She 
argues that mirror self-recognition does not imply a self-concept, and that it is not 
appropriate to treat it theoretically in the comparative domain (animals) as a necessary 
indicator of a sense of self.  Furthermore, Gergeley (1997) also critiques Gallup’s 
theory and states that the developmental synchrony prediction based on Gallup’s 
model of mirror self-recognition does not hold. 
 
The equivalence between kinaesthesis and vision for passing the mark test has been 
independently discussed in various but fundamentally related forms (cited by 
Mitchell, 1997b) in Priel (1985), Meltzoff (1993), Kennedy (1992) and Parker (1991).  
The notion that matching between kinaesthesis and vision is necessary for both mirror 
self-recognition and bodily imitation is discussed by Wallon (1954/1984).  
Kinaesthetic-visual matching is possible because the parietal region of the brain’s left 
hemisphere houses visuokinaesthetic motor engrams, where motor acts may be 
programmed (Heilman, Rothi & Valenstein, 1982).  These ‘engrams’ co-ordinate 
between one’s own kinaesthetic experiences and visual experiences of oneself and 
others.  Injuries to the left parietal region result in ideomotor apraxia in which people 
show impaired imitation of others’ bodily gestures (Heilman, Rothi & Valenstein, 
1982; Goldenberg, 1995).  Taking the physiological brain dynamics and the basic 
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suppositions of KVM-theory into consideration, it follows as a logical deduction that 
one would expect a significant relation between mirror self-recognition and imitation 
abilities.  And indeed, there is now clear evidence of a connection between having 
gestural imitation abilities and passing the mark test in normal functioning humans 
(Hart & Fegley, 1994) and in autistic children (Mitchell, 1997a).  Corroboratively, 
several chimpanzees, an orangutang, a bonobo, and a gorilla tested for both 
bodily/gestural imitation and mirror self-recognition provide evidence for both 
capacities (Custance & Bard, 1994; Hyat and Hopkins, 1994; Miles, 1994; Patterson 
& Cohn, 1994).   
 
The important factor in both mirror self-recognition and imitation is contingency, but 
the contingencies involved in the two processes differ in significant ways (Custance & 
Bard, 1994).  In the case of mirror self-recognition the contingency is recognized, 
whereas with imitation the contingency is in a sense produced.  When the infant 
cognition has matured to such a level where he/she has acquired both these capacities 
(normal children start recognizing that they are being imitated at 14 months [Meltzoff, 
1990a]) the synthesis of these two processes allows for a kind of pre-verbal 
communicative interaction - the synchronic imitation of each other’s object usage 
(Baudonniére, 1988; Eckerman, Davis & Didow, 1989; Eckerman & Stein, 1990; 
Nadel & Fontein, 1989).  In synchronic imitation (Asendorph et al., 1996) two 
children simultaneously play with the same type of object in a similar, though not 
always identical way.  They regularly look at the partner and seem to realize and 
enjoy the reciprocity inherent in their joint play, as indicated by the positive mood, 
and they often begin and end the object use at the same time or shift to a different 
activity almost synchronically.  The reciprocity involved in the activity distinguishes 
synchronic imitation from simple immediate imitation (Baudonniére, Werebe, Michel, 
& Liégeois, 1988) and from parallel play - playing with similar toys near to the 
partner, with some visual regard of the partner but without clear indications of 
interaction (Mueller & Brenner, 1977; Parten, 1932). 
 
Research conducted by Asendorph and Baudonniére (1993), investigated the 
relationship between mirror self-recognition and synchronic imitation.  They 
systematically paired unfamiliar 19-month-old children in terms of their mirror self-
recognition status and studied the extend to which they engaged in synchronic 
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imitation.  Their results were as follows: unfamiliar 19-month-old children who 
passed the mirror self-recognition test became engaged in long phases of synchronic 
imitation if their partner was also a recognizer.  In mixed dyads in which a recognizer 
and a non-recognizer were paired, fewer long imitation sequences resulted, and the 
average length of these sequences was shorter than in dyads in which both partners 
were recognizers.  Dyads consisting only of non-recognizers showed only very few 
and short phases of synchronic imitation.  Recognizers tended to initiate synchronic 
imitation more often than non-recognizers by inviting them to join play or by joining 
the play of the partner.  The researchers thus concluded that mirror self-recognition is 
associated with sustained synchronic imitation as a form of pre-verbal communication 
with an unfamiliar peer and suggests that the association can be interpreted in terms of 
a synchrony between self- and other-awareness (thus further substantiating the S – S: 
O model).  Using a different methodological approach, these results were replicated 
by Asendorph et al. (1996).   
 
The ability to recognize contingency (mirror self-recognition), to produce contingency 
(imitation), and to partake in synchronic imitation, will conjunctively be designated – 
the phenomenon of symmetrical states.  To further elucidate the phenomenon of 
symmetrical states, the author will comparatively investigate the anomaly exhibited 
by some organisms that demonstrate the ability of object correspondence (ability to 
locate objects using mirrors), yet do not recognize themselves in the mirror (Mitchell, 
1993b). 
 
Consider research conducted by Loveland (1984) concerning the development of 
linguistic self-reference in young children.  Loveland observed nine children 
longitudinally in a mirror task.  In the mirror task the child was first asked to name or 
identify the self-image, then to find a toy that the examiner introduced silently above 
and behind the child’s shoulder.  Children began the study at ages between 20 and 27 
months and completed it when the criteria were met relating to language 
development.  Many of the children who were able to identify themselves in the 
mirror, nevertheless failed to find the toy (object correspondence).  Loveland (1986) 
states, “Children capable of identifying the self-image or of clearly using the mirror 
for self-inspection may nevertheless fail to perceive correctly the location of reflected 
objects other than the self ” (p. 11) 
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Loveland interprets the confusion exhibited by the infants in mirror experiments as 
being a consequence of their unfamiliarity with mirror surfaces in terms of the 
specific properties and affordances of mirrors.  But the experiment also substantiates 
another point.  If the phenomenon of symmetrical states is taken into consideration, 
the results are perfectly sensible.  What the infant identifies as his/her self-image is 
primarily related to the experience of contingency, while the task of finding the toy 
involves no immediate experience of contingency or symmetrical movement.  The toy 
finding task is more closely related to the ability of object correspondence (using the 
mirror to find objects), an interpretation which accords with Loveland’s (1986) 
postulate that infants initially do not fully comprehend the special properties of 
mirrors (in the sense that the infant can’t use mirrors to find objects if the infant 
doesn’t know how mirrors work). 
   
Papousek and Papousek (1974) found that 5-month-old infants are able to respond 
differentially to a simultaneous-contingent videotape and a pre-recorded tape of the 
self.  Research conducted by Lewis and Brooks-Gunn (1979) demonstrated that even 
the youngest infants in their videotape studies (9 months) were able to respond 
differentially to contingent (simultaneous) and non-contingent (pre-recorded) video 
stimulation, preferring to watch the non-contingent attentively but to play with the 
contingent (self-controlled) image.  Watson (1994) showed that infants can make use 
of contingency information to distinguish between televised images of their own 
moving legs and the moving legs of another infant. 
 
From the above discussion it becomes clear that the phenomenon of symmetrical 
states is fundamentally linked to the process of objectification.  The question now 
remains: How does the infant cognition progress from experiencing symmetrical 
states, to experiencing him/her self as a separate and distinct subject?  The remainder 
of this section will be dedicated to answering the latter question by analysing the 
construction process involved in establishing the dichotomous subject objectification 
(S – S: O). 
 
Much of mirror self-recognition research has been directed to how a person comes to 
recognize the self, but from a non-local perspective the question is rather, how does it 
 
 53
come to be that the self as a subject is constructed.  From the assumption of non-
locality follows that we do not have cognitive identities that give rise to cognitive 
abilities (ala Gallup’s theory), but that we have cognitive abilities that give rise to 
cognitive identities.  So the question of objectification can be more precisely 
formulated as: What are the primary factors involved in the construction of 
experienced objectification? 
 
Mitchell (1997b) cites research by Gallup, McClure, Hill and Bundy (1971) that 
investigated whether social interaction per se is necessary for mirror self-recognition.  
They found that chimpanzees raised in isolation did not recognize themselves in 
mirrors, whereas chimpanzees raised socially did.  Important to note is that 
chimpanzees brought up in isolation would have no social interactions with 
conspecifics that would allow their imitation skills to develop properly.  Also, Hart 
and Fegley (1994) found that high levels of infant social imitation between the ages of 
15 and 19 months are related to the emergence of self-recognition behaviour.  The 
study demonstrated a significant increase in the percentage of gestures imitated by the 
infant during the time period directly preceding self-recognition.  The logic is as 
follows:  Organisms capable of experiencing or producing symmetrical states develop 
(mature) this capacity through interaction with others.  Through the development of 
this capacity the organism can become aware of dissymmetrical states, consequently – 
organisms that do not evince the phenomenon of symmetrical states are unable to 
become aware of dissymmetrical states.  Thus, only organisms that reveal the 
phenomenon of symmetrical states would be expected to be able to become aware of 
symmetrical and dissymmetrical states. 
 
This developing sense of symmetrical and dissymmetrical states is demonstrated by a 
study performed by Boulanger-Balleyguier (cited in Loveland, 1986), which found 
that an infant reacts differently to the self-image depending upon whether others are 
also visible to him/her in the mirror.  Infants under the age of 12 months smiled and 
babbled in response to the self-image when no other image was present, but ignored 
the self-image when others’ images were also visible.  Loveland (1986) also cites a 
study performed by Dixon in which various stages of behaviour before the mirror was 
delineated.  In the first stage the infant is primarily interested in observing others in 
the mirror and tends to ignore the self-image.  Later, the infant seems to respond 
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socially to the self-image, then starts to explore by observing his own movements in 
the mirror.  Boulanger-Balleyguier and Dixon’s studies suggests that the infant in 
some definite sense experiences symmetrical and dissymmetrical states, evinced by 
the infants explicit selective attention focus in front of the mirror. 
 
If the differentiated experience of symmetry and dissymmetry is considered in light of 
the [R]-element, in terms of the experience of the movement of localities from where 
emerges rationality, then organisms which exhibit the phenomenon of symmetrical 
states will develop a form of rational conditioning informed by their experience of 
symmetrical and dissymmetrical states.  Their physiological cognitive capacities will 
allow them the perceptive ability to experience/interpret the physical world in terms 
of symmetrical and dissymmetrical patterns. 
 
Originally infants appear to be incapable of every type of representational thought 
(Case & Khanna, 1981) perhaps due to their neurological immaturity (Fischer, 1987).  
According to Hart and Fegley (1997) the information about the self that is generated 
through imitation in the first year of life consequently can’t be synthesized and 
integrated to form a mental model of the self.  However, as representational skills 
emerge toward the end of the first year and through the middle of the second, social 
imitation becomes more frequent because the self-relevant information that is 
generated can be integrated into a mental model of the self (Hart & Fegley, 1997).  
The infant’s ability to form mental representations corresponds with Piaget’s notion 
of deferred imitation – the ability to reproduce the behaviour of an absent model - 
which first appears around 12 to 18 months of age according to Piaget (cited in Hook 
et al., 2002).  Research has however indicated that infants and children are capable of 
deferred imitation earlier than Piaget proposed (Craig, 1996).  According to Ginsberg 
and Opper (1969), only once a child has developed the ability to form mental images 
or mental representations of another person’s behaviour, and to store and retrieve 
these from memory, is he/she capable of deferred imitation.  What research thus 
indicates is that at the time that infants demonstrate mirror self-recognition, they are 
also capable of forming and manipulating mental images.    
 
Concerning the manipulation of mental images the author refers to a hypothesis 
proposed by Gergeley (1997) who argues that the cognitive capacity for deductive 
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inference is involved in mirror self-recognition.  Deductive inference refers to the 
capability to judge or asses a situation based on logical deduction rather then on 
appearance.  Gergeley bases his argument on developmental literature that indicates 
that 15-20 month-old infants are capable of deductive inferences as evinced by the 
successful performance on such non-verbal tasks as sensorimotor weight conservation 
(Mounoud & Bower, 1974/1975) and, especially, the Piagetian stage 6 invisible 
displacement task of object permanence (Bower, 1982, 1989; Meltzoff, 1990b).  
According to Gergeley if the assumption is made that deductive inference underlies 
mirror self-recognition and the Piagetian stage 6 invisible displacement task of object 
permanence, one would expect to find a developmental correlation between the 
emergences of performative success on these two kinds of tasks.  In this regard 
Gergeley cites the following research that substantiates this expected correlation:  
Natale and Antinucci (1989) concluded that only apes (can self-recognize), but not 
monkeys (can’t self-recognize), class with humans in their ability to solve the 
Piagetian stage 6 task (see also Parker, 1991); childhood autistics of the right mental 
age, apart from showing mirror self-recognition (Dawson & McKissick, 1984; Ferrari 
& Matthews, 1983), are also able to solve the Piagetian stage 6 task (Curcio, 1978; 
Dawson & Adams, 1984); Bertenthal and Fisher (1978) found a high correlation 
between the development of mirror self-recognition and object permanence, where the 
success on the mirror self recognition rouge-mark test strongly correlated with 
passing the Piagetian stage 6 task.  Custance and Bard (1994) argue that the Piagetian 
stage 6 sensorimotor capacity for mental representation is primary to the infants 
ability to recognize itself in the mirror (they do not accept the primary role of 
imitation abilities), an argument which might be considered as indirectly supporting 
the claim that similar inferential cognitive capacities (deductive inference) are 
involved in mirror self-recognition and the ability to solve the Piagetian stage 6 task. 
 
Gergeley (1997) adds (as an ending note) that the competence for deductive inference 
is hypothesized to be a necessary and not a sufficient condition for mirror self-
recognition.  There is evidence indicating success on the Piagetian stage 6 task in 
several organisms, such as capuchin monkeys (Mathieu, Bouchard, Granger & 
Herscovitch, 1976), dogs (Gagnon & Doré, 1992; Pasnak, Kurkjian, & Triana, 1988), 
and gorillas (Natale & Antinucci, 1989), in which mirror self-recognition has not been 
demonstrated.  However, in light of the preceding dialectic of this study, if one were 
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to require firstly the active status of the ability for image representation, deductive 
inference and the phenomenon of symmetrical states (indicating symmetrical and 
dissymmetrical awareness), and secondly the functionally integrated convergence of 
the latter three cognitive capacities, one would have sufficient conditions for mirror 
self-recognition, a sufficient logistical [R]-element that can account for the empirical 
research data.  This cognitive model describes an organism that can create mental 
images that are encoded as to symmetrical and dissymmetrical pattern experiences, 
and possesses the cognitive capacity for deductive inference that allows the organism 
to make sense of these differentiated and conglomerating patterns of localized form 
movement.  As such the author has conceptualized a chronological and physiological 
coherent cognitive model that ‘saves the phenomena’. 
   
Furthermore, if one considers the occurrence of infantile transvitism from the 
perspective of the infant with regards to the immediate post-transvitism experience, 
one can readily extrapolate to the experience ‘fallacious transvitism’ (coined by the 
author).  Fallacious transvitism refers to infant who cries when he/she sees another 
baby getting hurt, but realizes afterwards - either through becoming aware that he/she 
did not physically experience any pain during the incident, or some care-taking figure 
indicating to the infant that he/she is fine and that he/she has misinterpreted the 
situation – that his/her experience has been wrong/mistaken.  The infant will 
eventually fathom that his/her visual interpretation and his/her proprioceptive 
cognitive schemas do not match (one might expect the infant to be confused by such 
an experience), as such the sense of a self and separate other becomes an obstinate 
rational pattern waiting to be inferred.   
 
Consider also the occurrence where the infant begins to react self-consciously when in 
the centre of other people’s attention (Lewis et al., 1989).  The infant with a natural 
propensity to imitate might in the process of attempting to imitate the surrounding 
others that are staring at him/her, find him- or herself unable to direct his/her actions 
or gaze on toward a corresponding object.  This is opposed to the interaction where 
the infant imitates a caretaker for example in shaking a rattle-toy (the infant is capable 
of copying the others’ action and directing his/her attention toward a specific and 
seemingly corresponding object).  In the case of the former the infant might find the 
behaviour of the care-taker simultaneously amusing and confusing, ultimately 
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evincing a smile or blush as if to say that this is a very funny game, or alternatively, 
the self-conscious demeanour might reflect the babies growing awareness that the 
object towards which the others’ gaze is directed, might somehow be related to the 
experience of physical sensations (as such presenting the infant with a novel and 
strange imitation pattern that is difficult to make sense of).  The author will designate 
this interpreted occurrence ‘indicative imitation’.  Accordingly, the experience of 
fallacious transvitism and indicative imitation might conjunctively contribute to the 
slowly dawning sense of the self as a separate subject in relation to other separate 
subjects - the slowly emerging experience of objectification. 
 
The KVM-theory bodes well as an accurate explication for the process of mirror self-
recognition, but mirror self-recognition is not the subject matter this section is 
primarily concerned with (mirror self-recognition is only utilized as a possible index 
for the investigated concept).  The primary concern of this section is the process of 
objectification, the clear and overt demonstration of self-awareness and other-
awareness in the sense of a self-reflective form of cognition.  Therefore, what happens 
in the case of a blind person, a person who would be unable to match kinaesthetic and 
visual schemas/modalities?  To be sure, blind people are under normal circumstances 
very much self-aware.  A possible answer to this question, is found by considering the 
longstanding psychological problem of perceptual unity – how does a person 
coordinate information that comes from several different modalities but emanates 
from a single source?  Experimental research answers the question with the concept of 
‘amodal perception’.  According to Stern (2000) research has demonstrated the 
infant’s capacity to transfer perceptual experience from one sensory modality to 
another and has done so in an experimental format open to replication.  Consider the 
following cross-modal matching evinced by infants:  audio-visual cross-modal 
matching (Haith, 1980; Kuhl & Meltzoff, 1982; Lewcowicz & Turkewitz, 1980; 
MacKain, Studdert-Kennedy, Spieker & Stern, 1982, 1983;), tactile-visual matching 
(Meltzoff & Borton, 1979).  Accordingly Stern (2000) states that infants thus appear 
to have an innate general capacity, called ‘amodal perception’, to take information in 
one sensory modality and somehow translate it into another sensory modality.  Thus, 
if the audio and the tactile modalities are related to the visual modality, and the visual 
modality is related to the kinaesthetic modality (according to KVM-theory), then the 
audio, tactile and kinaesthetic modalities can all be inter-related.  One can even argue 
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that modality matching might occur within the same modality through the interaction 
of different limbs of the same body, for example: a person can simultaneously 
experience proprioceptive information (one modality) from both arms (different 
limbs) and can without looking at them experience whether the two arms are moving 
synchronously or not (match modality information). 
 
A simpler argument to explain the self-awareness of blind people might proceed as 
follows:  Imitation and mirror self-recognition are related (Custance & Bard, 1994; 
Hart & Fegley, 1994; Hyat & Hopkins, 1994; Miles, 1994; Patterson & Cohn, 1994), 
and mirror self-recognition is considered to be related to self-awareness (Damon & 
Hart, 1982; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979, 1984), hence imitation can be considered to 
be related to self-awareness.  Blind people are capable of imitation (example: verbal 
imitation), so consequently the physiological mechanisms involved in the ability of 
imitation might also be involved in the process of blind people becoming self-aware.     
 
The author will now exposition a succinct synopsis to elucidate the objectification 
process (see Figure 1) formulated in the above disquisition. 
 
It is proposed that the human infant originally experiences the world of localities in an 
undifferentiated manner.  Progressively the neonatal behaviour seems to indicate an 
autonomous propensity for the phenomenon of symmetrical states - this propensity 
develops juxtaposed to the maturing cognitive capacities of mental image 
representation and deductive inference.  Combined with the practical peculiarities of 
fallacious transvitism and indicative imitation, the basic character of objectification 
begins to take shape (as exhibited through mirror self-recognition) and imbues the 
[R]-element with a self-reflective form of comprehension.  These primitive 
beginnings emotionally suffuse and haunt the ever-elusive dichotomous subject 
objectification experience.  This suffusion moves through and over objectification in 
the opaque form of ‘reciprocated subjectification’ (the particular choice of name will 
become clear as the discussion progresses and will be specifically addressed at the 
end of this section).  If dichotomous subject objectification represents the anatomy of 
localized experience, then reciprocated subjectification represents the physiology of 
localized experience. 
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To animate reciprocated subjectification, the author will now explicate the essential 
role the [E]-element plays in the process of objectification.  The functionality of the 
[E]-element in the formation of the dichotomous subject objectification is crucial, 
especially in light of the amalgamated physiological relationship of the [R]-element 
and the [E]-element described in section 4.1.  Regarding available research related to 
the emergence of self-and other-awareness using mirror self-recognition and imitation 
as indexes, the possible involvement of the [E]-element in this objectification process 
is conspicuously lacking in an investigative sense.  To sufficiently characterize the 
notion of reciprocated subjectification the author will conceptually integrate the 
notion of ‘affect attunement’, as described by Stern (2000), thus shedding light on the 
role played by the [E]-element in the objectification process. 
 
According to Stern (2000) for there to be an intersubjective exchange of affect (for the 
purposes of this section the terms ‘affect’ and ‘emotion’ will be considered readily 
interchangeable), strict imitation is not sufficient.  Stern enumerates three processes 
that must take place: (a) the parent must be able to read the infant’s feeling state from 
the infant’s overt behaviour (b) the parent must perform some behaviour that is not 
strict imitation but nonetheless corresponds in some way to the infant’s overt 
behaviour (c) the infant must be able to read this corresponding parental response as 
having to do with the infant’s own original feeling experience.  To establish some 
kind of emotional connection, the mother must go beyond the basic imitation 
character that has been the salient feature of her social repertoire during the first six 
months of the infant’s life (Kaye, 1982; Uzgiris, 1981, 1984; Malatesta & Izard, 
1984). 
 
Stern (2000) states that around nine months the intersubjective exchange of affect 
becomes clearly detectable, and that for this exchange to take place, different 
behavioural expressions occurring in different forms and in different sensory 
modalities must be interchangeable.  If a certain gesture by the mother is to be 
‘correspondent’ with a certain kind of vocal exclamation by the infant, the two 
expressions must share some common currency that permits them to be transferred 
from one modality or form to another.  This common currency is amodal perception 
(see earlier discussion).  Stern gives the following examples: 
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• A nine-month-old girl becomes very excited about a toy and reaches for it.  
As she grabs it, she lets out an exuberant ‘aaaah!’ and looks at her mother.  
Her mother looks back, scrunches up her shoulders, and performs a terrific 
shimmy with her upper body, like a go-go dancer.  The shimmy lasts only 
about as long as her daughter’s ‘aaaah!’ but is equally excited, joyful and 
intense. 
• An eight-and-one-half-month-old boy reaches for a toy just beyond reach.  
Silently he stretches out towards it, leaning and extending arms and fingers 
out fully.  Still short of the toy, he tenses his body to squeeze out the extra 
inch he needs to reach it.  At that moment his mother says, 
‘uuuuuh….uuuuuh!’ with a crescendo of vocal effort, the expiration of air 
pushing against her tensed torso.  The mother’s accelerating vocal-
respiratory effort matches the infant’s accelerating physical effort. 
 
Affect attunement, then, is the performance of behaviours that express the quality of 
feeling of a shared affect state without imitating the exact behavioural expression of 
the inner state.  Stern holds that the embedding of attunements is so common and 
most often so subtle that unless one is looking for it, or asking why any behaviour is 
being performed exactly the way it is, the attunements will pass unnoticed.  To 
operationalize his conceptualization of ‘affect attunement’ for clinical purposes, Stern 
(2000) identifies those aspects of a person’s behaviour that could be matched without 
actually imitating them.  He indexes three broad categories – intensity, timing and 
shape – and differentiates six more specific sub-categories – absolute intensity, 
intensity contour, temporal beat, rhythm, duration, and shape. 
 
Stern (2000) notes that the notion ‘affect attunement’ is similar to the idea of 
‘mirroring’, yet differs fundamentally.  Mirroring in a Lacanian sense (1966/1977), 
notes that reflecting back an infants’s feeling state is important to the infant’s 
developing knowledge of his/her own affectivity and sense of self.  However, used in 
the Lacanian sense, mirroring implies that the mother is helping create a state of being 
within the infant’s emotional experential world – the Other – which fundamentally 
serves an alienating function.  This is in contrast with ‘affect-attunement’, which has 
no alienating telos beyond the basic disposition of S – S: O that becomes conditioned 
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as a form of interpretation and experience.  As such no rubiconic alienation is implied, 
and more overtly, the reciprocated occurrence of this symmetrical amodal interaction 
fosters positive emotional states and a sense of belonging (Goleman, 1996). 
 
Stern (2000) also distinguishes ‘affect attunement’ from empathy.  He holds that 
attunement occurs largely unconsciously and almost automatically, while empathy 
involves the mediation of conscious cognitive processes.  These two constructs do 
however share the basic matrix of emotional resonance, without which neither can 
occur (Hoffman, 1978; Basch, 1983).  According to Hoffman (1978) the basic matrix 
of emotional resonance encompasses the first of four stages in the development of 
empathy.  Whence this notion of ‘affect attunement’ might also facilitate in 
formulating an understanding of the psycho-physiological processes related to the 
domain of autism.  Mitchell (1997a) writes that although high-functioning autistic 
children develop emphatic understanding of others (but less than do normal children 
[Yirmiya, Sigman, Kasari & Mundy, 1992]), the most general description of social 
impairment in autism is the lack of empathy.  Autistic children are noted for their 
indifference to other people’s distress, their inability to offer comfort (Frith, 1989).  
Gillberg (1992) states that autism is a disorder of empathy, resulting not from an 
inability to feel emotions, but instead from a difficulty in understanding that others 
have inner worlds.   
 
Considering research data related to autism the following conjectures can be made:  
The emotional brain circuitry of the autistic infant (at around nine months) involved 
in the infant-caretaker interaction (affect attunement process prominent) might be 
deficient, or highly underdeveloped.  The basic matrix of emotional resonance (the 
shared platform of attunement and empathy) can be implicated as the defective 
cognitive capacity in autism.  Autistic children do well on visual perspective taking 
tasks (moving an object to show another person various requested facets of it), as well 
as on some cognitive perspective-taking tasks (telling about what another person 
perceives) (Hobson, 1984; Reed, 1994; Reed & Peterson, 1990;).  Autistic children’s 
functional perspective taking skills indicate that the brain circuits involved in these 
processes are adequately developed.  Perspective-taking skills, as developed during 
the third stage of empathy development (Hoffman, 1987), mean that a child can 
deliberately take the perspective of another person; it is studied where children are 
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verbally instructed to take the view of others (Selman, 1980; Wimmer & Perner, 
1983).  As such perspective-taking skills indicate higher neocortical functions, 
matured brain dynamics distinct from the more primitive brain circuitry involved in 
the first stage of empathy – the basic emotional resonance stage.  Accordingly, 
Hoffman’s four stages of empathy development must not be viewed in terms of a 
serial stage progression, but rather as parallel phases interacting reciprocally 
according to the underlying physiological brain capacities.  This implies that the third 
stage of empathy can occur without the mature development of the first stage. 
   
Thus the basic sense of empathy often times evidenced in autism (Yirmiya et al., 
1992), might be strictly (or predominantly) related to the higher cognitive capacity 
related to perspective taking, yet remaining essentially uninformed by more primitive 
emotional circuitry (prevalent during around 9 months).  As such the empathy evinced 
by autistic children might have a very different character than the type of empathy a 
person with normal physiological brain circuitry might experience/demonstrate.  The 
latter formulation would explain why autistic children do not appear to be deficient in 
the experience and interpretation of their own emotions (Gillberg, 1992), yet seem 
deficient in empathizing with other people’s distress (Frith, 1989).  The emotions that 
autistic children experience and are able to understand, are postulated by the author to 
be related to specific amalgamated emotional and rational brain circuitry of the 
neocortical-hippocampul pathway (discussed earlier), which is related to the process 
of objectification (recall that autistic people can recognize themselves in the mirror).  
While the experience of affect attunement prevalent from the period of nine months 
onward (in normal children) is postulated by the author to be correlated with brain 
circuitry related to the absence of proper objectification (possibly the amygdala-visual 
cortex circuitry – research has indicated the latter brain circuitry to be strongly related 
to empathy  [Brothers, 1989]) – as such accepting a much more emotional character 
(less rational).  Accordingly autistic children will demonstrate other-awareness 
through their ability for perspective taking, mirror self-recognition and imitation; will 
experience and interpret their own emotions normally; yet will struggle to 
autonomously extrapolate from their own experiences to that of others (Baron-Cohen, 
Tager-Flusberg & Cohen, 1993; Harris, 1989) as a consequence of their faulty basic 
matrix of emotional resonance capacities related to Hoffman’s (1987) first stage of 
empathy development. 
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Research indicates that affect attunement assumes fundamental significance in the 
later development of the self as subject.  Goleman (1996) cites a study conducted by 
Prentsky investigating criminals who had committed the cruellest and most violent 
crimes.  It was found that the one characteristic that set them apart from other 
criminals was that they had been shuttled from foster home to foster home, or raised 
in orphanages – life histories that suggest emotional neglect and little opportunity for 
attunement.  Stern (2000) indexes three different forms of potential psychopathology 
that are visible during the period beginning at seven to nine months and ending at 
about eighteen months (note the temporal correspondence of affect attunement with 
the onset of mirror self-recognition): neurotic-like signs and symptoms; personality 
malformations; and self pathology.  These potential forms of psychopathology are 
related to what Stern identifies as ‘misattunement’, ‘unauthentic attunements’, ‘over- 
or underattunement’, and ‘non-attunement’. 
 
There is an important distinction to explicate in terms of an autistic child versus a 
‘normal child’:  A normal child can under unhealthy circumstances experience 
‘misattunement’, ‘unauthentic attunements’, ‘over- or underattunement’, or ‘non-
attunement’; while the autistic child will not experience these adverse attunement 
states, or at most, only experience attenuated versions of the latter – due to the 
temporally specified deficient brain circuitry postulated.  Accordingly, a mother that 
exhibits unnatural or adverse attunement propensities will have a different influence 
on an autistic child than on a ‘normal child’. 
 
From the above investigative exposition of objectification, the nucleic importance of 
the phenomenon of symmetrical states and affect attunement can readily be gleaned 
(affect attunement is also suffused with symmetry dynamics, these dynamics will be 
expositioned in section 6).  The experience of the self as subject (in terms of the 
process of objectification) is therefore permeated by the essential rational and 
emotional character of these two nucleic processes described above.  Hence, to aptly 
acknowledge these rudimentary and pervasive influences related to the construction of 
dichotomous subject objectification, the motivating drive of the subjective self is 
termed ‘reciprocated subjectification’.  This designation semantically incorporates the 
essentially pleasant nature of naturally reciprocating interactions as evinced in the 
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phenomenon of symmetrical states and affect attunement, and conversely the 
unpleasant nature of unreciprocated interactions.  Consider in this regard an 
experiment conducted by Stern (cited in Goleman, 1996) where mothers were 
instructed to deliberately over- and under-respond to their infants.  Rather than the 
infants matching their mothers in an attuned way, the infants responded with 
immediate dismay and distress (unpleasant).  Consider also the research performed by 
Asendorph and Baudonniérre (1993) where, during synchronic imitation, the two 
infants ‘enjoyed’ the reciprocity inherent in their play, as indicated by their ‘positive 
mood’; moreover, during this study the desirability of reciprocated interaction was 
also revealed by the prolonged phases of synchronic imitation produced by dyadic 
infants clearly evincing the capability of objectification.  These indications must be 
considered above and beyond the psychopathological ramifications of adverse 
attunement discussed above. 
 
Compendiously stated: the notion of reciprocated subjectification represents a 
complex rational and emotional elaboration of the phenomenon of symmetrical states 
as an expression of the conditioned cognitive experience of the movement of locality.  
Reciprocated subject interactions are experienced as pleasant, and thus desirable, 
while unreciprocated subject interactions are experienced as unpleasant, and thus 
undesirable.  Accordingly, from a theoretical non-locality framework, the desire of 
man is the desire of reciprocated subjectification.  The desire for reciprocated 
subjectification describes the convolution of the biological needs of the physical body 
and the phenomenon of symmetrical states.  In the absence of the cognitive capacity 
for symmetrical phenomenon experience, S – S (later called non-local perceptum) 
experience of locality would possibly resemble the envisaged conditioned experience 
of lower animals (animals who aren’t able to recognize themselves in the mirror). 
   
The ceremonial master of the ephemeral dancing cascade of objectification does not 
carry the name of logic - no, logic is a blind sceptre impudently flailed in the air 
according to the desire of this king of kings, this desire of reciprocated 
subjectification, the desire of man.  This desire commands the mighty army of the [E]-
element – an army marching in perfect file and rank according to the vicissitudes of 
‘knowing’, of ‘needing to know’.  Objectifications equate what a person believes 
he/she ‘knows’ or ‘does not know’.  The ‘need to know’ (even if it is the need to 
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know that you are ignorant), the clinging to objectifications, is based on this desire to 
allow or create reciprocated subjectification, or conversely the desire to avoid or 
control unreciprocated subjectification.  
 
Before the conditioned anatomy of S – S: O is dissected, the author will critically 
examine Lacan’s mirror stage using contemporary empirical research in the domain of 
mirror self-recognition (related to the preceding discussion) as a referent framework. 
 
4. 3   The Lacanian mirror  
 
This section will paint a picture of the reflected neonatal image in the Lacanian mirror 
and make visible the pseudo-colouring there-of through super-positioning on the 
empirical canvass of the contemporary self-recognition mirror.  The author will 
demonstrate that Lacan’s infant, standing on the legs of the Other, has never been able 
to walk because these alienating limbs have no veridical substance. 
 
Lacan (1966/2001) writes: 
 
This behaviour contrasts strikingly with the indifference shown even by 
animals that perceive this image, the chimpanzee, for example, when they 
have tested its objectal vanity, and it becomes even more apparent when one 
realizes that it occurs at an age when the child, as far as instrumental 
intelligence is concerned, is backward in relation to the chimpanzee, which he 
catches up with only at eleven months.  (p. 20-21) 
 
Custance and Bard (1994) found that mirror self-recognition in chimpanzees appear to 
be consolidated between the ages of 24 and 30 months, this is in comparison with 
human infants who exhibit mirror self-recognition between eighteen and twenty four 
months (Johnson, 1983; Chapman, 1987).  Thus the research indicates that human 
infants compared to chimpanzees are 6 to 12 months developmentally more advanced 
in terms of mirror self-recognition.  This of course renders fallacious Lacan’s claim 
that the human infant is ‘backward in relation to the chimpanzee’ during the early 
 
 66
months of life.  But more importantly, it reveals that in some definite sense, Lacan did 
not correctly interpret mirror related behaviours as it pertains to humans and animals. 
 
The author posits that there are fundamental assumption similarities between Gallup’s 
theory and Lacan’s formulation of mirror interaction.  Recall that Gallup’s theory 
holds that a self-concept or self-awareness is necessary for mirror self-recognition, in 
a similar vain, Lacan’s mirror stage assumes that the infant is self-aware, in the sense 
that to experience oneself as fragmented, requires that the infant be aware of the self 
as fragmentary.  Furthermore, the infant being aware of the ‘whole’ other, implies that 
the infant is ‘other-aware’, which in retrospect of the literature discussed earlier 
(indicated that self-awareness and other-awareness are synchronous), indicates that 
the infant is self-aware.  Thus, implicit to Lacan’s theory is the assumption of a 
definite sense of self-awareness that facilitates mirror self-recognition, as such the 
theory exposes itself to the same methodological difficulties as those evinced by 
Gallup’s theory (see section 4.2). 
 
Also, the notion of the infant experiencing its own body as “fragmentary” and “motor-
uncoordinated” (Lacan, 1966/2001, p. 4) - whence would be the provenance of such 
an experience?  If an infant has never experienced a whole body, or has never 
experienced a body where the motor functions are co-ordinated, how would the infant 
be able to recognize that its body is fragmented or motor-uncoordinated?  By the time 
the infant demonstrates self-and other-awareness, which appears to occur around 18 to 
20 months (Asendorph & Baudonniére, 1993), the infant also demonstrates a definite 
sense of motor-control – the infant can perform complex tertiary circular reactions by 
the age of 12 months (Hook et al., 2002) - and will consequently not experience a 
sense of fragmentation due to uncontrollable limbs.  The conjecture that the infant’s 
early bodily experiences are anxiety provoking (due to a sense of fragmentation and 
uncoordination) is accordingly based on unsubstantiated logic.  Hence, if this infantile 
state of anxiety is as it were without logical merit, it would be disconcertingly 
presumptuous to postulate that the infantile awareness projects itself into, or identifies 
with the external ‘gestalt’.  And if this primary projection/identification does not take 
place, Lacan’s alienating Other is never born. 
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Concerning the fragmentary body:  if the conjecture is made that the infant 
experiences the body and the environment originally in an undifferentiated fashion (as 
Lacan does – see section 3.1), it would be dubious to infer that the infant experiences 
the body parts in a differentiated manner.  Surely undifferentiated perceptive 
experience would not be able to differentiate where the body ends and the 
environment begins?  The limbs would be as much a part of the body as the body is a 
part of the environment.  Even if one allows for an undifferentiated infantile 
perception incapable of differentiating its own body from the environment, yet 
capable of differentiating fragments, one can readily state that the experience of limbs 
and external bodies might be equated, in the sense that external bodies might be 
experienced by the infant awareness as larger or different kinds of limbs, or 
conversely, that the limbs might be experienced as autonomous bodies.  Consequently 
one might in accordance with such an allowance be faced with the infantile awareness 
projecting itself into, or identifying with its own body parts.  As such the arm can 
function as the alienating Other and the subject will, according to Lacanian theory, 
always address its truth to its arm.  A rather precarious logical implication. 
 
Consider also the following: If we were to attribute any validity to the KVM-theory 
(empirical evidence implores us to do so), this would be conceptually problematic for 
Lacan’s mirror stage.  Recall that the KVM-theory postulates that passing the mark 
test (test for mirror self-recognition) is a consequence of the capacity for matching 
kinaesthetic, proprioceptive and somasthetic sensations of one’s own body positions, 
with the visual images of one’s own body and the other’s body.  If an infant brain is 
capable of performing the rather complex cognitive task of matching different 
modalities, it would be wholly justified to assume that the infant brain is capable of 
allowing the more basic cognitive task of experiencing, or is in some sense being 
aware of the proprioceptive sensations emanating from the limbs.  Experiencing the 
proprioceptive sensations from the limbs can be correlated with not experiencing 
proprioceptive sensations from other bodies (external bodies).  As such it is quite 
possible that the infant will, during the onset of mirror self-recognition, have some 
sense of a unitary proprioceptively experienced body, as opposed to the fragmented 
body experience postulated by Lacan.  
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Also, Lacan (1966/2001, p. 3) explicates how the identification of the infant with the 
gestalt, the external “whole image”, is a consequence of the infant experiencing 
himself/herself as “animated by turbulent movements” and that the infant anticipates 
the “maturation of his power” in the external form of the gestalt.  This explication 
correlates with Lacan’s description of the infant as ‘motor-uncoordinated’ at the time 
of mirror self-recognition.  Loveland (1986) cites research by Lewis and Brook-Gunn 
indicating that the infant appears to become aware of contingency between self-
movement and mirror self-image movement at around three to eight months.  
Subsequently Loveland states, “At this level the baby’s achievement can be viewed as 
a sensory motor procedure that produces a desired result (control over the mirror 
image).” (p. 19) 
Thus, in contrast to Lacan (1966/2001) interpreting the gestalt mirror image from the 
infant’s perspective in an “anticipatory power maturation sense” (p. 3), the specified 
research indicates that the infant’s original experience with the gestalt mirror image 
between three and eight months might represent an expression of the infant’s 
‘maturing sense of power’.  The former bespeaks an outside image being invested 
with a sense of control and power, and consequently making the infant feel helpless 
and powerless with regards to his/her own position, while the latter bespeaks a sense 
of power and control over an outside image consequently making the infant feel 
powerful and in control.   
Also the ability to imitate from as young as 9 months (Bauer & Mandler, 1992; Hanna 
& Meltzhoff, 1993) in conjunction with the Piagetian notion of secondary circular 
reactions which infants demonstrate from four to eight months (Papalia, Olds & 
Feldman, 1998), suggests some succinct sense of motor-control.  The cognitive ability 
of the mirror self-recognizing infant therefore does not bespeak the Lacanian 
signification of turbulent movements and motor-uncoordination. 
 
Furthermore, with clandestine presumptuousness, Lacan’s mirror stage formulation 
implicitly assumes that six to eighteen month old infants necessarily grasp the 
idiosyncratic properties of mirrors.  Lacan (1966/2001) assumes that the infant’s 
“flutter of jubilant activity” (p. 2) indicates that the infant is aware that the whole 
image reflected in the mirror is its own, and that the infant recognizes this external 
personal gestalt form to be diametrically opposed to his/her own fragmentary body.  
Loveland (1986) proposes that the mirror is a special case in visual perception, whose 
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properties and whose meaning for the individual must be discovered gradually, and 
that the meaning or significance of a mirror image (self or other) changes for the 
young child with experience and exploration before the mirror.  She states that while 
the perceptual properties of the mirror situation are incompletely understood, the 
significance of the mirror image may be only partly understood or understood only 
with respect to particular cases.  Recall the study by Loveland (1984) described in 
section 4.2 where many of the infants were able to seemingly identify themselves in 
the mirror, yet were unable to locate the toy that they could see in the mirror 
(incorrect searching strategies included among others – grasping at the mirror, or 
searching behind the mirror).  The infant behaviours substantiate the idea that infants 
do not fully comprehend the meaning or properties of the mirror.  These results 
corroborate the findings of a study conducted by Zazzo (cited in Loveland, 1986).  A 
large number of children were investigated in the children’s own homes – the 
experimenters set up a situation in which the mother entered silently from behind in 
the child’s mirror view with a hand full of candy.  The experimenter drew the child’s 
attention to the mother’s image and urged the child to get the candy.  Forty percent of 
the children between the ages of three-and-a-half and four years approached the 
mirror and tried to search behind it to obtain the candy.  The findings suggest that the 
business of learning about the mirror as a perceptual situation is not yet complete at 
the time when self-recognition tasks are solved. 
Loveland’s research implies that Lacan’s assumption that the six-month-old infant 
understands the mirror image as his/her own whole image (see Lacan, 1966/2001) is 
doubtful (more plausible at eighteen months, but by no means definite).  The 
research-supported hypothesis that infants do not necessarily fully comprehend the 
idiosyncrasies of reflective surfaces before or during initial mirror self-recognition 
behaviour, suggests that infants do not during this period necessarily understand the 
significance of the reflected image. 
 
The foregoing dialectic demonstrates that Lacan’s mirror stage formulation is not 
supported by empirical evidence and applied logic. As a consequence the 
conceptualization of the Other as to its disposition and essentially alienating function 
thus appears fallacious.   
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4. 4   Dichotomous subject objectification
 
The author posits that in terms of the premise of non-locality, there is no ontological 
central I, no reified subject position, no petrified or coagulated ego; rather the author 
states that there is constructive and destructive interference of S – S: O through the 
ubiquitous substrate of S – S at localized and ephemeral conjunctive intersections.  
The intertwined converging and diverging S – S: O will in this section be explained in 
terms of a topographical exposition and the dynamic discontinuous processes that 
drive the form there-of.  The non-locality signification function of S – S will be 
substituted with an antonomasia designation of ‘non-local perceptum’.  This term 
describes a form of perception that accepts its logical provenance from the premise of 
non-locality, as such it encompasses the unitary existence of locality and non-locality 
and accounts for the locality experience of non-local phenomena.  The word 
‘perceptum’, is specifically formulated using the Latin suffix ‘-um’, this is a neutrum 
inflection indicating neither masculine nor feminine emphasis – an androgynous 
signification. 
   
Non-local perceptum experiences localized ‘movement’, and becomes conditioned as 
to the [R]- and [E]-element in accordance with the physiological bodily nature and 
biological cognitive capacity.  Non-local perceptum permeates objectification in the 
form of reciprocated subjectification.  It is to the topographical objectification of non-
local perceptum that the author will now turn. 
 
The dichotomous subject objectification will be delineated by the author as to three 
distinct forms of interpretation for functional and practical purposes.  The three forms 
are root-objectifications, stem-objectifications and leaf-objectifications.  These 
differentiated objectifications will be considered in terms of the physiological brain 
development of the maturing child. 
 
Root-objectifications primarily refer to the early awareness experiences of the infant 
from birth (experiences within the womb can be included but this is beyond the scope 
of this thesis) to roughly eighteen to twenty two months, the time period before the 
infant is capable of decent objectification.  Root-objectifications imply the pre-verbal 
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phases of life during the early maturing stages of the neocortex.  The brain physiology 
predominant during this period correlates with the primitive emotional brain circuitry 
postulated to be involved in the basic matrix for emotional resonance capacity – the 
early phases of empathy development (see discussion in section 4. 2).  These 
primitive emotional brain circuits constitute the experience of an early and seemingly 
different kind of [E]-element, as was alluded to in the discussion interpreting the 
‘distorted empathy’ of autistic children (section 4.2).  The infantile experience of 
emotion during the ‘affect attunement’ phases, occur in a period preceding the 
capability for objectification.  Accordingly it should be clear that the emotional 
circuitry involved during the early stages of neocortical development, the period 
preceding mirror self-recognition, is different in comparison to the emotional circuitry 
involved during stages when the infant is capable of objectification and the neocortex 
has reached a higher level of maturation.  Hence, the emotional matrix laid down 
during the early months of life will have a fundamentally different character than the 
myriad of later emotional experiences related to the active ability of objectification 
(related to the thalamus-cortex-hippocampul pathway). 
 
Root-objectifications secondarily represent emotional experiences where the 
hippocampus might completely shut down due to the stress of a traumatic event, as 
such having no functional capacity to form new memories during the traumatic event 
- rendering it impossible to later excavate a conscious memory there-of.  During such 
an experience the thalamus-amygdala pathway can act unilaterally.  This pathway 
subverts the neocortex and so acts outside of awareness, outside of direct 
objectification experience.  The traumatic experience can, accordingly, in such a 
scenario adopt the form of a non-objectification emotional reactive memory.  Later 
experiences exhibiting similar characteristics to the original traumatic event might 
consequently induce an emotional response that completely overwhelms 
consciousness, and afterwards remains completely non-sensical to the person 
experiencing this emotional occurrence (because there is no conscious memory of the 
original traumatic event). 
 
The author specifically chooses to use the word ‘root-objectification’, although the 
cognitive capacity for objectification has not as yet been sufficiently/functionally 
developed during this early period.  The reason being the following:  This early 
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emotional matrix of experience is experienced and interpreted by the later more 
matured and objectifying cognition.  Root-objectifications fundamentally inform and 
diffuse later conditioned objectification experiences.  The author designates this 
process – ‘Retro-transposed objectification’, which can be explained as follows:  
Imagine a young boy by the name of Sam who didn’t know what to do with his life.  
One day after school, while waiting on a bench for the bus to arrive, Sam and an older 
man sitting next to him on the bench started up a conversation.  Sam found this 
stranger very intriguing – he had a peculiar hairstyle and a very particular and 
unfamiliar style of dress.  This man told Sam all about the wonders of science and the 
mysteries of the universe.  The older man spoke in a very animated and enthusiastic 
manner, his eyes lighting up as he explained the anomalies of time.  He told Sam all 
about Einstein’s theory of relativity and the bizarre phenomena of quantum physics.  
Sam was fascinated by these thoughts and after that day his life was never the same.  
Sam had discovered his passion and henceforth dedicated his life to the pursuit of 
unravelling the mysteries of space and time.  Sam grew up to be a brilliant scientist 
and some years later invented the first time machine.  Miraculously the time machine 
worked and Sam managed to travel back in time.  He found himself in the past, sitting 
on a small bench in a rather familiar looking environment.  Still dazed and 
disorientated by the time-travel journey, Sam began to speak to a young boy sitting 
next to him on the bench.  Slowly becoming aware that his time-travel journey had 
been successful, he exuberantly told the young boy all about time and the anomalies 
there-of.  After about half an hour of animated story telling, the young boy’s bus 
arrived.  Sam the scientist greeted his young friend and with a sparkle in young Sam’s 
eye he made his way on to the bus. 
 
The origin of root-objectification is a self-perpetuating circle.  It is the person capable 
of objectification that by reflecting on the past and experiencing remnants of past 
emotions in the present, who autonomously constructs the pith of root-
objectifications.  As such objectification pervades the past and the future.  Root-
objectifications suffuse stem- and leaf-objectifications and becomes itself suffused by 
stem- and leaf-objectifications. 
 
Stem-objectifications and leaf-objectifications are reciprocally related. Leaf-
objectifications are related to specific interpretive experiences, while stem-
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objectifications represent thematic conglomerations of the specific experienced leaf-
objectifications.  If leaf-objectifications are the specific character interactions of a 
mythological tale, then stem-objectifications represent underlying themes pervading 
the mythological tale, as such animating the telos of the characters. Stem-
objectifications and leaf-interactions are continuously interacting in a discontinuous 
dance of synchronous reinforcement or dissynchronous confrontation.  Where leaf-
objectifications inductively inform, stem-objectifications deductively impose.  Stem-
objectifications are the converging lines of generalized characteristics emanating from 
the multifarious nodal points of particular leaf-objectifications.  These intersectional 
convergences then protrude across the spectrum of particular interactions searching 
for coherent inter-relations of specific leaf-objectifications. 
   
Stem-objectifications can be correlated with the clinical conceptualization of 
‘generalized episodes’. According to Stern (2000) a generalized episode is a 
structure/abstract representation about the likely course of events, based on the 
average of experiences.  It creates expectations of actions, feelings and sensations that 
can either be met or violated.  The provenance of this meeting or violation of 
expectations assumes the form of the interpreted leaf-objectification.   
 
The conceptualization of stem- and leaf-objectifications is further informed by a 
comparative understanding of George Kelly’s ‘personal construct theory’. Kelly 
(1969) deduced from his therapeutic and experimental work that his clients’ problems 
arose from the particular way they interpreted the circumstances of their lives.  As 
methodological intervention he proffered his clients novel and sometimes ‘absurd’ 
interpretations of their circumstances and behaviour.  Kelly found that what was of 
primary importance for the relief of psychological symptoms, was not the accuracy of 
his interpretations, but rather the simple fact that the interpretations encouraged his 
clients to see their problems in a new way.  For Kelly the essence of personality is the 
construction system, which the individual uses to predict and control events (cited in 
Meyer et al., 1997).  The construction system comprises a very large number of 
constructs (notions, ideas, concepts), each with their own idiosyncratic formal and 
functional properties.  The properties of the construction system and of the individual 
constructs are what determine a person’s behaviour.  Kelly’s explicative formulation 
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of these constructs will briefly be correlated with the differentiated forms of 
objectification. 
 
Consider for example comprehensive and incidental constructs, central and peripheral 
constructs, and the dichotomous classification of constructs.  Firstly, regarding the 
dichotomous classification of constructs: Kelly emphasizes that constructs are 
dichotomous or bipolar.  This implies that a construct consists of two opposites, such 
as ‘beautiful-ugly’, ‘man-woman’ and ‘true-false’.  As such constructs are used to 
make predictions by categorising objects or an anticipated event into one of the two 
opposing classes (cited in Meyer et al., 1997).  Central and peripheral constructs refer 
to the concentric relationship between constructs.  According to Sechrest (1983) 
central or core constructs are important for the individual’s maintenance of 
himself/herself as a person, while peripheral constructs have only marginal 
implications for self-maintenance.  For example: for a person with high moral values, 
a construct like ‘right-wrong’ might constitute a central construct, while a construct 
like ‘thick book - thin book’ might equate a peripheral construct.  Comprehensive and 
incidental constructs are differentiated as follows: a comprehensive construct has a 
broad range or context, which means that it is applicable to a broad set of events 
(elements), whereas an incidental construct has only a limited range (cited in Meyer et 
al, 1997) .  For example the construct ‘good-bad’ as used by most people is a 
comprehensive construct because a great variety of events (elements) can be classified 
in terms of it.  Conversely, a construct like ‘my Duncan Fearnly bat – my Gun and 
Moore bat’ is incidental because it has bearing on a single set of elements only. 
 
Considering the construct system in terms of objectification. Comprehensive 
constructs are related to stem-objectifications and incidental constructs are related to 
leaf-objectifications.  Regarding central and peripheral constructs: central constructs 
can be equated with any objectification carrying significant emotional weight, be it 
stem-or leaf-objectifications. Inversely, peripheral constructs are related to 
objectifications that assume less emotional importance in the person’s life.  A case in 
point: a father lying on his death bed tells his younger son that he must always be 
there for his mother (the father’s wife), and that his helping her with small things, like 
taking out the garbage, is very important.  Consequently, a leaf-objectification like 
‘me taking out the garbage – me not taking out the garbage’, constructed in relation to 
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a significant other subject position – the father, can be considered a central construct 
due to the gravitatious emotionally laden character there-of.  The act of taking out the 
garbage, can as such assume fundamental importance for the boy in terms of his self-
evaluation.   
Regarding the dichotomous nature of constructs: As already demonstrated by way of 
practical example in the directly preceding case in point, a person’s ability to perceive 
similarities and differences between events, imbues objectification with the succinctly 
differentiable form of inter-subject experiences.  This can be related to the 
phenomenon of symmetrical states explained earlier, which was demonstrated to be 
essential in the formation of self- and other-awareness, the pristine form of 
objectification.    
 
Conspicuously, Kelly’s ‘personal construct theory’, gives little consideration to 
unconscious processes as emphasized in psycho-dynamic theory.  Correlatively the 
animating forces of root-objectifications (in terms of influencing the behaviour of the 
person), and the physiological and psychological phenomena that drive construct 
formation, remain unexplored and essentially unaccounted for. 
  
Post-cedingly the author will expound a prototypical matrix of rudimentary 
objectification development. 
 
This prototypical matrix is infested with two inclusively differentiable fields of 
objectification experience that dehisce around the desire for reciprocated 
subjectification.  The primary field of objectification experience encircles the 
dynamic interactive domains of root-objectifications on the one hand, and the domain 
of interrelated stem- and leaf-objectifications on the other (see appendix A).  The 
nature of this interaction is determined by the allowance or disallowance of 
reciprocated subjectification in, alternately, the domain of root-objectification, and the 
domain of stem-leaf-objectifications (see appendix for elucidating diagram).  Adverse 
emotional states induced by dissymmetrical interactions during the first eighteen to 
twenty-four months of life (affect attunement predominating in the absence of active 
objectification capabilities), establish particular emotional neural circuitry patterns.  
These negative emotional undercurrents perniciously simmer about the threshold of 
the later maturing, cognitively more complex stem-leaf-objectification interactions.  
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Specific interactional configurations of these two domains might then manifest as 
psychotic episodes or states, in such cases the alien emotional character of root-
objectifications overwhelm the comparatively fragile [R]- and [E]-elemental 
amalgamation of leaf-stem-objectification processes.  The particulars of these specific 
interactional configurations connecting the two pertinent domains are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
 
The secondary field of objectification experience is signified by the reciprocal 
relationship of stem- and leaf-objectifications described earlier - the deductive 
thematic web of stem-objectifications cast out over the sea of multifarious fish (leaf-
objectification) in an attempt to satisfy the hunger of the fisherman, the desire for 
reciprocated subjectification (see appendix A).  This field is characterized by the 
implementation of the [R]-element to manage the [E]-element, to appease the desire 
of reciprocated subjectification.  The allowance or disallowance of reciprocated 
subjectification becomes encoded as to the more complex forms of ‘the safe subject’, 
‘the belonging subject’, ‘the deserving subject’, or ‘the worthy subject’ – to name but 
a few stem-objectifications.  This secondary field interprets verbal as well as non-
verbal cues in terms of allowance or disallowance of the subject form.  This subject 
form, constructed in accordance with allowed or disallowed desire, implies ipso facto 
conditions of worth.  The Rogerian notion of unconditional positive regard (see 
Hergenhahn & Olson, 1999; Meyer et al., 1997), exemplifies the illusion of the 
fulfilled desire of reciprocated subjectification.  The birth of objectification (root, 
stem, leaf) represents the birth of conditions of worth.  Objectification is the apple of 
the garden of Eden that all subject experiences bite into everyday.  The experience of 
the self as subject, positive or negative, implies the condition of reciprocated 
subjectification.  Roger’s unconditional positive regard never extends beyond a 
particular form of objectification conditioning (recall also the conditioned character of 
all rationality – the [R]-element).  The accomplished freedom of ‘Humanism’ equates 
a bigger box, essentially a pseudo-freedom.  The simulacrum of subjective freedom 
informs all objectification and guards the gates of the garden of Eden.  This 
inexorable state of conditioned worth, of conditions of worth, is the provenance of the 
psycho-dynamic defence-mechanisms conceptualized by Sigmund Freud.  From the 
premise of locality it would be quite valid to envisage the human being as one big 
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walking defence-mechanism, for in a sense the human experience (the capability of 
objectification) differs only in degrees and intensities of objectification. 
A premise of non-locality transforms the veridical pessimistic and nihilistic elements 
of objectification into illusory wails of perception that obscure depths of being 
unfathomable to the rich-man, the man laden with subject suppositions.  
 
Section 5 will be dedicated predominantly to the further elucidation of this secondary 
field of objectification, as such investigating the logic non-local perceptum would 
imply for the objectification experience of localized movement.  Subsequently, in 
section 4.5, the author will investigate the logic non-local perceptum implies for logic. 
 
4. 5   The intuitive-element 
 
To facilitate an understanding of non-local perceptum, S –S will be formulated in 
terms of a Socratic interpretation.  This Socratic interpretation will be based on the 
historical literary distinction made between the Socrates of the early Platonic 
dialogues and the Socrates of the later Platonic dialogues (see Vlastos, 1991).  The 
alternate philosophies put forward by these two ‘differentiable’ Socrates’ are the 
essence of what the author has posited as the brilliant Greek mistake (see also 
introduction and conclusion).  Vlastos (1991) writes: 
 
…in different sets of dialogues he (Socrates) pursues philosophies so different 
that they could not have been depicted as cohabiting the same brain 
throughout unless it had been the brain of a schizophrenic.  They are so 
diverse in content and method that they contrast as sharply with one another as 
with any third philosophy you care to mention, beginning with Aristotle’s.  (p. 
46) 
 
Vlastos (1991) lists ten theses, each thesis consisting of a part A and B.  Part A 
specifies a trait of Socrates exhibited only in the late dialogues (L-Socrates), while 
part B specifies a trait exhibited only in the early dialogues (E-Socrates).  The author 
will enumerate only the theses applicable to the present investigation. 
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1. A) L-Socrates had a grandiose metaphysical theory of ‘separately existing’ 
forms and of a separable soul which learns by ‘recollecting’ pieces of its pre-
natal fund of knowledge. 
B) E-Socrates has no such theory. 
2. A) L-Socrates seeks demonstrative knowledge and is confident that he finds 
it. 
B) E-Socrates, seeking knowledge elenctically, keeps avowing that he has 
none – ‘I know that I don’t know’. 
3. A) L-Socrates has a complex, tripartite model of the soul. 
B) E-Socrates knows nothing of this model. 
4. A) L-Socrates has mastered the mathematical sciences of his time. 
B) E-Socrates professes no interest in these sciences and gives no evidence of 
expertise in any of them throughout the Elenctic dialogues. 
 
Consequently, if we acknowledge the possibility of distinctive and different 
philosophies declared alternatively by E-Socrates and L-Socrates, the author would 
like to specifically consider the third thesis in terms of non-local perceptum. 
 
In “The Republic” (Ferrari, 2000), Plato tells the story of Leontius, son of Aglaeon, to 
demonstrate the differentiation he makes amongst the rational-element, the desiring-
element and the emotional-element.  Plato uses this tripartite model to inform his 
notion of ‘master of the self’, positing that for the person who is master of 
himself/herself, the rational-element would necessarily rule over the other two 
elements.  As thesis three indicates, Socrates of the early dialogues posits no such 
tripartite model of the soul.  The question now remains - if Socrates (the author’s use 
of the name Socrates, implies the E-Socrates) were to conceptualize some kind of 
experiential psychological model, what form would it assume if he were to remain 
faithful to his declaration of ignorance.  Indeed, is such a conceptualization even 
possible considering the criteria of ‘ignorance’?  Of course, the Socratic ignorance 
must be understood in terms of Socrates’s famous dictum – ‘I know that I don’t 
know’.  Such an understanding should accordingly be distinguished from a 
conceptualization of ignorance professing – ‘I know nothing’ or ‘I don’t know’.  The 
difference between the former (Socrates’s dictum) and latter declarations of ignorance 
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is enormously significant if a premise of non-locality is assumed (the significance will 
become clear as the investigation progresses).   
 
From the premise of locality the development of an experiential model for ‘I know 
that I don’t know’ presents a paradoxical and essentially contradictory endeavour, but 
from a premise of non-locality, as the author will demonstrate, it would be logically 
permissible (non-contradictory).  However, the understanding of this logical 
permissibility requires a re-evaluation of what is generally considered to be logical.  
This re-evaluation will be based on a subversion of the assumptions of locality (the 
indicative factors of locality) as enumerated in section 3.2.  
 
Clearly, considering the distinction Vlastos makes, the Socratic model would have to 
be different to the Platonic model.  In context of the dichotomous subject 
objectification notion expounded earlier (section 4.2 and 4.4) to inform the structure 
of perception - the rational-element, the desiring element and the emotional element 
merge into the ‘amalgamated relation of the [E]-element and [R]-element’ 
characterized by the desire for reciprocated subjectification.  As such the rational-
element assumes no ruling function (in terms of the master of the self), but rather 
assists in convoluting physical and emotional needs (desires) through the filter of the 
dichotomous subject objectifications.  From a premise of non-locality the very 
existence or experience of rationality and emotion reciprocally constructs and 
necessarily entails desire, as such, through the anthropomorphic dynamics of 
reciprocated subjectification, Plato’s desiring-element dissolves into the amalgamated 
relation of the [R]-element and the [E]-element. 
 
Non-local perceptum introduces us to the notion of the intuitive-element ([I]-
element).  The [I]-element is not situated in any one body, but pervades the 
experience of all bodies – it is non-localized.  The [I]-element never rules the 
amalgamated relationship of the [R]-element and the [E]-element, as it remains 
wholly undifferentiated from the other two elements - yet it always characterizes and 
expresses the experiential manifestation of the latter.  The [I]-element dissolves into 
the myriad patterns of rational and emotional experience, yet never deviates from its 
singular significance for any one localized perception.  The [R]-element and [E]-
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element perpetually interpret the ‘here and there’, but the [I]-element never glimpses 
beyond the ‘here’.  It is perfectly here.   
 
Accordingly, as can be deduced from the preceding paragraph, the postulated Socratic 
experiential model is constituted by the [R]-element, the [E]-element, and, 
importantly, the [I]-element.  Please note that the [I]-element does not substitute 
Plato’s desiring element (see earlier discussion). 
 
Of course, by positing the notion of the [I]-element and romanticising the ubiquitous 
character there-of (the ‘here’ character there-of), the author is dangerously close to 
falling prey to the fanciful construction of a possible, yet basically non-substantial 
objectification.  To provide substance for the conceptualization of the [I]-element, and 
consequently to indicate the validity of the assumption of non-locality, the author will 
investigate particular non-sensical rational phenomena (irrationalities) that might be 
considered ‘evidence’- clues that implicate non-locality.  As first witness the author 
calls to the stand – ‘the problem of self-referential statements’. 
 
It is important to realize that Socrates’s dictum is a self-referential statement.  Self-
referential statements discuss themselves.  For example: This sentence has five words.  
The sentence, in fact, does have five words, so although self-referential, it is true.  
Also: This sentence has four words.  Now this sentence is self-referential and false.  It 
does however become less clear in the following sentence: This sentence is false.  It is 
clearly a self-referential statement, but is it true or false?  When we try to decide, we 
find ourselves stuck in a vicious cycle.  The truth or falsity of the statement appears 
indeterminable.   
 
Consider the ‘Barber Paradox’:  There is a barber in a village that shaves every male 
villager if and only if the villager does not shave himself.  That is clear enough; some 
villagers shave themselves and some villagers let the barber shave them, but 
everybody is shaved.  The paradox arises when we ask whether the barber shaves 
himself.  If we assume he does, then, since the barber only shaves those who don’t 
shave themselves, the barber can’t shave himself.  Hence, if he does shave himself, 
we get stuck in the same circular argument, since the barber shaves everyone who 
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doesn’t shave himself.  Hence, if he doesn’t shave himself, he necessarily does shave 
himself.  From a premise of locality we are caught in a net of paradox. 
 
In 1902 the British logician and philosopher Bertrand Russel developed a paradox 
(self-referential) using, in rather extreme form, the same type of very general 
mathematical set-theoretic reasoning that the mathematicians were beginning to 
employ in their proofs (Penrose, 1989).  Russel’s paradox shattered the growing 
confidence of mathematicians (at the dawn of the twentieth century) by undermining 
the mathematical reasoning which they believed would ultimately allow for the 
certain determination of the truth and falsity of any statement.  Russel’s paradox reads 
as follows (see Penrose, 1989, p. 100-101 for a detailed explication): 
It concerns a set R defined in the following way: 
 
 R is the set of all sets which are not members of themselves. 
 
Thus R is a certain collection of sets; and the criterion for a set X to belong to this 
collection is that the set X is not to be found amongst its own members. 
 
What does it mean to say a set is a member of itself?  Consider for example, the set I 
of infinite sets (sets with infinitely many members).  Suppose that there are infinitely 
many different infinite sets, in that case the set I is itself infinite.  Thus set I belongs to 
itself.   
The paradox arises when we ask whether set R (as formulated above) is a member of 
itself or not (self-referential).  If it is not a member of itself, then it should belong to 
R, since R consists precisely of those sets which are not members of themselves.  
Thus R belongs to R after all, hence a contradiction.  On the other hand, if R is a 
member of itself, then since ‘itself’ is actually R, it belongs to that set whose members 
are characterized by not being members of themselves, hence set R is paradoxically 
not a member of itself! 
 
Mathematicians responded to this dilemma by attempting to develop a highly 
formalized mathematical system of axioms and rules of procedure, the aim being to 
avoid the paradoxical types of reasoning (like Russel’s paradox) and translate all 
kinds of correct type of reasoning into their scheme.  The hope of formal 
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mathematical systems (the perspective that one can dispense with the meaning of 
mathematical statements and regard them as nothing but strings of symbols in some 
formal system) was to place mathematics, once and for all, on an unassailably secure 
foundation (Penrose, 1989). 
 
The prospect for an impregnable foundation for mathematics was destroyed when in 
1931 Kurt Gödel developed a brilliant theorem known today simply as “Godel’s 
theorem”.  Gödel demonstrated that formal mathematical systems that attempt to 
avoid contradictive reasoning and is broad enough to contain descriptions of simple 
arithmetical propositions (example: Fermat’s last theorem), must contain statements 
which are neither provable or disprovable by means allowed within the system.  
Consequently a valid conjecture that flows from Gödel’s theorem is that any 
formalistic mathematical scheme can’t encapsulate the concept of mathematical truth.  
Penrose (1989) states: 
 
Gödel’s argument shows that the strict formalist viewpoint does not really 
hold together; yet it does not lead us to a wholly reliable alternative point of 
view…The procedure that is actually adopted in contemporary mathematics, 
for avoiding the type of reasoning with ‘enormous’ sets that leads to Russel’s 
paradox, is not entirely satisfactory.  Moreover it is still stated in distinctly 
formalistic terms- or alternatively, in terms that do not give us full confidence 
that contradictions can not arise.  (p. 101) 
 
Beyond the testimony of paradoxical self-referential statements, there is of course the 
wave function – recall that the wave function is a mathematical quantity obtained by 
solving Schrödinger’s wave equation that contains all the possible information we can 
obtain about a quantum system (observed system interacting with an 
observing/measuring system).  The wave function, however, confronts the [R]-
element with a paradoxical state of affairs.  To illustrate the paradoxical implications 
of the wave function, Schrodinger (Lockwood, 1989) devised a thought experiment 
called ‘Schrodinger’s cat’, which reads as follows:  A cat is placed in a steel chamber 
together with a device containing cyanide and radioactive atomic nucleus.  When the 
atomic nucleus decays it emits a particle that triggers a mechanism that releases the 
cyanide into the steel chamber - consequently the cat is killed immediately.  The 
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question is, without looking inside the chamber, what has happened to the cat – is the 
cat dead or alive?  According to classical physics, the cat is either dead or alive.  All 
we have to do is open the chamber and see which is the case.  However, as the author 
explicated in section 2, the concepts of classical physics break down at subatomic 
level, and instead we have to rely on the wave function to describe subatomic events 
(the decay of the radioactive atomic nucleus).  The description of the possible states 
of the system (recall that all the possibilities are related to certain probabilities that 
change with the passing of time) forms the nucleus of this paradox of Schrodinger’s 
cat (described next). 
 
The time when the radioactive atom decays can, according to quantum mechanics, 
even in principle, not be predicted exactly.  This is a consequence of the nature of the 
wave function.  The moment we close the steel chamber, the wave function describes 
a quantum superposition of states – this means that the wave function of the system 
must be composed of two parts, describing both a decayed and an undecayed nucleus.  
As time goes by the wave function changes and consequently the probability of 
finding the nucleus in one or the other state changes.  After a significant amount of 
time has passed, the part of the wave function describing the undecayed nucleus will 
constitute only a small component, while the probability of finding a decayed nucleus 
will be almost equal to one hundred percent.  Now for the interesting and paradoxical 
part. 
 
The cat is also composed of atoms and should accordingly also be described by a 
wave function – this would be a very complex wave function, but a wave function 
nonetheless.  Since the fate of the cat is now strongly correlated with that of the 
radioactive nucleus, these two elements must be described by an entangled state.  
Therefore the cat’s wave function will also unavoidably split into a superposition of 
two states.  This means that before the experimenter looks inside the chamber, there is 
a certain probability for finding the cat dead, another probability for finding the cat 
alive, and most importantly, a probability for finding the cat dead and alive!  Of 
course the problem with this is that no one has ever seen a cat being dead and alive 
simultaneously!  The success and accuracy of quantum mechanics forces these 
indications to be taken seriously. 
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Is it possible that there really exists such a state of affairs?  Schrodinger himself 
believed otherwise.  He argued that the rule of the evolution process of the wave 
function should not apply to something so large or so complicated as a cat (Penrose, 
1989).  According to Schrodinger any indeterminacy (example: dead and alive) must 
be regarded as a feature of the description, rather than of the state of affairs described 
(Lockwood, 1989).  Penrose (1989) disagrees with Schrodinger’s view and states that 
a great many physicists (probably most) would maintain that, on the contrary, there is 
now much experimental evidence in favour of the evolution of the wave function – 
and none at all against it – that physicists have no right whatsoever to abandon that 
type of evolution, even at the scale of the cat. 
 
From a premise of non-locality, the “problem” of self-referential statements, and the 
“paradox” of Schrodinger’s cat, become the “case” of self-referential statements, and 
the “case” of Schrodinger’s cat.  The reason for the latter two ‘cases’ will be 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
The problem of self-referential statements and the paradox of Schrodinger’s cat is 
essentially the problem of the assumption of locality, specifically indicative factor one 
as enumerated in section 3.2 – the acceptance of a fundamental here-there/now-then 
dichotomy.  Consider for example paradoxical self-referential statements:  the acting 
subject directs his/her actions towards a him/herself also as an acting subject.  These 
two actions are the same actions yet opposing forms of this action (this idea will later 
be elaborated in terms of the principle of symmetry in section 6).  This dual 
symmetrical action state is a necessary criterion to differentiate possible paradoxical 
self-referential statements from singular action or non-symmetrical self-referential 
statements, for example:  ‘I know myself’ and ‘I know that I know’. 
 
The conditioned [R]-element inevitably accepts from a premise of locality and 
specifically through the medium of language, a fundamental here-there/subject-object 
foundation.  What happens in the case of dual action self-referential statements is that 
they play along with the rules of the game, in the sense that they assume the form of 
here-there, for example: ‘I know that I know’, where ‘here’ equals ‘I know’, and 
‘there’ equals the second ‘I know’.  On the surface everything appears fine, but 
implicitly the foundation for a possible paradox has already been laid.  The active 
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subject has directed its actions to itself as active subject, and in the process become its 
own object.  Thus, although the subject-object structure/the here-there rationale has 
been accepted, the content specifically signifies a ‘subject-subject’ structure, a ‘here-
here’ format.  The ‘here’ is a ‘here’, but the ‘there’ is also a ‘here’, stated otherwise, 
the ‘acting subject’ is the ‘acting subject’, but the ‘object’ is also the ‘acting subject’.  
Of course this presents no problem for self-referential statements if the acting subject 
corresponds with the other acting subject, the subject-object structure is allowed to 
make sense, for example: ‘I know that I know’.  However, the covert contradiction 
becomes overt if the alternating ‘acting subjects’ do not correspond, as would be the 
case with – ‘I know that I don’t know’.  In such cases the subject-object rationale 
becomes problematic, the locality assumption of ‘here-there’ breaks down.  It 
degenerates into an ad infinitum self-perpetuating circular argument. 
 
The paradox essentially lies in the same subject performing two similar yet opposing 
actions at exactly the same time.  For symmetry based on the [R]-element this is 
contradictory, but for symmetry based on the [I]-element this is precisely sensical (the 
latter proposition will be explained in detail in section 6).  If the barber was allowed 
to cut his hair now and later not cut his hair, there would be no problem, or 
alternatively, if Socrates could know now and later not know, there would be no 
contradiction.  But the simultaneity criterion, forced upon the ‘here-there’ structure by 
the ‘here-here’ content, at least questions, if nothing else, the assumption of locality as 
premise. 
 
The possible fallaciousness of the assumption of locality must also be evaluated in 
terms of Schrodinger’s cat.  It is problematic for a conditioned [R]-element to 
consider in terms of its dichotomous temporal and spatial assumptions the state of a 
simultaneously dead and alive cat.  As was the case for paradoxical self-referential 
statements, the here-there/now-then structure breaks down.  Once again, it would be 
acceptable for the cat to be alive now and dead later, but wholly unacceptable in a 
dichotomous spatio-temporal framework for the cat to be simultaneously alive and 
dead.  Similarly, it was paradoxical for the single photon to pass through two different 
slits at once in the two-slit experiment, but that is exactly what the inferential pattern 
on the plate (empirical experiment results) forced the assumption of locality to 
confess.  Consequently, it is quite possible that the experimental indications of 
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quantum mechanics are not dubious, but indeed that it is our fundamental assumptions 
concerning the nature of reality and the character of our own existence that are 
dubious.  The latter possibility does not imply that Schrodinger’s cat truly exists in a 
state of being dead and alive, it does however acknowledge that logic that is delimited 
to spatio-temporal dichotomies, fails to describe the evolution of certain physical 
systems (like for example the two slit experiment).   As such one might extrapolate 
and state that manifesting localized phenomena do not necessarily equate some 
exclusive ontological base.  In context of this thesis this amounts to saying that the 
conditioned [R]-element does not appear to occupy a prototypical form of experience.      
 
The ‘case’ of self-referential statements (linguistic and mathematical) implicate non-
locality as a more suitable candidate to occupy the position of base assumption.  The 
latter implication assumes an essentially logical character and will be elaborated 
subsequently. 
The ‘case’ of Schrodinger’s cat, considered in light of the two-slit experiment and 
Bell’s theorem, also corroborates the implication of non-locality.  Now, however, the 
implication assumes an essentially practical character informed by empirical 
experiments. 
 
Consider also, in questioning the ontology or exclusivity of locality, exhibit A – the 
principle of relativity, and exhibit B – Zeno’s paradox.  Exhibit A: The principle of 
relativity was the starting point of Albert Einstein’s special theory of relativity (as 
distinguished from his later ‘general theory of relativity’).  Relativity theory 
demonstrates that all measurements involving space and time lose their absolute 
significance and that the classical concepts of an absolute space and an absolute time 
are superfluous (Capra, 1999).  Sixty-four years after Einstein first conceptualized his 
special theory of relativity, Sachs (1969) in ‘Physics Today’ wrote: 
 
The real revolution that came with Einstein’s theory … was the abandonment 
of the idea that the space-time co-ordinate system has objective significance as 
a separate physical entity.  Instead of this idea, relativity theory implies that 
the space and time coordinates are only the elements of a language that is used 
by an observer to describe his environment. (p. 53) 
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Important to note is that the special theory of relativity is not a theory positing that 
everything is relative.  Zukav (1991) states that fundamentally the special theory of 
relativity is not about what is relative, but rather about what is absolute.  Regarding 
the latter consider the following: in relativistic physics time is added to the three space 
coordinates (breadth, length, and height) as a fourth dimension.  Space and time are 
no longer considered to be separate entities, but are intimately and inseparably 
connected to form a four-dimensional continuum called the ‘space-time continuum’ 
(Capra, 1999).  As such the special theory of relativity gives rise to a phenomenon 
well known to physicists, called the twin paradox.  One twin remains on earth while 
the other twin flies away in a spaceship at a speed approaching the speed of light.  
According to relativistic physics, when the twin in the spaceship returns a few years 
later he will be younger then the twin that remained on the earth (Hawking, 2001).  
The point is the following:  the special theory of relativity holds that there is a definite 
space-time interval that allows for movement of the two twins to be correlated.  From 
their own individual frame of reference the twins will record different times and 
distances in relation to each other, yet the special theory of relativity allows for the 
two different sets of data to be transposed to the other’s frame of reference (the latter 
is often referred to as Lorentz invariance and will be explained in section 6.3).  The 
final numbers would come out the same for both the twins (Zukav, 1991).  However, 
from a premise of non-locality even this absolute relation must be considered in terms 
of an epiphenomenon.  Implicit to the principle of relativity is the assumption of 
locality in the form of indicative factor one (see section 3.2) – the primacy of here-
there/now-then.  Therefore the special theory relativity, including the real physically 
changing bodies, describes a particular pattern of localized ‘movement’.  Exhibit A, if 
nothing else, clearly indicates the illusory appearances that localized (spatio-temporal) 
phenomena can assume. 
 
Exhibit B: Zeno’s paradox.  The ancient Greek philosopher Zeno believed that our 
senses could not be trusted, and specifically argued that the basic experience of 
motion is an illusion.  By utilizing an apparent inconsistency in what everyday 
experience indicates to be true and what logic dictates must be true, he developed the 
following argument known to this day as Zeno’s paradox (Pine, 1988):  To move 
from any point A to another point B a person must first travel half the distance.  To 
move from this halfway point to point B, again half the distance must be traversed.  
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To move from any subsequent point to point B, again half the distance must be 
traversed.  No matter how close point B is approached, there will still be some 
distance left, and the next half of the distance must be travelled again, and again, and 
again, ad infinitum.  Since point B can be any distance, including a very short 
distance, it is logically impossible to traverse even the shortest distance!  A person 
might experience the self and others moving about from point to point everyday, but 
careful logical inspection, according to Zeno, reveals such movement to be an 
illusion.  Zeno believed that we should follow the logical guide of our reason, no 
matter how strange the result.  If the above paradox is problematic, it is so because the 
movement that traverses the distance between A and B acknowledges only the 
distinctness of A and B and not the identicalness of A and B.  From a premise of non-
locality all exclusively dichotomous relation must be considered a consequence of 
localized conditioning, such relation of course not being encompassed by the capacity 
for objectification (lower animals also experience the world in a relational manner 
without the desire for reciprocated subjectification related to non-imitation/non-
mirror-self-recognition), but succinctly expressed thereby. There-fore, in 
consideration of factor 8 in section 3.2, the relation between A and B must 
acknowledge the differentness, but also the identicalness of A and B due to the [I]-
element and the principle of symmetry (explained in section 6).   All localized logic, 
in order to be able to describe the simple movement from point A to point B, must 
also include the extra option of ‘A and B’ that is essential for making sense of the 
movement from A to B.  When Zeno says that one must initially traverse half of the 
distance between A and B, point A remains the same, point B remains the same, yet 
the extra option ‘A and B’ is now changed to ‘half A and B’.  ‘Half A and B’ does not 
equal ‘A and B’, and because ‘A and B’ is the logical requirement from a premise of 
non-locality to traverse the distance between A and B, ‘half A and B’ will never 
logically be able to traverse the distance between A and B, it will logically only be 
able to initially traverse half the distance between A and B (consequently also half the 
distances between the new point and B). The nature of non-local perceptum 
explicating the latter will be further considered in section 5.3 and section 6. 
 
If a premise of non-locality is assumed, a fundamental implication is the non-
exclusive state of any here-there/now-then dichotomy.  If, as such, no exclusivity was 
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attributed to the experience of this spatio-temporal dichotomy, the experience there-of 
might equally well be described as illusory. 
 
Furthermore, regard also the occurrence of what mathematicians call ‘real’ numbers.  
Real numbers are numbers that can be represented as infinite decimal expansions, 
such as: 
5.789345346797….  or  – 359.677647823681…  
 
The Russian-German mathematician Georg Cantor demonstrated, through what 
became known as Cantor’s diagonal slash argument, that real numbers are, in fact, 
uncountable (Penrose, 1989).  This means the number of real numbers are greater than 
the number of rational numbers (rational numbers include all numbers that have 
repeated or finite decimal expansion).  Real numbers proliferate ad infinitum, and 
when interpreted in terms of distance or time (or describing distance or time) 
mathematicians encounter scales so small that the concepts of distance or time, in the 
ordinary sense, cease to have meaning.  Real numbers refer to a mathematical 
idealization rather than to any actual physically objective quantity (Penrose, 1989).  
Again, as with Zeno’s paradox, any logical system (such as the numerical system) 
based fundamentally on the differentiation of its constitutive elements (different 
numbers in this case), inevitably produce infinity considerations as a consequence of 
the premise of locality. 
   
Thus, real numbers and Zeno’s paradox describe realities completely foreign to our 
everyday localized experience.  Again, if nothing else, the premise of locality 
engenders a multitude of irreconcilable questions and paradoxical implications.  From 
a premise of non-locality, the latter are not problems, but solutions on to themselves 
(see also section 5.3). 
 
In light of the above dialectic, how is one to understand Socrates’ particular flavour of 
ignorance in context of non-locality?  Is the tripartite model consisting of the [R]-
element, the [E]-element, and the [I]-element logically coherent in terms of the non-
locality interpretation of Socratic ignorance? 
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If one is to assume a premise of locality and adopt a Platonic tripartite model, 
Socrates’s ignorance becomes contradictory (see Vlastos thesis 3 enumerated earlier) 
and the [R]-element ipso facto relegates Socrates’s self-referential dictum to the realm 
of non-sensical and amusing paradoxes (as expounded earlier).  However, if one is to 
accept a premise of non-locality, Socratic ignorance becomes infused with novel 
meaning and his infamous dictum bespeaks a new and wondrous realm of unchartered 
knowledge.  The primacy of the [I]-element (related to S – S) buffers ‘I know that I 
don’t know’ against a paradoxical fate, and acknowledges, indeed requires, that 
Socrates can know and not know at exactly the same time!  Recall the “Schrodinger’s 
cat” experiment - before the experimenter looks inside of the chamber, the state of the 
cat becomes entangled to the state of the radioactive atomic nucleus, accordingly the 
cat can be said to be alive, or dead, or dead and alive.  The cat exists in a state of 
quantum superposition (dead and alive) until the experimenter looks inside the 
chamber (makes a measurement), only then does the wave function ‘collapse’, and the 
experimenter finds either a dead cat or an alive cat.  Analogously the same applies to 
the Socratic ‘elenchus’, before Socrates investigates the truth or falsity of a belief or 
proposition, or stated otherwise, before Socrates investigates whether the interlocutor 
knows or does not know, the interlocutor’s state of knowledge can be considered to be 
entangled with the Socratic state of ‘I know that I don’t know’ (as the state of the cat 
becomes entangled to the state of the radioactive atomic nucleus).  As such Socrates 
and the interlocutor adopt the role of the experimenter, with the dialectical 
investigation (the elenchus) comparatively symbolising the experimenter looking 
inside the chamber.  One might consider the superposed state of ‘knowing and not 
knowing’ to collapse as the elenchus investigation proceeds – either the interlocutor 
knows or does not know.  In either case, knowing or not knowing can only be 
determined by investigating the proposition (looking inside the chamber), but 
importantly, the state of ‘knowing and not knowing’ must form an integral part of the 
logic underlying the dialectical investigation.   
 
An important difference, however, between Schrodinger’s cat and the Socratic 
elenchus is that whereas the cat exists only in a superposition of two states (dead and 
alive), Socrates and the interlocutor have multifarious beliefs and opinions, each of 
which can be formulated in terms of a particular dichotomous subject objectification.  
Objectifications equate what a person thinks he/she knows or does not know (see 
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earlier discussion – section 4.2).  The investigation of the state of knowledge of the 
interlocutor consequently becomes entangled by way of the superpositioning of a 
multitude of objectifications, multifarious superposed ‘knowings’ and ‘not knowings’.  
No wonder the elenchus of the early Socratic dialogues usually ended up in confusion 
or aporia3. 
 
The latter understanding requires a re-evaluation of the notion that for Socrates the 
discovery of ignorance was the beginning and not the end of the philosophical task 
(Tarnas, 1991).  The [I]-element engenders that it would be fallacious to suppose that 
once one has discovered a particular ignorance, or discovered that one is ignorant in 
general, that this would serve as a foundation whence a spatio-temporal dichotomous 
edifice of certain and true knowledge can be constructed.  Such a supposition would 
only serve to enthrone the [R]-element (relate to the brilliant Greek mistake), to 
confer a sense of exclusivity to the experience of locality and the conditioned nature 
of rationality.  Rather the [I]-element dictates a form of logic allowing states of 
knowing, states of not knowing, and, importantly, states of ‘knowing and not 
knowing’.  Thus ignorance and knowledge are different sides of the same coin that 
with every toss has a definite probability of landing vertically (on its rim). 
 
The above disquisition proffers a Socratic interpretation of non-local perceptum, and 
entails a re-evaluation of the character and scope of logic in context of the postulated 
non-exclusive state of spatio-temporal localized phenomena. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Aporia is a Latin word derived from the Greek word ‘aporos’ – meaning ‘impassable’. 
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Section 5 
5.  Absolute power states 
 
5. 1   Juxtaposed Foucault 
 
Absolute power states refer to discontinuous manifesting spatio-temporal circular 
states (the choice of the term ‘circular’ is related to the perfect reflective 
symmetry/invariance of a sphere and will be explained in section 6) which biological 
cognition experiences/interprets as repetitive patterns of locality movement.  Absolute 
power states acknowledge the possibility of the non-exclusivity of spatio-temporal 
dichotomies and so dictate that all localized form can be considered to participate in a 
fundamental and instantaneous connectedness.  As such the miniscule quark and the 
awesome quasar are inextricably intertwined, the singular ant and the masses of man 
siamese patterns of a transparent plinth, the primordial and the postremordial4 forever 
united in an omnipresent now.  Such subversion of here-there/now-then assumptions, 
preclude absolute power states from describing the interactions of localized 
phenomena as original or causal – no exclusively dichotomous relation constitutes the 
character of absolute power states.  Hence the word ‘absolute power states’ is used as 
opposed to ‘absolute power relations’, specifically to avoid such confusion.   
 
Absolute power states are the dynamic function of non-local perceptum manifesting 
as locality.  Localized form of non-local perceptum implies a perspective that only 
exists as another perspective.  These perspectives inform localized bodies which 
become entangled to configure illusory patterns of movement and experience.  The 
healthy human cognition interprets these manifesting patterns as dichotomous subject 
objectifications, as such absolute power states assume inter-subjective relational 
significance.  The latter formulation consequently extends the Gestalt psychology 
principle of the ‘mind that constructs spatial wholes’ in the following manner: non-
local perceptum emanates as localized form by constructing spatial and temporal 
wholes.  To be sure, continuous time and space, from the premise of non-locality, will 
be interpreted as knotted relations that infinitely ‘happen’ or ‘occur’ together as 
                                                 
4 Postumordial is a word devised by the author derived from the Latin superlative postremus - a – um,  
  meaning ‘hindmost’ or ‘last’; Postremordial means – ‘existing from the end of time’ – the converse of  
  primordial.   
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juxtaposed epiphenomena.  As such the boundaries of a space-time-continuum do not 
extend beyond the relational experience there-of, which, through its dichotomous 
relational construction, is delimited as to its ontological significance. 
   
To reiterate: absolute power states might be understood as manifesting spatio-
temporal-circular states that conglomerate discontinuously (‘discontinuously’ here 
does not imply successive moments or states, but rather the same moment happening 
as different moments) to collapse as locality states experienced/interpreted 
relationally as to continuous space and time.  Possible scientific mechanics 
underpinning absolute power states will be considered in section 5.3. 
 
Absolute power states further acknowledge the depths of the conditioned [R]-element, 
in the sense that even the physical body represents a form of conditioning and so does 
not inhabit an ontological base.  This principle is illustrated by an experiment 
conducted in 1972 by Hafele and Keating (Zukav, 1991).  Four of the most accurate 
atomic clocks available were put aboard an aircraft and flown around the world 
(alternatively east and west).  At the end of the trip, they were found to be slightly 
behind their stationary, earthbound counterparts with which they were synchronized 
before the flight.  Thus, proportional to their velocities relative to each other, the 
physical clocks (physical body) appeared to be subjected to relative time frames.  This 
experiment correlates with the twin paradox explicated earlier, where the physical age 
of the biological bodies of the twins differed according to their velocities relative to 
each other.  Hence even the physical body equates a form of spatio-temporal 
relational conditioning, locality conditioning, basically the contingent character of the 
[R]-element (please note that the preceding description does not equate absolute 
power states with Einstein’s relativity, it merely supposes that there is some 
underlying character of being that allows for this temporal anomaly). 
 
This section will focus on the biological body experiencing the desire for reciprocated 
subjectification that becomes encoded as dichotomous subject objectifications that 
simultaneously relationally interpret and influence configurations of absolute power 
states.  Absolute power states will inform the character of objectifications (and 
consequently itself be informed) through correlation, specifically not equation, of 
objectification with Michel Foucault’s formulation of power. 
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Gordon (1980) writes that Foucault insists on “the use of the concept of power in a 
relational rather than a substantiating mode” (p. 245).  Power for Foucault is not an 
omnipotent causal principle or shaping spirit, but a perspective concept, a practice that 
establishes certain relationships between heterogeneous elements.  In “History of 
Sexuality: Volume 1” Foucault states that power must not be regarded a group of 
institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given 
state.  Also it must not be considered a mode of subjugation which, in contrast to 
violence, has the form of the rule.  Neither must power be interpreted as a general 
system of domination exerted by one group over another, a system whose effects, 
through successive derivations, pervade the entire social body.  Accordingly, the 
sovereignty of the state, the form of law, or the overall unity of domination must not 
be considered as a priori forms of power.  In Foucault’s (1976/1998) own words:  
 
It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as a 
multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate 
and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through 
ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses 
them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus 
forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and 
contradictions which isolate them from one another … (p. 92) 
 
Implementing his conceptualization of power-relations as a methodological 
instrument to analyse power, Foucault characterizes, in two lectures delivered in 
1976, two predominant forms of power, namely: the juridical-political theory of 
sovereignty (sovereign power) and disciplinary power.   
 
Foucault portrays sovereign power by identifying a common point between the 
judicial conceptualization of power (also designated liberal conceptualization of 
power), and the Marxist conceptualization of power (a certain conception of power 
that might be held by Marxists).  This common point Foucault calls an economism in 
the theory of power.  The reasons for this Foucault explains as follows:  in classic 
judicial theory power is taken to be a right, which one is able to possess like a 
commodity, and which one can in consequence wholly/partially transfer or alienate 
 
 95
through a legal act or some act that establishes a right, such as takes place through 
cession or contract.  As such juridical theory is essentially based on the idea that the 
constitution of political power obeys the model of a legal transaction involving a 
contractual type of exchange.  In the Marxist conception, power is conceived 
primarily in terms of the role it plays in the maintenance simultaneously of the 
relations of production and of class domination which the development and specific 
forms of the forces of production have rendered possible.  In this case then, the 
historical raison d’ ếtre of political power is to be found in the economy.  This 
sovereign power with its correlating economic emphasis, formulates power as an 
original right that is given up in the establishment of sovereignty, and the contract, as 
matrix of political power, which bilaterally provide its points of articulation.  
Whenever such a power goes beyond the terms of the contract, it risks becoming 
oppression.  Therefore this sovereign power (a type of contract power) has oppression 
as its limit, or more specifically, the transgression of this limit.  Accordingly Foucault 
describes this power in terms of a contract-oppression schema. 
 
The conceptualization of disciplinary power is the end product of Foucault’s 
development of a methodology which allows for a non-economic analysis of power.  
A non-economic analysis of power reveals two solid hypotheses to characterize 
power.  The first of these Foucault designates the repression-hypothesis (Reich’s 
hypothesis).  This hypothesis holds that power is basically that which represses - 
power represses nature, the instincts, a class, individuals.  Such a description of power 
as repression is a notion evinced in the discourse of intelligentsia like Hegel, Freud, 
and later Reich (Foucault, 1976/1980). The second hypothesis Foucault calls 
Nietzsche’s hypothesis. This hypothesis posits that power should be analysed 
primarily in terms of struggle, conflict and war.  As such this hypothesis argues that 
the basis of the relationship of power lies in the hostile engagement of forces. 
 
Foucault links these two hypotheses in the following way:  repression can be seen as 
the political consequence of war, somewhat as oppression, in the juridical-political 
theory of sovereignty, was seen as the abuse of sovereignty in the juridical order.  
Important to note, this repression is not abuse, but is, on the contrary, the mere effect 
and continuation of a relation of domination.  Consequently these hypotheses are 
synthesized into the domination-repression, or war-repression schema.  Concerning 
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the latter schema, the pertinent opposition is not between the legitimate and the 
illegitimate, as in the first schema, but between struggle and submission.  As such the 
domination-repression schema is nucleic to the conceptualization of disciplinary 
power. 
 
According to Foucault (1976/1980) the disciplinary form of power emerged, or rather 
was invented, during the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (the 
nature of this ‘invention’ will be discussed in 5.2 and serve as a descriptive exemplar 
for the character of S – S: O).  Foucault (1976/1980) elucidates this disciplinary 
power as follows: 
 
This new mechanism of power is more dependent upon bodies and what they 
do than upon the Earth and its products.  It is a mechanism of power which 
permits time and labour, rather than wealth and commodities, to be extracted 
from bodies.  It is a type of power which is constantly exercised by means of 
surveillance rather than in a discontinuous manner by means of a system of 
levies or obligations distributed over time.  It presupposes a tightly knit grid of 
material coercions rather than the physical existence of a sovereign. (p. 104) 
 
The notion of disciplinary power is further informed by what Foucault calls “a micro-
physics of power” (Foucault, 1975/1977, p. 26).  This refers to the political 
investment in the body in accordance with complex relations.  It is largely as a force 
of production that the body is invested with relations of power and domination, 
however, the bodies constitution as labour power is possible only if it is caught up in a 
system of subjection.  As such the body is considered useful only if it is both a 
productive body and a subjected body.  Foucault explains that this micro-physics of 
power presupposes that the power exercised on the body is conceived not as a 
property, but as a strategy, that its effects of domination are attributed not to 
‘appropriation’, but to dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques and functionings.  
The model of this microphysics resembles a perpetual battle rather than a contract 
regulating a transaction, it should be deciphered in a network of relations, constantly 
in tension, in activity, rather than a privilege that one might possess. 
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Foucault (1976/1980) postulates that modern society, from the nineteenth century 
onward has been characterized by the simultaneous exercise of power through the 
heterogeneity of the sovereign mode and disciplinary mode.  According to Foucault, 
since the nineteenth century, the contract-oppression schema (sovereign power) has 
been superimposed on the domination-repression schema (the mechanisms of 
discipline, disciplinary power), in such a way as to conceal the actual procedures of 
disciplinary power, the actual elements of domination inherent in its techniques.  
Foucault further posits that the juridical systems have enabled sovereignty to be 
democratised through the constitution of a public right articulated upon collective 
sovereignty, while at the same time this democratisation of sovereignty was 
fundamentally determined by and grounded in mechanisms of disciplinary coercion. 
 
The preceding discourse regarding Foucault’s formulation of power will provide the 
elucidating framework whence a specific dynamic of objectification will be explicated 
as to its capillary details and function.  The Foucaultian power conceptualization 
correlates with the secondary field of objectification expositioned in section 4.4.  
Objectifications, in general, equate the psycho-physiological interpretation of the 
‘moving’ physical world, it represents what a person consciously or unconsciously 
‘knows’, expects or projects in relation to other bodies.  Basically objectifications 
subsume any form of activation or experience of the [R]-element that evinces 
cognisance of the self as subject on toward the external world, any biological 
cognitive state that can fathom the ephemeral status of the physical body, that on 
some level realizes that its experience as physicality will end (humans are by no 
means necessarily the only species that possess this capacity).  Objectifications can 
readily be correlated with knowledge, knowledge of knowledges (be they ignorant or 
knowing knowledges), power, and knowledge of power.  Of course, in context of this 
thesis, these knowledges, these powers, these modes of being, revolve and configure 
around the spill of the desire for reciprocated subjectification.   
 
Consider, regarding objectification on toward power, Alfred Adler’s explication of the 
overall motivation of mankind.  Adler regards the striving for superiority as innate 
and universal to all organisms (Adler, 1930).  Adler expresses the pertinence of this 
notion for the human psyche as follows: 
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I began to see clearly in every psychological phenomenon the striving for 
superiority.  It runs parallel to physical growth and is an intrinsic necessity of 
life itself.  It lies at the root of all solutions to life’s problems and is 
manifested in the way in which we meet these problems.  All our functions 
[italics added] follow this end. (p. 398)   
 
According to Adler, this striving for superiority manifests itself in two ways, namely 
as a striving for power and social interests (Adler, 1930; Adler, 1938).  Therefore an 
Adlerian exposition of the human psyche would characterize the perceptive world of 
the localized individual (“all our functions”) as geared towards satisfying this striving 
for power.  Whereas Adler’s theory ascribes a sense of genesis to this striving for 
power, the striving for power can be considered, in context of the premise of non-
locality, a specific dynamic born from the desire of reciprocated subjectification.  This 
desire, characteristic of dichotomous subject objectifications, remains firmly rooted in 
the field of locality and must therefore be regarded as a derivatory form of experience.  
No ontological exclusivity is accordingly granted to the striving for power, no 
inescapable innate and universal character need be imposed on this ‘will to power’. 
 
The desire of reciprocated subjectification imbues objectifications with ‘power’ 
significance and allows for the succinct correlation of the secondary field of 
objectification and Foucault’s conceptualization of power.  This correlation is also 
supported by Foucault’s description of the interdependent state of power and 
knowledge.  Foucault (1975/1977) asserts that power and knowledge directly imply 
one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a 
field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the 
same time power relations.  He states that the whole tradition that places knowledge 
in a disparate domain beyond the injunctions, interests and demands of power 
relations, should be abandoned.  Foucault bespeaks ‘power-knowledge relations’, 
where the subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of 
knowledge must be regarded as multifarious effects of the fundamental implications 
of power-knowledge and their historical transformations. 
 
A possible pattern of absolute power states broadly in terms of the secondary field of 
objectifications, cohesively in terms of the interactive configurations of leaf- and 
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stem-objectifications, specifically in terms of disciplinary power, will be investigated 
in the next section. 
                   
5. 2   A panoptic objectification 
 
Dichotomous subject objectifications have an omnipresent breath that does not 
entangle locality by means of a descending net of invincible unity, but rather these 
objectifications are produced from one moment to the next, at every capable cognitive 
point, proliferating in every relation from one mobility to the other.  As such S – S: O 
represent concatenating patterns articulated upon and through manifesting states of 
locality – absolute power states.  This section will investigate the contracting, 
expanding, proliferating morphology of objectifications.  Objectification will be 
examined in terms of the appearance of the panopticon at the end of the eighteenth 
century, and the subsequent spread of the Panopticon principle throughout societal 
mechanisms and structures.  Michel Foucault’s book “Discipline and Punish” will 
serve as reference source unless indicated otherwise. 
 
The panopticon (conceptualized by Jeremy Bentham) is an annular (ring-shaped) 
building in the middle of which there is a yard with a tower at the centre.  This tower 
is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric 
building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; 
they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the 
tower; the other, on the outside, allowing the light to cross the cell from one end to the 
other.  In the central tower there is an observer.  Since each cell faces both the inside 
and the outside, the observer’s gaze can traverse the whole cell.  Through the effect of 
backlighting there is no dimly lit space, so the small captive shadows in the cells of 
the periphery are constantly exposed to the gaze of the observer who watches through 
shuttered windows or spy holes in such a way as to be able to see everything without 
anyone being able to see him/her.  The particular arrangement of spatial unities by the 
panoptic mechanism make it possible to see constantly and to recognize immediately.  
Each inmate, in his/her place, is securely confined to a cell from where he/she is seen 
from the front by the observer, yet prevented by sidewalls from coming into contact 
with his/her fellow inmates.  The inmate is seen, but he/she does not see; he/she is the 
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object of information, never a subject in communication.  The arrangement of his/her 
room imposes on the inmate an axial visibility, but the division of separated cells 
imply a lateral invisibility.  This invisibility facilitates order.   
 
According to Foucault the major effect of the panopticon is the following: to induce in 
the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic 
functioning of power, to achieve a spatial arrangement where surveillance is 
permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; to create through this 
architectural apparatus a sustained power relation independent of the person who 
exercises it.  Basically, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of 
which they themselves are the bearers.  Foucault explains that Bentham laid down the 
principle that power should be visible and unverifiable.  Visible: the central tower 
from which the inmate is spied upon must constantly be in his/her field of sight.  
Unverifiable:  the inmate must be ambiguous as to whether he/she is being looked at 
at any one moment, the high probability that he/she is currently being observed must 
be ever present for the inmate.  To this end the central tower must have Venetian 
blinds or a spy hole in order to make the presence or absence of the observer 
unverifiable. 
 
The panopticon makes it possible to perfect the exercise of power.  It does so in 
several ways: it reduces the number of those who exercise it, while increasing the 
number of those on whom it is exercised; the constant pressure of the omnipresent 
gaze acts even before the offences, mistakes or crimes have been committed; without 
any physical instrument other than architecture and geometry, it acts directly on 
individuals.  The panopticon assures an effective application of material, personnel 
and time. 
 
The architectural figure and functions of the panopticon can be characterised as 
specific leaf-objectifications, as particular operations of dichotomous subject 
formation (S – S: O) - for example: the prisoner on toward the observing guards (and 
vice versa), the prisoner on toward the building or his/her cell, prisoners on toward 
each other, the prisoner on toward his/her sentence and crime.  But the panopticon 
must be understood as more than a mere dream prison filled with criminals: it is a 
diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form, it is in fact a figure of 
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political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use.  Foucault 
(1977/1980) says that whereas the palace and the church were architectural forms 
manifesting might, the Sovereign, or God, the panopticon utilizes “the disposition of 
space for economico-political ends” (p. 148).  The panopticon allows for a fictitious 
relation to mechanically give birth to a real subjection.  The latter principle informs 
the network of leaf-objectifications that construct the panopticon experience with a 
thematic stem-objectification that may be formulated as follows: a person who is 
subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the 
constraints of power, he/she allows invisible subjection to play spontaneously upon 
the self; he/she inscribes in him/herself the power relation in which he/she 
simultaneously plays both roles; the person becomes the principle of his/her own 
subjection – the self on toward an invisible and omnipresent imperative. 
   
This stem-objectification provides the underlying dynamic matrix where-upon 
multifarious, yet intricately related leaf-objectifications are interpreted, constructed 
and articulated.  Take for example the following leaf-objectifications: the panopticon 
institution is functionally applicable to hospitals, schools, workshops, factories, 
barracks, and of course, prisons (Foucault, 1973/2000).  The stem-objectification is 
polyvalent in functionalising these leaf-objectifications: it serves to reform prisoners, 
but also to treat patients, to instruct children, to confine and observe the insane, to 
supervise workers, to put beggars and idlers to work, and to inspect soldiers.  As such 
a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy might occupy the 
cells in the peripheral building.  So the observer becomes a controlling and 
dominating subject, on toward the observed that adopts a dominated, controlled and 
subjugated subject position (represents an exemplar of the desire for reciprocated 
subjectification that becomes encoded as to a particular dichotomous subject 
objectification). 
 
The stem-objectification as formulated above equates the notion of ‘panopticism’.  
Bentham dreamt of transforming the capillary relations of the panopticon into a 
network of mechanisms that would permeate society as a whole without interruption 
in space or time.  Foucault states that the panoptic schema, without disappearing as 
such or losing any of its properties, was destined to spread throughout the social body 
and that its vocation was to become a generalized function.  This generalized function 
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that would pervade societal mechanisms is essentially expressed by the idea of 
panopticism.  Foucault (1973/2000) describes panopticism as follows: 
 
Panopticism is one of the characteristic traits of our society.  It is a type of 
power that is applied to individuals in the form of continuous individual 
supervision, in the form of control, punishment, and compensation, and in the 
form of correction, that is the molding and transformation of individuals in 
terms of certain norms.  This threefold aspect of panopticism – supervision, 
control, correction – seems to be a fundamental and characteristic dimension 
of the power relations that exist in our society. (p. 70) 
 
Panopticism is the general principle of a covert politics whose object and end are not 
the relations of sovereignty, but the relations of discipline.  These relations of 
discipline portray a specific configuration of dichotomous subject objectifications.   
 
The disciplinary mechanism of the panoptic schema not only lead to an increase in 
disciplinary establishments, but also became “de-institutionalised” (Foucault, 
1975/1977, p. 211), that is, the relations of discipline emerged from the closed 
institutions in which they once functioned and began to circulate in a ‘free’ state 
(panopticism).  Consider for example the dissemination of centres of observation 
throughout society.  Religious groups and charity organizations had long played this 
role of disciplining the population.  They divided territory into quarters and cantons, 
and the members of the association divided themselves up along the same lines.  
Foucault writes that from the Counter-Reformation to the philanthropy of the July 
monarchy, initiatives of this type continued to increase.  They had multifarious aims, 
for example: religious (conversion and moralization), economic (aid and 
encouragement to work), and political (the struggle against discontent and agitation). 
 
Disciplinary mechanisms not only took responsibility for the particular function it 
exercised over individuals, but also for the individual’s existence as a whole 
(Foucault, 1973/2000).  Consider the following: hospitals, which were designed for 
healing, forbade sexual behaviour, sexual activity; in schools pupils weren’t just 
taught to read, but also obliged to wash.  Furthermore these closed apparatuses added 
to their internal functioning a role of external surveillance, developing around 
 
 103
themselves a whole margin of lateral controls.  For example: the Christian School 
must not simply train docile children; it must also make it possible to supervise the 
parents, to gain information about their daily lives, their resources, their piety, their 
monetary status, their morals. 
 
Social discipline soon became the function of the police apparatus.  Although the 
police as an institution were certainly organized in the form of a state apparatus, as 
Foucault acknowledges, and although as such it was certainly linked to the centre of 
political sovereignty, the type of power that it exercises, the mechanisms it operates 
and the elements to which it applies them are specific.  In disciplinary power, police 
power must bear over everything, not as the totality of the state, nor of the kingdom as 
visible and invisible body of the monarch, but rather as an instrument of permanent, 
exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance capable of making all visible, as long as it could 
itself remain invisible (recall the Panopticon relation of the invisible observer on 
toward the visible prisoner).  The police apparatus, extending its function through 
corroboration with secret agents, paid informers, and prostitutes, acted like a faceless 
gaze that transformed the whole social body into a field of perception: thousands of 
eyes posted everywhere, mobile attentions ever on the alert, a multitude of fictional 
central towers permeating the social network. 
Foucault (1975/1977) explains as follows: 
 
On the whole therefore, one can speak of the formation of a disciplinary 
society in this movement that stretches from the enclosed disciplines, … to an 
indefinitely generalizable mechanism of ‘panopticism’.  Not because the 
disciplinary modality of power has replaced all the others (example Sovereign 
power), but because it has infiltrated the others… (p. 216) 
 
Accordingly one might synoptically assess disciplinary power (a specific form of 
stem-objectification) as follows: it must not be identified with an institution or with an 
apparatus; it is a type of power relation, a technology, a modality for its exercise, 
comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, 
and targets.  Foucault (1975/1977) explicates that it may be taken over either by 
specialized institutions (the penitentiaries of the nineteenth century), or by institutions 
that use it as an essential instrument for a particular end (schools, hospitals), or by 
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pre-existing authorities that find in it a means of reinforcing or reorganizing their 
internal mechanisms of power (intra-familial relations – the parent-child cell), or by 
apparatuses that have made discipline their principle of internal functioning (the 
disciplinarization of the administrative apparatus from the Napoleonic period), or 
finally, by the state apparatuses whose major, if not exclusive, function is to assure 
that discipline reigns over society as a whole (the police). 
 
Julius (cited in Foucault, 1975/1977) speaks of panopticism and says that the 
panopticon was much more than architectural ingenuity, he describes it as an event in 
the ‘history of the human mind’.  On the surface the panoptic principle appears 
merely as a solution to a technical problem, but through it a whole type of society 
emerges.  The influence of such a stem-objectification (disciplinary power; 
panopticism) on general societal transformations is expounded by Foucault as 
follows: historical patterns of societal mechanisms evinces the conjunction of, on the 
one hand, the monarchical, ritual exercise of sovereignty, and on the other, the 
hierarchical, permanent exercise of indefinite discipline; simply put - the interplay of 
sovereign power (contract-oppression) and disciplinary power (domination-
repression; as discussed in section 5.1).  During the eighteenth century the 
establishment of an explicit, coded and formally egalitarian juridical framework 
(related to sovereign power), which was made possible by the organization of a 
parliamentary, representative régime, masked the process whereby the bourgeoisie 
became the political dominant class.  This process was facilitated by the clandestine 
operations of disciplinary mechanisms.  These disciplinary mechanisms, characterized 
by tiny, everyday, physical mechanisms, by all those systems of micro-power that are 
essentially non-egalitarian and asymmetrical, supported the general juridical form 
that guaranteed a system of rights that were egalitarian in principle.  Thus a 
contradictory and heterogeneous interplay of power arose where, in a democratic 
fashion, the will of all form the fundamental authority of sovereignty, but the 
disciplines provide at the base, a guarantee of the submission of forces and bodies.  
Panopticism bellied the ‘contract’ which was regarded as the ideal foundation of law 
and political power - real corporal disciplines constituted the foundation of the formal, 
juridical liberties.   
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According to Foucault (1975/1977) the disciplines should be regarded as a type of 
“counter-law” (p. 222).  They function as to produce insurmountable asymmetries and 
exclude reciprocities.  Conversely, whereas the juridical systems define juridical 
subjects according to universal rules, the disciplines “characterize, classify, specialize; 
they distribute along a scale, along a norm, hierarchize individuals in relation to one 
another and, if necessary, disqualify and invalidate” (p. 223).  Disciplinary power 
effects a suspension of the law that is never total, but is never annulled either.  The 
exercise of power appears to be delimited by the universal juridicism of modern 
society, yet its universally widespread panopticism enables it to operate, on the dark 
side of the law, a ‘machinery that is both immense and minute’, which supports, 
reinforces, multiplies the asymmetries of power.  So the limits drawn around the law 
are compromised.  The fundamental disparity between disciplinary power and 
sovereign power, two heterogeneous and divergent objectifications, will be revisited 
in section 6 and conceptualized in terms of a type of cognitive dissonance.  
 
The dynamics of absolute power states allow for a pattern of the secondary field of 
objectification to be described.  The reciprocal interplay of leaf-objectifications and 
stem-objectifications have traced a path from the architectural figure of the 
panopticon, through the individual institutions such as hospitals, schools and 
factories, delineating into governmental control procedures and mechanisms, 
ultimately effecting broad juridico-economical transformations in modern society.  
These power-relation patterns (in terms of the premise of non-locality) must not be 
regarded as some univocal outside force imposing itself on the totality of individual 
minds, rather these dichotomous subject objectifications are produced from one 
moment to the next as interactive perspectives converging into the experience of the 
self as subject.  Always related to, and always confronting the desire of reciprocated 
subjectification that animates the objectification experience. 
 
Foucault (1975/1977) asks the question, “Is it surprising that prisons resemble 
factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?” (p. 228).  From 
the perspective of leaf-objectifications it is very surprising, from the perspective of 
stem-objectifications it was a matter of time. 
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5. 3   A scientific Zeno 
 
The same delimited relational experiences that delude our sensory perception also 
misguide the rational principles and extrapolations of mathematics and science.  The 
problematic of the latter will be investigated in this section and correlated with Zeno’s 
paradox and so illustrate the implicit and ultimately fallacious assumption of locality 
as premise in modern scientific thought. 
 
Modern day physics is characterised by an embarrassing disparity between two of the 
most successful scientific theories of the 20th century – the general theory of relativity 
and Quantum mechanics.  Beyond the apparent contradiction of the one theory 
forbidding faster than light interconnections (Einstein’s relativity) and the other 
essentially requiring such connections, the disparity revolves around the four 
postulated forces of nature (actually five if the more recent postulated antigravity 
force is considered).  According to modern physic there are four fundamental 
interactions between particles: the weak, the strong, the electromagnetic, and the 
gravitational (Zee, 1986).  Gravitational forces are what keep physical bodies from 
flying of the earth, holding planetary systems together, and controlling the apparent 
expansion of the universe.  Electromagnetic forces (as the name indicates this force 
expresses a synthesis of electric force and magnetic force) holds atoms together, 
governs the propagation of light (in terms of electromagnetic wave description) and 
radio waves, causes chemical reactions and facilitates the cohesiveness of physical 
bodies.  The strong force holds quarks together and consequentially protons and 
neutrons to form the nucleus.  The weak force is another force found in the nucleus 
and refers to the process of beta-decay whereby an electron and its antimatter partner, 
a positron, are created when protons and neutrons are converted into each other to 
conserve the electric charge of the atom. 
 
In contemporary science there is no single grand theory describing and explaining the 
four forces in a unified manner.  On the one side there are the quantum field theories 
(broadly known as quantum mechanics) describing the weak force, the strong force 
and the electromagnetic force, while on the other side there is Einstein’s general 
theory of relativity describing gravity.  Apart from the fact that these two sides both 
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approximate to Newtonian physics on an everyday scale, they have very little in 
common.  The two sides delineate to interpret on the one extreme very small objects 
and distances (quantum mechanics), and very large objects and distances on the other 
(general relativity). These delineations are characterized by very different 
mathematical structures, rendering them incompatible (Al-Khalili, 2003).  Even 
within the domain of quantum field theories the distinctive theories have not yet been 
completely successfully combined. The electromagnetic force is described by 
quantum electrodynamics and the strong force by quantum chromodynamics 
(Penrose, 1989).  An extended field theory, called the ‘electroweak theory’, was 
developed that unified the electromagnetic and weak forces.  Despite electroweak 
theory and quantum chromodynamics both being quantum field theories, physicists 
have not been able to properly merge these two theories.  A scheme for combining 
them has been developed, but it has not been verified experimentally.  In the 
meantime particle physicists refer to a framework that loosely incorporates both the 
electroweak theory and quantum chromodynamics, called the Standard Model.  In 
general physicists do not regard this model to be ultimately sufficient (Al-Khalili, 
2003). 
 
For the purposes of this section, the author will investigate the rationale of quantum 
field theory, which characterizes the domain of quantum mechanics.  The central tenet 
of a quantum field theory is that something like an electric field can be thought of as 
many virtual particles popping in and out of existence all the time, as such acting as a 
type of particle exchange force between other particles (Capra, 1999).  For example: 
the electroweak theory describes particles (like electrons) interacting by exchanging 
the force-carrying photons or W and Z bosons (virtual force carrying particles), 
quantum chromodynamics describes quarks exchanging gluons.  The supreme 
quantum field theory is quantum electrodynamics, basically the theory of photons and 
electrons (Penrose, 1989).  Quantum field theory is however plagued by mathematical 
difficulties in the sense that certain calculations lead to infinite answers.  Quantum 
electrodynamics, the brain child of Richard Feynman, Julian Schwinger and Sin-Itiro 
Tomonaga, compensated for these infinities with a mathematical trick called 
‘renormalization’.  What emerged was an extremely accurate theory from which all 
mechanical, electrical, and chemical laws and phenomena are ultimately derived.  
Some physicists, including the father of quantum field theory – Paul Dirac, didn’t like 
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the way quantum electrodynamics’ renormalization trick took care of the infinities.  
Mathematically speaking it seemed as though the awkward bits (the infinities), which 
arise when doing the calculations, were being swept under the carpet.  Purists such as 
Dirac always felt this should not be necessary and held out for something more 
fundamental (Al-Khalili, 2003).  This particular problematic of ‘infinities in the 
calculations’, will now be examined more closely and the provenance there-of related 
to the premise of locality. 
 
The infinities that arise during the calculations of quantum field theory can be 
understood as follows (Al-Khalili, 2003):  recall, as briefly alluded to earlier, that an 
electric field can be thought of as many virtual particles popping in and out of 
existence all the time.  An electron interacting with another electron must be 
understood as a process where the force between the two particles is in actual fact the 
exchange of another particle, an electron for example.  This interaction must take into 
account a series of evermore complex, but less likely, processes that can take place.  
For example: the lowest order process is that the two electrons exchange a single 
virtual photon.  Higher order terms that must also be considered involve one of the 
electrons emitting a photon that spontaneously creates, whilst in transit, a virtual 
electron-positron pair (a matter particle and its correlating antimatter particle).  These 
quickly annihilate to produce the original photon again that is absorbed by the second 
electron.  During the short life of the electron-positron pair (the duration and energy 
amount of which is determined in accordance with Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle 
– the energy/time uncertainty relation – discussed in section 2.2) there is a small 
probability that the electron-positron pair created by the exchanged photon can 
themselves exchange a virtual photon, which also creates a further electron-positron 
pair, and so on, ad infinitum.  Quantum field theorists hoped that such ever-more 
complex activity could be ignored in the calculation, or at least become progressively 
less important, ‘unfortunately’ this was not the case and these higher order processes 
lead to infinite answers in the calculations.  It is these infinity problems that quantum 
electrodynamics compensated for using the mathematical trick of renormalization.  
Renormalization did not solve the infinity problem, rather it found a way to work 
around the problem, or stated otherwise, to sweep the problem under the carpet. 
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However, the problem of infinities has a much more serious effect in a quantum 
theory of gravity.  A consequence of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is that waves 
(in the Maxwell field), even in the vacuum or lowest energy state, won’t be exactly 
zero but can have small sizes.  Thus each wavelength would have a ground state 
energy.  Since there is no limit to how short the wavelengths of the Maxwell field can 
be, there are an infinite number of different wavelengths in any region of space-time 
and an infinite amount of ground state energy.  Because energy density is, like matter, 
a source of gravity, this infinite energy density ought to mean there is enough 
gravitational attraction in the universe to curl space-time into a single point, which 
obviously contradicts our current experience of space-time (Hawking, 2001). 
 
Now consider the indicative factors of the premise of locality enumerated in section 
3.2, specifically factor 1 and factor 8.  Wholly unassuming (or would wholly 
assuming locality be more appropriate?), the quantum field theorists are treading 
down the same path as Zeno.  Moreover, similarly as Zeno assumes an exclusively 
and primary differentiated point A and point B, a fundamental here-there dichotomy, 
so the field theorists assume an exclusive and primary differentiated this-that particle 
(an electron vs. a photon or another electron, or, an electron vs. a positron).  Whereas 
Zeno continuously, ad infinitum, traverses the half distances within the framework of 
his own conceptualized relation (the relation between point A and B), so field 
theorists continuously describe ad infinitum the interaction process of virtual particles 
within the framework of their own conceptualized relation of the two separate 
particles.  Thus, similarly as Zeno’s conceptualization of a relation within a relation 
prevents him from ever reaching the other point (traversing his first posited relation), 
so field theorists’ positing of a particle here and particle there within or between 
another pair of here-there particles, prevent the calculations from providing a finite 
answer.  Just as Zeno has to turn a blind eye to the logic that makes it impossible to 
reach the other point and just walk to the other point, so quantum field theorists have 
to sweep the infinities under the carpet and ‘renormalize’.  In both cases only the 
differentiation (opposition) of, alternatively, point A and B (Zeno), and this-that 
particle (Field theory) is acknowledged and not the co-occurring identicalness that a 
premise of non-locality requires.  The problematic of counter-intuitive infinities, as 
illustrated by the latter two examples, are a consequence of the assumption of locality 
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and the consequent violation of the principle of symmetry (the concept of symmetry 
as a function of non-local perceptum will be the focus of section 6).     
 
Consider a related problem that has been around long before quantum mechanics.  An 
electric charge generates an electric field around it; the influence of the electric field 
on another charge can be calculated using Coulomb’s law.  The problem arises when 
physicists attempt to determine the effect this electric field has on the charge that 
generated it in the first place.  To determine the effect of the field on the charge, 
physicists need to divide a certain quantity by the distance between the point they are 
interested in and the position of the charge.  In this case that distance is zero, and 
dividing anything by zero gives an infinity answer.  Recall the ‘problem’ of self-
referential statements: Socrates’ “I know that I don’t know” can logically run around 
in circles ad infinitum.  In the case of the effect of the electric charge, the question 
might be formulated as follows: what is the effect the electric charge has on its self?  
As such the physicists are essentially confronted by a self-referential question, a self-
referential problem.  And again, as is the case of Socrates’ dictum, the logic of here-
there/now-then, basically the premise of locality, breaks down.  Logic related to the 
premise of non-locality would completely re-evaluate the specific elements (in terms 
of factor 1) involved and the questions asked about the relation of these elements (in 
terms of factor 8).  The development of a possible mathematical formula that can 
describe the effects of an electric charge in the framework of non-locality as premise 
is beyond the scope of this thesis.  The author provisionally notes that the principle of 
symmetry (as developed in section 6) will be essential to such a mathematical 
formulation. 
 
Zee (1986) writes: 
 
In fundamental physics, after an era of unification and simplification, we seem 
to have entered an era of embellishments and complexities.  Recent 
developments tend to be increasingly complicated; in particular superstrings 
theory involves an enormous jump in mathematical complication. (p. 273) 
 
From the premise of non-locality this undesirable ‘increase in complexity’ is 
primarily a consequence of the implicit assumption of locality as premise that 
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pervades the rationality and logic of the natural sciences (and the human sciences for 
that matter).  Even the contemporary scientific quest to discover the smallest particle, 
begins from the premise of locality, and will according to the logic of non-locality, 
walk the same path as Zeno. 
 
In an attempt to unify quantum mechanics and the general theory of relativity, two 
dominant schools of thought have emerged.  The one school claims that quantum 
mechanics contains the more fundamental concepts and that consequently quantum 
mechanics should serve as the base whence the general theory of relativity should be 
incorporated.  A candidate theory in terms of the latter is for example - string theory.  
It is based on the principles of quantum field theory, and describes the force of gravity 
in terms of an exchange particle called the graviton.  String theory differs from earlier 
quantum field theories in the sense that this theory holds that all the fundamental 
particles are in fact tiny vibrating strings.  The different elementary particles are a 
consequence of the different frequencies at which these strings vibrate (Calder, 2003). 
 
The other school disagrees and rather starts from general relativity with its 
fundamental notions of space and time, and tries to quantize this theory.  The 
prominent theory in this regard is called ‘Loop quantum gravity’.  Here, the focus is 
on space itself, which is visualized as consisting of a network of loops – like lace, but 
in three dimensions.  Each loop is formed by a particle with a certain spin making a 
little excursion and returning to its starting point.  The loops do not exist in space – 
they are space.  Twists in the loops denote the deformations of space due to gravity, 
while the passage of time is reflected in changes in the network.  Space-time as a 
whole is the sum of all possible networks (Calder). 
 
Provisionally, based on surface validity, neither of these two theories appear 
compatible with the postulated premise of non-locality.  For example: in string theory, 
related to the action of the tiny vibrating strings, space and time are still regarded as 
an absolute background (Al-Khalili, 2003).  From a premise of non-locality, space 
and time must be considered as illusory constructions of relational experience.  
Indeed, the positing or the requirement of absolute space and time, exemplifies the 
implicit assumption of a premise of locality (see factor 1).  Regarding the theory of 
loop quantum gravity: the ‘loops’ are not real physical entities like the strings in string 
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theory, rather all that is real is the relationship between loops.  From a premise of non-
locality no relationship or network of relationships can be considered inclusively 
accurate or valid if the principle of symmetry is not applied – in the case of loop 
quantum gravity the loops themselves have to be considered to be identical yet 
opposite (see factor 8).  All exclusively dichotomous relationships must be interpreted 
as forms of localized perception or rational conditioning akin to epiphenomena.  The 
notion of dichotomous relation can be interpreted as an imposition of the horizontal 
spatial and temporal lines of the [R]-element on the circular intermediary 
phenomenon of absolute power states.  Temporally speaking, absolute power states 
are a single moment, an omnipresent now, with a symmetrical differentiation of past 
and future.  Spatially, absolute power states are something from nothing.  In the 
framework of a non-locality premise, the principle of symmetry is fundamental to the 
conceptualization of absolute power states and will be expounded in section 6. 
 
Absolute power states may, for explanatory purposes, be envisaged through the 
relational character of the [R]-element in terms of Planck’s constant.  In the year 1900 
Max Planck developed a formula to describe the way a particular type of warm object, 
known as a black body, emits radiation.  According to Planck’s formula the energy of 
the smallest bundle of light of a given frequency is equal to the frequency multiplied 
by a certain constant.  This is known as Plank’s constant of action.  It has the symbol 
h and, like the speed of light c, is considered by physicists to be one of the universal 
constants of nature (Hawking, 2001).  According to the formula the energy given off 
could only have certain values (certain modes of vibration) since not all possible 
energies are allowed.  Thus the energy would come in discreet lumps or ‘quanta’.  
Planck’s constant, which accordingly represents the quantized nature of energy 
emission and absorption, is an essential element in the understanding of subatomic 
phenomena.  Einstein used Planck’s constant to explain the photoelectric effect, and 
later he still used it to determine the specific heat of solids.  Bohr discovered that the 
angular momentum of electrons as they orbit atomic nuclei is a function of Planck’s 
constant, de Broglie used Plank’s constant to calculate the wavelength of matter 
waves, and it is a central element in Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (Zukav, 1991). 
  
Importantly, Einstein’s use of Planck’s constant to describe the photoelectric effect 
elaborated on Plank’s idea that the absorption and emission of energy is a quantized 
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process, to posit that energy itself is quantized.  This supposition allowed the 
calculations to correlate with the experimental data concerning the photoelectric effect 
(Zukav, 1991).  Based on Planck’s constant and Einstein’s extension of the principle 
to include all energy forms, physicists now postulate that space and time itself must 
also ultimately be composed of irreducible lumps (Al-Khalili, 2003).  The length and 
time scale where this quantization must take place is known as the Plank scale (Planck 
length – about 10-35 centimetres; Planck time – about 10-43 seconds, time it takes light 
to travel the distance of the Planck length). 
 
In light of a non-locality premise, Planck’s constant can be understood as follows:  h 
represents a dichotomous spatio-temporal differentiation of absolute power states, 
which occurs in terms of the principle of symmetry (specifically the symmetrical [I] – 
see section 6).  Stated otherwise: h represents a dichotomous relational differentiation 
of circular states that are not exclusively bound to spatio-temporal dichotomies. 
 
Plank’s constant expresses the connection of absolute power states in terms of the 
relational and associative character of the conditioned [R]-element.  There is, 
however, no exclusive dichotomous spatio-temporal relation binding absolute power 
states.  The experienced relation in terms of the space-time continuum is rather a 
symmetrical subsidiary.  As such h rationally connects identical yet opposite space-
time circular states and might consequently be understood as describing a single 
moment differentiating as multiple moments. 
   
What is fascinating is that h can perpetually be deduced from experimental data from 
subsequent experiments, and can be utilized in other formulas (as indicated earlier) to 
accurately describe other different phenomena.  The consistency of h (or any other 
successful theory or mathematical formula) is a consequence not of the veridical 
character of dichotomous relations, but of the symmetrical character of absolute 
power states.  It is exactly the principle of symmetry, as related to absolute power 
states, that will be investigated in the next section and inform the conceptualization of  
power to will. 
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Section 6  
6.  Implication: From power to will 
 
A premise of non-locality attributes fundamental significance to the notion symmetry, 
to be sure, non-local perceptum emanating as localized form bespeaks a symmetrical 
disposition.  Recall ‘the phenomenon of symmetrical states’, the designated 
nomenclature of the cognitive ability to recognize contingency (mirror self-
recognition), to produce contingency (imitation), and to partake in synchronic 
imitation.  The capacity to recognize symmetrical phenomena informs the 
conceptualization of the desire of reciprocated subjectification and so injects 
dichotomous subject objectification with oxygen-rich blood.  As such the 
phenomenon of symmetrical states, with its conscious anthropomorphic vitality, 
provides the transparent plinth on which the primary and secondary fields of 
objectification promulgate.  The secondary field of objectification, the particular 
domain of interrelated leaf- and stem-objectifications, will now be implemented as 
methodological tool to illuminate the fundamental importance and pervasiveness of 
the principle of symmetry.  Thus the instruments of pedagogy (stem and leaf-
objectification) reflect on the very principle, the essential capacity that allows for their 
own psycho-functional conceptualization5. 
 
The child recognizing him/herself in the mirror can be regarded as experiencing a 
rudimentary leaf-objectification.  The child is able to discern from his/her own 
movements and the mirror image’s movements a certain invariance, a definite and 
unwavering correlation between his/her own activity and that of the image in the 
mirror.  Recall the reciprocal and mutually constructing process of leaf- and stem-
objectification expositioned in section 4.4. - exactly the same applies to the 
experience of symmetry.  As Bentham’s panopticon prison, a particular leaf-
objectification, gave birth to the more extensive societal dynamics of disciplinary 
power, a specific stem-objectification, so the infant’s particular symmetrical 
experience of the mirror can be regarded as a leaf-objectification, whence the 
                                                 
5 Similarly as the eye is used to examine the physiology of the eye, so objectifications are used to  
  examine objectification. 
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pervading principle of symmetry, a pervading stem-objectification, emerges.  
Important to note is that the latter set of stem- and leaf-objectifications represent the 
base cognitive symmetrical dynamic that outlines all other objectifications, including 
for example the panopticon prison and panopticon principle.  This base cognitive 
symmetrical dynamic will be called the symmetrical [R] – the principle of symmetry 
in terms of the [R]-element.  The symmetrical [R] can specifically be defined as 
follows: as certain features change between subjects, other features remain the same, 
or stated more plainly logical, certain features remain invariant while other features 
transform.  As such the symmetrical [R] represents the pristine rationality of the 
phenomenon of symmetrical states, the animation pencil of dichotomous subject 
objectification.  If the desire for reciprocated subjectification is primarily an 
emotional drive, then the symmetrical [R] is primarily a rational mechanism.  In light 
of the amalgamated relationship of the [R]-element and the [E]-element, symmetrical 
[R] and the desire for reciprocated subjectification are functionally distinguishable, 
yet are in a very definite sense intricately intertwined.  Dichotomous subject 
objectification can be regarded as the progeny of the amalgamated relation of the 
symmetrical [R] and the desire for reciprocated subjectification.  From a premise of 
non-locality the principle of symmetry must primarily be considered in terms of the 
[I]-element.  Before the author explicates the symmetrical [I], the pervasive 
applicability of the symmetrical [R] for localized perception will be expounded. 
 
The symmetrical [R] acts as a window for localized perception, allowing the 
formation of dichotomous subject objectification and establishing a thematic 
framework that can be applied as an instrument for theoretical investigation.  As an 
example of the symmetrical [R] consider the notion affect attunement (emotion 
attunement) discussed in section 4.2: Affect attunement was defined as the 
performance of behaviours that express the quality of feeling of a shared affect state 
without imitating the exact behavioural expression of the inner state.  Thus the infant-
mother interaction can perform various different behavioural actions, yet these 
different actions evince the same underlying emotional state.  The mother and infant’s 
respective bodily actions transform (not apparently correlated), while the [E]-element 
for both remains invariant.  As such affect attunement is rendered intelligible through 
the [R]-element. 
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Furthermore, it is precisely Lacan’s non-acknowledgement of the fundamental 
importance of the symmetrical [R] for the developing human cognition that leads to 
the incompatibility of his mirror stage formulation with contemporary empirical 
research in the domain of mirror self-recognition.  Recollect the Lacanian 
differentiation of the subject (S) - the position of the own body, on toward the Other 
(O) - the outside world of reflected images in which the subject becomes alienated 
during the mirror stage; and furthermore the differentiation of the ego on toward the 
other (small o).  Lacan posits this cumbersome dual duality as the basic and 
encompassing structure of the human psyche.  As discussed in section 3.1, Lacan 
describes the relation between the S and the O as ‘circular and dissymmetrical, yet 
without reciprocity’ – this is a deductive formulation based on Lacan’s interpretation 
that the infant experiences his/her own body as fragmentary and consequently 
identifies with the reflected whole images of the external world (for example his/her 
own image in the mirror).  As such Lacan conceptualizes the infant’s early postulated 
mirror-like experiences and real mirror experiences in terms of a fundamental 
dissymmetry assuming the form of a fragmentary body versus a whole outside 
image/body.  Yet, as argued in section 4.2, it is originally the symmetrical 
characteristics of the mirror image that attracts the attention of the infant, not the 
dissymmetrical aspects.  Consequently it is precisely the non-acknowledgement of the 
symmetrical [R] that imposes a sense of pessimism and nihilism on the Lacanian 
psyche.  The premise of locality identified in Lacan’s theory (see section 3.2), also 
exposes this theory to the typical infinity problems related to the locality assumption 
discussed earlier.  The infinity problem the author is referring to concerns Lacan’s 
conceptualization of the status or location of the subject.  Recollect that for Lacan the 
subject is that which is represented by the signifier, and the signifier can only 
represent something for another signifier. Hence Lacan infers that the signifier 
represents the subject for another signifier and that the subject ought to be sought in 
the very structure of the signification chain (sentences, paragraphs, in speech), or 
indeed, that the subject is this very chain.  Consequently the subject, as a result of 
alienation function of the Other, runs along the signification chain ad infinitum in 
search of itself. 
   
Also note the resemblance between, on the one hand, Lacan’s exposition of the L-
schema (section 3.1) in terms of how the relation between o – o’ (the imaginary 
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relation) forms an obstacle to the subject’s symbolic realization, and Zeno’s paradox 
on the other.  Whereas for Zeno point B remains ever elusive, so for the Lacanian 
psyche the realization of the subject and the truth of the subject remains unreachable. 
 
The significance of the symmetrical [R] extends far beyond the traditionally 
demarcated domain of psychology, underlying ‘even’ (a more accurate word would be 
‘necessarily’) the most empirical of sciences – the natural sciences.  The principle of 
symmetry has shone brightly as a guiding light for exploring physicists.  In this regard 
Zee (1986) states: 
 
Fundamental physicists are sustained by the faith that the ultimate design (of 
nature) is suffused with symmetries.  Contemporary physics would not have 
been possible without symmetries to guide us.  Einstein showed us how the 
secrets of gravity could be mastered in one fell swoop.  Learning from 
Einstein, physicists impose symmetries and see that a unified conception of 
the physical world may be possible. (p. 280) 
 
In fact, Einstein himself wished that he had rather used the term invariant theory 
instead of special and general theory of relativity (Zee, 1986).  The whole point of 
Einstein’s work is that different observers must perceive the same structure of reality 
and that an invariant truth can be extracted.  Strictly speaking, relativity theory is not 
a theory by itself, but a requirement that has to be satisfied by physical theories, this 
requirement being the symmetrical [R].  The principle of symmetry can assume 
various forms, for example: rotational invariance, Lorentz invariance, relativistic 
invariance, general covariance, and reflection/parity invariance. 
 
Rotational symmetry of geometric figures implies the following: a geometrical figure 
is rotated around its centre and these rotations leave the figure unchanged.  For 
example: a circle is left invariant by rotations around its centre through any angle, 
while the square is left unchanged only by rotations through angles of 90º, 180º, 270º, 
and 360º.  Thus the circle is said to be more symmetric than the square.  The rectangle 
is even less symmetric than the square, because it is left invariant only by rotations 
around its centre through angles of 180º and 360º.  Relativistic invariance (the 
primary assumption of Einstein’s relativity theories) says that two observers in 
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relative motion at a constant velocity must arrive at the same physical laws, in spite of 
the fact that they differ in the measurement of various physical quantities, furthermore 
relativistic invariance dictates that it is physically impossible to determine which one 
of the two observers in relative motion is actually moving (Zee, 1986).  If the physical 
laws observed by the two specified observers were not the same, then nature would be 
distinguishing between the two observers.  As such relativistic invariance would be 
violated and the basic symmetry broken.   
 
Einstein used this principle of symmetry in the form of relativistic invariance to 
demonstrate that different observers in relative motion at constant velocity perceive 
the passage of time differently, thus rendering the notion of absolute time, an absolute 
frame of reference, redundant (consequently throwing Galilean transformation out the 
window).  Einstein’s insistence on relativistic invariance is dependent on another 
transformation under which physics is relativistic invariant.  This transformation is 
known as Lorentz invariance and requires that the relations between two sets of 
space-time co-ordinates are such that the speed of light comes out to be the same as 
measured by the observers in relative motion at a constant velocity (Zukav, 1991).  
Thus the invariant variable is the speed of light and not time.  Einstein believed that 
Lorentz invariance is a necessary criterion for all of physics.  Recall Schrödinger’s 
wave equation as discussed in section 2.2, which is used to calculate the wave 
function and so indicate the possible behaviour and consequent probability of finding 
a subatomic particle at specific location.  Originally Schrodinger’s wave equation was 
not Lorentz invariant, but since particles like electrons move much slower then the 
speed of light the equation was perfectly adequate in describing the known properties 
of atoms.  In 1929 Paul Dirac, like Einstein before him, insisted that all physics be 
relativistic invariant, and thus proceeded to make Schrodinger’s wave equation 
Lorentz invariant.  The modified equation possessed twice as many solutions as the 
original.  After much bewilderment and confusion, Dirac realized that the additional 
solutions indicated the existence of particles that possessed properties exactly the 
opposite of normal matter particles.  So for every electron there must exist an opposite 
particle, an anti-electron.  Three years later the existence of the electron’s anti-particle 
was experimentally verified and is known today as the positron (Zee, 1986).  Thus 
symmetrical [R] allowed certain aspects of nature to be accurately described a priori.   
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Furthermore the principle of symmetry was also successfully utilized by Einstein to 
describe gravity in the form of the equivalence principle – the equivalence principle 
simply states that the physical effects of a gravitational field, as perceived by an 
observer, are indistinguishable from the physical effects reported by another observer 
accelerating at a constant rate in the absence of a gravitational field (Zee, 1986).  
Also, the mathematician Emmy Noether demonstrated that symmetry and conserved 
quantities are interrelated.  This was a profound discovery indicating that the 
conservation laws (for example the conservation laws of energy, momentum and 
angular momentum) always have a corresponding symmetry, for example: Noether’s 
theorem reveals that angular momentum conservation follows from rotational 
invariance.  Noether’s theorem has proven to be of fundamental importance for 
quantum mechanics (Zee, 1986). 
 
The form of symmetrical [R] most pertinent to a premise of non-locality is the notion 
of reflection invariance (also called parity invariance).  Reflection invariance is 
concerned with whether nature distinguishes between left and right (Zee, 1986).  This 
principle dictates that if one were to observe any physical process in the mirror (like a 
bat hitting a ball or an atom emitting a photon), this process must not contradict the 
laws of nature as physicists know them – the laws of nature must remain invariant.  If 
nature is reflection invariant this means that nature does not distinguish between left 
and right (that chirality is not intrinsically significant), and consequently parity is not 
violated. 
   
Up until 1956, physicists held it as self-evident that nature is parity invariant, since 
then various experiments have however indicated that nature appears in the case of 
the weak force (and only in the case of the weak force) to violate parity invariance.  
One of the physicists responsible for constructing the experiments that intimate parity 
violation, C. N. Yang, suggests that a deeper understanding will reveal that nature 
indeed does respect reflection/parity invariance.  In fact, several theorists have since 
the 1980s proposed plausible schemes which demonstrate that nature, at a deeper 
level, is impartial towards left and right (thus reflection/parity invariant) (Zee, 1986).  
Please refer to appendix B where the author indicates a possible logical error made by 
physicists concerning parity invariance. 
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From a premise of non-locality the symmetrical [R] must be regarded as an 
epiphenomenon related to the character of absolute power states.  Recall that in 
section 5.1 the author described absolute power states as ‘discontinuous manifesting 
spatio-temporal circular states, which biological cognition experiences/interprets as 
repetitive patterns of locality movement’.  The specific description of absolute power 
states as circular states is based on the symmetrical [R] in the form of reflection 
invariance explicated earlier.  A circle exhibits perfect reflection invariance across 
any straight line that passes through its centre.  Thus absolute power states are always 
identical, yet always opposite – perfectly reflection invariant.  However, in light of the 
premise of non-locality, the logic of the [I]-element must now also be applied to the 
principle of symmetry.  This entails the following: the principle of symmetry is 
accordingly formulated, not exclusively in the manner of certain aspects remain the 
same while other aspects change, but also in the sense that the aspects that remain the 
same, also change, and the aspects that change, also remain the same.  The preceding 
formulation represents the gist of ‘the symmetrical [I]’.  Thus in the case of absolute 
power states the symmetrical [I] implies that absolute power states are ‘identical’, 
‘opposite’ and also ‘identical and opposite’.  Such an understanding of absolute power 
states in context of the premise of non-locality represents the nucleus of the power to 
will.  Consider the following analogy: as the little bird experiences her image in the 
mirror and does not recognize the image as her own, so man experiences the other 
through absolute power states and does not recognize these multifarious forms as his 
own being.  Whereas the little bird fails to recognize the symmetrical [R] of the mirror 
image, so man fails to recognize the symmetrical [I] of absolute power states.  
Therefore it can deductively be stated that men and women fail to recognize 
themselves in their brothers and sisters. 
 
Accordingly the delimitations of the premise of locality can also be understood in the 
form of the symmetrical [R].  The premise of locality, exemplified by the conditioned 
[R]-element, can never wander beyond the borders of irreconcilable ‘differentness’, or 
‘opposition’, because the exclusively dichotomous localized perception itself is this 
border, and perpetually creates and believes its own creation and conditioning.  In the 
realm of the conditioned [R]-element, what is different cannot be the same, and what 
is the same cannot be different.  Theoretical mountaineers setting up base camp at the 
premise of locality inexorably become lost on the mountains of infinity.  Be these 
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infinities paradoxical self-referential statements, quantum field theory interactions, 
mathematical Real numbers, Zeno’s never ending quest, or Lacan’s unattainable 
desire. Consider in this regard Socrates’ dictum – ‘I know that I don’t know’.  The 
paradoxical nature of the latter dictum is precisely a consequence of logical 
interpretation through the prism of the symmetrical [R].  The same yet opposite act is 
performed, and when what is opposite moves towards its opposite, logic breaks down 
– this is necessarily so because from a premise of locality what is opposite cannot also 
be the same.  
  
The delusional and delimiting pith of the premise of locality in the form of a 
prototypical ‘differentness’ or ‘opposition’, is clearly expressed in the Adlerian will to 
power as discussed in section 5.1.  As indicated, for Adler the basis of human 
motivation is subsumed by the striving for superiority (power).  One can interpret 
(among other interpretations) such a formulation to bespeak a subject’s desire to strive 
for superiority over another subject, where the first subject thus ‘opposes’ another 
subject, and confronts, challenges and attempts to overcome the ‘different’ other 
subject (even if it is in accordance with the higher motivation of ‘social interest’ – the 
second dynamic of the striving for superiority referenced in section 5.1).  Adler also 
defines the striving for superiority as a striving to move from the bottom to the top or 
to change a minus into a plus, and that is why he sometimes calls it the striving for 
perfection (Adler, 1930).  Thus one finds the implicit idea of a less perfect subject 
attempting to become a more perfect subject, a weak subject striving to become a 
strong subject, a lower subject desiring to become a higher subject.  Therefore this 
Adlerian notion readily translates into the humanistic notion of ‘becoming what you 
are’, in the sense that – a subject with specific qualities at a certain point in time, 
becomes, as time progresses, a subject with different qualities at a future point in time.  
As such intimating a subject experience originally having the status of unrealised 
potential, developing or advancing to a subject experience evincing realized potential 
– accordingly, in Adlerian terms, the strong subject position being the potential of the 
weak subject position, the more perfect subject being the potential of the less perfect 
subject.  Consequently it should be clear that both the Adlerian perspective and the 
‘becoming what you are’ dictum, fundamentally assume the premise of locality in the 
form of exclusive spatio-temporal subject positions – be it the self on toward the 
other, or the now self on toward the then (future) self (factor 1, 6 and possibly factor 
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2, 3), and, concerning the specific point in case, subversion of the principle of 
symmetry in terms of the [I]-element through the exclusive emphasis on 
‘differentness’ and ‘opposition’ of subject positions (factor 8).   
 
The desire of becoming, of striving for superiority, the will to power, necessarily 
suffers from the undesirable infinity fate characteristic of the premise of locality, in 
the sense that – psychologically the subject can become and become ad infinitum, 
while physically the subject becomes what he or she is right into the grave. The 
premise of non-locality, while emphasizing the desire for reciprocated 
subjectification, disavows the primacy of this desire and rather professes the illusory 
character there-of.  The symmetrical [I] requires that all dichotomous subject 
objectifications can be considered as different, but also as exactly the same.  So 
whereas the premise of locality forces, for example, the conceptualization of desire in 
Lacanian psychology to be insatiable and unattainable (related to a fundamental lack 
of being discussed earlier – section 3.1), the premise of non-locality, through the 
acknowledgement of the [I]-element, posits the desire for reciprocated subjectification 
to be a mirage that ultimately dissolves in the light of the power to will.  That is, if a 
person believes the dichotomous subject objectifications to be veridical and exclusive, 
and as such considers only the self on toward the other and not also the ‘self and the 
other’, then the desire for reciprocated subjectification is reified, adhered to, and 
perpetually produced ad infinitum from one moment to the next.  From a premise of 
non-locality the desire of reciprocated subjectification is transcended in those 
moments where non-local perceptum, through the eyes of localized form, experiences 
the nature of absolute power states - experiences not only differentiated or opposed 
subject positions, but also the other as the self and the self as the other.  Thus, whereas 
the will to power dissymmetrically exclaims – ‘becoming what you are!’, the power to 
will symmetrically whispers – ‘being here and now’. 
 
Regard also the Nietzschean ‘will to power’ as conceptualized by Foucault in terms of 
the Nietzsche’s hypothesis (see section 5.1).  Appropriately the philosopher Friedrich 
Nietzsche wrote a book entitled ‘Becoming what you are’.  Recall that this hypothesis 
puts forward the idea that power should be analysed primarily in terms of struggle, 
conflict and war, and consequently argues that the basis of the relationship of power 
lies in the hostile engagement of forces.  The notion of war/conflict aptly represents 
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pervasive effects related to the desire for reciprocated subjectification, and as such 
describes the common everyday experience of struggle and difficulty as perceived 
through the typical cognition of dichotomous subjectification.  Consider the following 
analogy: an active pathological virus always experiences the human body as a hostile 
and restless environment due to continuous attacking waves of white blood cells 
defending the body.  Viruses would readily characterize their experience of the human 
body in terms of struggle, conflict and war.  In the world of viruses the human body 
would be a necessary yet often unfriendly habitat.  Similarly the everyday human 
experience of a self in a world of localized phenomena, often exhibits conflict, 
struggle and war.  The ‘I’ and the ‘you’ epitomize the illusion of dichotomous subject 
objectification and activate patterns of manifesting absolute power states.  In the 
world of the self the localized experience is a necessary yet often unfriendly habitat.  
The premise of locality, the self, and the power to will - are comrades of war, brothers 
in arms. 
 
To deepen the understanding and illustrate the importance of power to will, 
contemplate the spread of dichotomous subject objectifications (see section 5.2) 
where a basic leaf-objectification that characterized the experience of a prisoner held 
captive in a panopticon type structure, permeated social thought as a stem-
objectification in the form of the panopticon principle which is fundamentally related 
to the possibility and occurrence of disciplinary mechanisms of power.  Disciplinary 
power, representing a particular social paradigm functionalised through current 
degenerating or developing social, political and economical structures, continues to 
exist and proliferate only insofar as it is allowed and discontinuously produced by the 
conglomerating networks of dichotomous subject objectifications of singular localized 
cognitions.  The perceptive fields of singular individuals amalgamate through 
discursive practices and non-discursive practices (example: classroom designs, 
transportation methods, technological appliances) confronting, denying and 
proliferating certain lines of objectifications that are as much a part of the individual’s 
idiosyncratic field of objectifications, as they are a part of the conceptualized and 
recognized prevailing societal paradigms.  In accordance with the conditioned and 
experienced ‘allowance’ of the desire for reciprocated subjectification, the 
multifarious conscious or unconscious lines of objectifications carry varying 
emotional significance.  The emotionally laden lines of objectifications, developing in 
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terms of the reciprocity of leaf- and stem-objectifications, constitute the person’s 
political beliefs, religious beliefs, self beliefs, etc – they animate the person’s personal 
and social perspective and experience of the world. 
 
Accordingly, if one thus acknowledges the direct link between the individual’s 
perceptive field and societal paradigms, a certain cognitive dissonance or fundamental 
hypocrisy is to be expected in the dichotomous subject objectification field of the 
localized cognition (the individual perceptive field) – necessarily so if any validity is 
to be attributed to the Foucaultian conceptualization of permeating power relations.  
To substantiate the latter claim, consider the following polemic. 
 
Recall, as discussed in section 5.1, Foucault’s description of the superimpositioning of 
sovereign power (the contract-oppression schema) on disciplinary power (the 
domination-repression schema) as to obscure the actual elements of domination 
inherent in the latter.  To this end Foucault describes how the juridical systems have 
enabled sovereignty to be democratised through the constitution of a public right 
articulated upon collective sovereignty, and that this democratisation of sovereignty 
was fundamentally determined by and grounded in mechanisms of disciplinary 
coercion.  Recall also, as discussed in section 5.2, that disciplinary power, 
characterized by tiny, everyday, physical mechanisms, which are essentially non-
egalitarian and asymmetrical, supported the general juridical form that guaranteed a 
system of rights that were egalitarian in principle.  According to Foucault (1975/1977) 
the real, corporal disciplines constituted the foundation of formal juridical liberties.  
Thus a contradictory and heterogeneous interplay of power emerges where the will of 
all form the fundamental authority of sovereignty (a sense of democratic equality), but 
the disciplines provide at the base a sense of inequality. 
 
The link between an individual’s perceptive world and contemporary societal 
paradigms imply that the notion of ‘democratised sovereignty’ necessarily forms part 
of the labouring and law-abiding citizen’s network of dichotomous subject 
objectifications.  Foucault (1976/1980) states that sovereign power and disciplinary 
power (the constitutive elements of democratised sovereignty) are so heterogeneous 
that they cannot possibly be reduced to each other.  On the one hand there is the 
juridical-political theory of sovereignty, articulating principles of equality 
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implemented through and symbolized by law and judicial rules.  On the other hand, 
absolutely antithetical to and incompatible with the these transformed relations of 
sovereignty, the polymorphous mechanisms of disciplinary power that produce 
discourse that speaks of a rule - precisely not the rule of right (juridical rule) deriving 
from sovereignty, but rather a ‘natural’ rule, a norm.  The disciplines define, not a 
code of law, but a code of normalization.  Thus subjects become normalized, that is, 
they are “compared, differentiated, hierarchized, homogenized, excluded” (Foucault, 
1975/1977, p. 183).  The disparity of these two forms of power represent the basic 
dynamics regarding the general mechanisms of power that characterize modern 
society, Foucault (1976/1980) writes: 
 
I mean, more precisely, that disciplinary normalizations come into ever 
greater conflict with the juridical systems of sovereignty: their incompatibility 
with each other is ever more acutely felt and apparent; some kind of 
arbitrating discourse is made ever more necessary, a type of power and of 
knowledge that the sanctity of science would render neutral. (p. 107) 
 
The exact same disparity can consequently also manifest in the form of minute 
capillary lines of contradictory dichotomous subject objectifications that constitute a 
person’s secondary field of objectification.  The latter statement can be explicated in 
the following way:  a democratic government, like for example our own fledgling 
South-African democracy, professes an equality of human rights, a universal right 
enforced through a legal edifice built on egalitarian principles, yet, antithetically, this 
same economic-political state evinces (never mind the question of black 
empowerment) a labour force that is differentiated, segmented, hierarchized, 
specialized, documented, graded, evaluated, promoted, retrenched; an education 
system that homogenizes, excludes, classifies, examines, tests, rewards, expels.  
According to Foucault the latter all typify disciplinary peripheral procedures aimed to 
create docile and subjugated bodies, thus revealing minute capillary lines of 
asymmetry and inequality that confront and inform the personal rational experience of 
an individual6.  Basically people might be educated as to believe that all people are 
equal and that this is what a decent, civil and democratised person should aspire to, 
                                                 
6In ‘Discipline and Punish’, the section called ‘Docile bodies’- Foucault discusses various practical 
examples regarding the normalization procedures of disciplinary power.  
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yet the everyday lives of these self same people are permeated by the very real 
experiences of inequality - a social and industrial system that does not equally 
appreciate and compensate all, occupations that reward selectively, fiscal institutions 
that marginalize, judge and discriminate.  Thus in the mind of the democratic 
individual of modern society, in the personal field of dichotomous subject 
objectifications of the democratised law-abiding and labouring individual, a definite 
cognitive dissonance or hypocrisy is to be expected proportionate to the emotional 
significance of the various conditioned lines of rationality converging and diverging 
to construct a belief system. 
 
The latter has important clinical implications: a person who accepts the principles of 
democracy (a sense of explicit equality), yet also, without any pertinent reservations, 
participates in the socio-economical system (a sense of implicit inequality), might, in 
consideration of the person’s idiosyncratic configuration of objectifications (the 
person might have an objectification that says that ‘hypocrisy’ is a part of life, it is 
‘normal’) and the distinctive emotional value attributed to these conflictual lines of 
thought, experience a psychological state ranging on a scale from feeling slightly 
uneasy/confused, to a full blown psychotic episode (as various contradictory or 
traumatic lines of objectifications converge). 
 
The preceding problematic can be traced back to the basic anatomy of dichotomous 
subject objectifications, the rudimentary conditioning of localized perception.  Recall 
that dichotomous subject objectification is a dyadic phenomenon that implies the 
synchronic emergence of self-awareness and other-awareness.  Thus, through the 
conditioning of the [R]-element in terms of the phenomenon of symmetrical states, 
the individual becomes aware of the self as subject on toward the other as a different 
and distinct subject.  A premise of locality, in light of the symmetrical [R], dictates 
that the self and the other are differentiated and opposed bodies, and that what is 
different cannot be the same and vice versa.  Different subjects might have features 
that are different and features that are the same, but the features that are the same 
cannot be different, and the features that are different cannot be the same.  The self on 
toward the other is central to the premise of locality, and it is this basic impassable 
subject-object dichotomy that draws the line of difference which cannot be traversed 
by that which is the same.  Considerations regarding equality/inequality (as discussed 
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in terms of the cognitive dissonance exposition) always condense into the disparate 
difference of opposing subjects.  The cul-de-sac of dichotomous subject 
objectification infinitely questions the equality/inequality rubicon through the logic of 
the symmetrical [R].  The premise of non-locality bespeaks a wholly different logic; 
the power to will bespeaks the symmetrical [I].  
 
The implication of the symmetrical [I] is the following: people can be ‘equal’, people 
can be ‘unequal’, and people can be ‘equal and unequal’.  Alternatively: Socrates can 
‘know’, Socrates ‘cannot know’, and Socrates ‘can know and not know’ at the same 
time.  Consequently, as was the case with the ‘dead and alive cat’, being equal and 
unequal (or knowing and not knowing) at the same time is completely foreign to the 
normalized conditioning of the [R]-element – basically, localized cognition has a very 
hard time making sense of the notion of ‘either-or’ and ‘and’.  Thus, assuming a 
premise of non-locality, one is lead to admit, as Socrates so boldly confessed, that one 
is indeed ignorant, that ‘I know that I don’t know’.  Such a declaration does not admit 
failure or futility, but rather admits the courage to challenge the desire for 
reciprocated subjectification, to confront one’s most precious beliefs, one’s most 
enamoured dichotomous subject objectifications.  Indeed, the life not criticized is not 
worth living. 
 
Consider also the symmetrical [I] in relation to the domain of religion.  Beyond 
illustrating the point, religious beliefs often form an important part of a person’s field 
of dichotomous subject objectifications – therefore it would be necessary to excavate 
any hidden assumptions of locality present in a person’s religious perspective.  In the 
case of Christianity, the symmetrical [I] dictates a reinterpretation of the notions of 
Christ vs. the anti-Christ.  The premise of locality describes a fundamental and 
exclusive opposition, in the sense that Christ is good and the anti-Christ is bad, and 
that it is imperative for a christian to accept Jesus as his/her saviour (the Christ), 
renounce the devil (anti-Christ), and so gain passage to a blissful afterlife, thus 
avoiding eternal damnation.  A premise of non-locality paints a completely different 
picture.  Regarding the symmetrical [I], the power to will consequently not only 
acknowledges the difference/opposition of the Christ and of the anti-Christ, but also 
the sameness.  And this acknowledgement is not the symmetrical [R] kind of 
acknowledgement where these two elements have certain features that are the same 
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and also have certain features that are different, no, rather what is the same must also 
be different, and what is different, must also be the same.  The symmetrical [I] 
prescribes a religious perspective where the Christian must consider ‘the Christ’, ‘the 
anti-Christ’, and ‘the Christ and the anti-Christ’.  Thus, if Jesus is sitting on the right 
hand of God, then Lucifer is sitting on the left hand of God – ‘either-or’ and ‘and’. 
 
Power to will, being here and now, attributes an epiphenomenal character to all 
patterns of localized ‘movement’, to semantically reiterate: bodily forms assume an 
epiphenomenal dynamic in relation towards every other bodily form – implying not 
only a ‘link between bodies’ or exclusive dichotomous ‘inter-relations’, but also the 
‘link of bodies’ or ‘intra-relation’.  Stable patterns like for example - Planck’s 
constant, objects that consistently fall towards the earth and not away from the earth, 
and repetitive symptom patterns related to psychological afflictions which allow for 
the compilation of diagnostic manuals (like for example the DSM-IV) - can be 
considered inferential stabilities, surface phenomena manifesting in accordance with 
the symmetrical dynamics of absolute power states.   
 
Mankind’s capacity to recognize symmetrical patterns, to recognize him/herself in the 
mirror, is the same capacity that will ultimately allow man to recognize the self in the 
other and the other in the self.  The cognitive capacity that animates the desire of man, 
will also serve to transcend the illusion of desire.  This is the process of power to will. 
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7.  Conclusion 
 
The study has meticulously mapped the topography of the premise of non-locality, 
starting from the simple two-slit experiment and tracing a line all the way through to 
the concept of power to will.  On route the premise of locality was diagnosed and 
indexed as to its indicative factors.  Subsequently an autopsy of Lacan’s decentred 
ego revealed his developmental mirror DNA to be suffused with malignant locality 
assumption mutations.  Whence the provenance of the genetically deformed Other 
that is incapable of recognizing itself in the mirror of contemporary mirror self-
recognition research. 
 
The premise of non-locality intuited the conceptualization of non-local perceptum.  
The emanation of non-local perceptum as localized form was translated into spatio-
temporal perceptive experience in the shape of root-, stem- and leaf-objectifications.  
The study demonstrated how the latter differentiations of dichotomous subject 
objectification are rationally and emotionally animated by the phenomenon of 
symmetrical states in the form of the desire for reciprocated subjectification.  The 
desire for reciprocated subjectification expressing the convolution of biological and 
psychological needs characterized by the cognitive capability to discern symmetrical 
interactions.  Features of root-, stem-, and leaf-objectifications were further elucidated 
by enunciating the intra-relation there-of with the concept of absolute power states – 
absolute power states representing a logical formalization of the localized dynamics 
of non-local perceptum.  As such the study conjoined, on the one hand, the explicated 
symmetrical qualities of absolute power states with, on the other, the correlation of 
dichotomous subject objectifications and Foucault’s understanding of power, to 
synthetically articulate a pattern (a symmetrical epiphenomenon) of localized 
experience through the gaze of objectification, as such elucidating the diffuse and 
evolutive character of objectifications. 
 
Furthermore, non-local perceptum was encoded as to a Socratic psychological model 
based on Socrates’ infamous dictum – ‘I know that I don’t know’.  The constructed 
Socratic model identified three fundamental elements – the [R]-element, the [E]-
element, and the [I]-element.  The author substantiated the abstraction of the [R]-
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element and the [E]-element by examining contemporary research related to brain 
physiology. 
 
Regarding the [I]-element: expounding the logic of the [I]-element and the logic for 
the conceptualization there-of, the study explicated the necessity of this third element 
by identifying various incongruencies facing a premise of locality in the shape of 
logically problematic paradoxes and contradictions.  By acknowledging the premise 
of non-locality and consequently applying the [I]-element to the latter paradoxes and 
contradictions, new light was shed on the possible meaning of Socrates’ self-
professed ignorance. 
 
The significance of the logic entailed by the [I]-element, and the postulated 
symmetrical nature of absolute power states, were conjunctively summarised in the 
formulation of power to will.  Elucidating the meaning of the power to will, the study 
showed how radical transformations concerning ‘what is sensical’, is required if the 
validity of a premise of non-locality is acknowledged. 
 
Possible implications and novel avenues for further research preliminary evinced by 
the study are the following: 
 
I. Replacing the premise of locality with the premise of non-locality can 
revolutionalize the ethos of modern day psychology.  A premise of non-
locality dictates and informs a re-evaluation of the most enamoured 
psychological theories and therapeutic practices developed over the last 
century.  For example: as already demonstrated with the post-modernistic 
theory of Lacan (which by its own post-modernistic tendencies already entails 
a kind of critique of typical modernistic theories), the non-locality assumption 
activates a fresh matrix for analysing psychological theories, and by its own 
eccentric logic reconfigures the conceptualization of the anatomy and 
physiology of the ego or subject. 
II. The [I]-element provides a pristine perspective to re-evaluate ‘traditional’ and 
contemporary logic problems infesting the domain of science and philosophy, 
for example: the infinity problems of quantum field theory, the disparity 
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between Einstein’s relativity theory and quantum mechanics, and 
philosophical paradoxes like self-referential statements. 
III. A premise of non-locality implies that the ‘movement’ of physical bodies, thus 
all localized forms, are patterns of conditioning and as such do not represent 
some fundamental irreducible ground state.  Consequently, that which is 
rational is also a form of conditioning (see section 4.1), thus entailing that all 
dichotomous subject objectifications, the experience of the self or the ‘I’, are 
derivatory epiphenomena.  The study argued that all physicality and also all 
experiences of the self as rational and emotional subject are animated by 
symmetrical dynamics.  
IV. The notion of stem-symmetry provides a possible therapeutic technology.  The 
rational principle of symmetry (related to the symmetrical [R]-element) where 
something stays the same while something else changes, characterizes, 
according to a premise of non-locality, the perceptive world of the individual.  
In a therapeutic context during the initial phases of treatment, a therapist might 
attempt to identify the pathological dichotomous subject objectifications that 
configure around the desire for reciprocated subjectification.  Thus the desire 
for reciprocated subjectification remains invariant, while the particular 
objectification that dehisce around this desire are variable (change).  So the 
principle of symmetry provides a searchlight to seek out the psychological 
pathology.  Future study might reveal a certain sense of symmetry that 
characterizes the rational and emotional interaction of two or more people.  
V. The study demonstrated that Lacan’s mirror stage formulation is logically 
incoherent (in terms of conventional either-or logic, and in terms of the [I]-
element’s logic), and ultimately conceptually incompatible with contemporary 
research findings in the field of mirror self-recognition.  The validity of 
Lacan’s subsequent conceptualization of the alienating Other, the L-schema 
(the quadrate structure of the subject), the name-of-the-father, the pessimistic 
and nihilistic impasse of desire, and his exposition of the function and role of 
language as it relates to the speaking subject, is accordingly dubious. 
VI. The author postulates, in light of the discussion on the process of affect 
attunement (section 4.2), that the emotional brain circuitry of the autistic 
infant involved (or the ‘normal’ neural pathways that should be active) in the 
infant-caretaker interaction at around 9 months is possibly deficient, or highly 
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underdeveloped.  The basic matrix of emotional resonance (the shared 
platform of attunement and empathy) can be implicated as the defective 
cognitive capacity in autism.  If research vindicates the latter postulate, 
psychological and physical therapeutic measures can be developed and 
administered specifically to the perceptive domain of root-objectification. 
VII. Comparatively, by better understanding the deficient nature of autistic 
children’s root-objectifications, a better understanding of the dynamics of the 
root-objectifications of normal individuals will be facilitated.  Such an 
understanding would be especially beneficial for developing interventions for 
psychotic afflictions, since adverse experiences related to the domain of root-
objectifications is expected by the author, due to the predominance of 
emotional brain circuitry in the absence of the capability for objectification 
during the first two years of life, to be fundamentally involved in the aetiology 
of psychosis.  
VIII. Future research can attempt to conceptualize the inter-relation of sexuality and 
the desire for reciprocated subjectification.  Provisionally the author posits that 
the disposition of hetero-sexuality or homo-sexuality might be associated with 
the primary field of objectification, specifically the inter-relation of root-
objectifications on the one hand, and stem- and leaf-objectifications on the 
other.  Future research can also examine the psychosexual stages of 
development in terms of the desire for reciprocated subjectification to 
establish possible stable (universal) patterns of dichotomous subject 
objectification formation. 
IX. The symmetrical [I] reformulates the question of morality.  What is ethical 
concerns not only the self in relation to the other, but rather the self, the other, 
and the ‘self and other’.  Concomitantly the power to will has methodological 
applicability to the domain of religion. Religious beliefs constitute a 
significant part of many people’s network of objectifications, therefore various 
religious doctrines must be analysed through the methodological logic of non-
locality to expose the possible psychological effects and implications of the 
religiosity in question.  In many cases what people believe to be their 
salvation, surreptitiously acts as their self-condemnation and delimitation. 
X. The substitution of the power to will for the will to power, entails a socio-
political telos not directed towards the domination of one group of people over 
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another, or the striving of one political party for superiority over another 
political party, or a religious doctrine attempting to impose its belief system on 
people, or one race of people trying to ignore their differences in relation to 
another racial group and focus on their mutual similarities, but rather directing 
the individual person to contemplate his/her rational beliefs and emotional 
feelings in terms of the [I]-element, a social-political telos where the 
governing or political or social person acknowledges the epiphenomenal 
character of his/her personal beliefs and explores the meaning of the ‘self’, the 
Other, and ‘the self and other’.  The power to will prescribes a political system 
that respects the differences and similarities of various ethnic groups, and also 
respects that these differences are similar and the similarities are different. 
 
To conclude the current study of the premise of non-locality, the meaning of the 
brilliant Greek mistake will be elucidated.  Consider the following paragraph 
formulated by the author: 
 
‘Emphasizes that all understanding is subjective opinion, truth seen as 
relative and not absolute, a deeper stable reality (objective essences) is 
neither accessible nor positable, a flexible atheism in metaphysics, relative 
moral values, appreciation of the plasticity and constant change of 
knowledge, a focus on the concrete and pragmatical, the application of a 
critical rationalism.’ 
 
The reader might be excused for thinking that the preceding paragraph is a description 
of general post-modernistic tenets.  In fact, this paragraph is a characterization of the 
Sophistic movement of 5th century ancient Greece (B.C.).  Both these paradigms 
(Sophism and Post-modernism) reveal a definite sense of scepticism and relativism, 
and both can be considered as a reaction to or a gradual development of a preceding 
more absolutistic paradigm.  In the case of the Sophists the preceding paradigm was 
the ancient mythological paradigm primarily characterized by the Homeric Iliad and 
Odyssey, thus evincing a paradigmatic shift away from belief in the truth of the 
Homeric Gods and their divine rule, towards a modern secular and relativistic 
rationalism (Tarnas, 1991).  In the case of the post-modernists the preceding paradigm 
was modernism, thus evincing a paradigmatic transition from a belief in science and 
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the laws of nature, to a pluralism typified by an unending relativism and existential 
finitude (Tarnas, 1991). 
 
It was at the height of the tension between the ancient Olympian tradition and the 
sceptical new intellectualism of the Sophists that Socrates entered the philosophical 
arena.  Socrates himself wrote nothing, and it is predominantly through the Dialogues 
of Plato that one can discern a silhouette of the philosophy espoused by Socrates.  
Yet, exactly where Socrates’ philosophy ends and Plato’s begins, is a hotly disputed 
issue amongst modern day scholars (see section 4.5).  It is precisely at this elusive 
conjunction that the author positions the brilliant Greek mistake.  Recall the 
distinction made by Vlastos (1991) between the Socrates of the earlier dialogues and 
the Socrates of the later dialogues.  It appears that the early dialogues are a kind of 
biography of the idiosyncratic spirit of Socrates’ dialectic investigation, while Plato’s 
later dialogues represent a gradual elaboration and transformation of his master’s 
ideas to bring them to what Plato understood to be their inherent metaphysically 
articulate conclusions.  Acknowledging the differentiation of E – Socrates and L – 
Socrates, the brilliant Greek mistake posits that Plato’s understanding of Socrates’ 
philosophy was inaccurate, that the essence of the Socratic ignorance was lost in the 
matured Platonic doctrine. 
 
In light of the premise of non-locality, the Socratic experiential psychological model 
does not consist of the desiring-element, rational-element, and the emotional-element, 
but rather of the intuitive-element, the rational-element, and the emotional-element 
(see section 4.5 for discussion).  Consider the discussion L – Socrates has with Cebes 
in Phaedo7 regarding the nature of opposites, L – Socrates (Plato, trans. 2003a) states: 
 
It seems to me not only that tallness itself absolutely declines to be short as 
well as tall, but also that the tallness ‘in’ us never admits smallness and 
declines to be surpassed.  It does one of two things: either it gives way and 
withdraws as its opposite shortness approaches, or it has already ceased to 
exist by the time that the other arrives… nor will any other quality, while still 
                                                 
7 Phaedo is considered to be one of Plato’s later dialogues, hence Late-Socrates.  See Vlastos (1991).  
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remaining what it was, at the same time become or be the opposite quality; in 
such a situation it either withdraws or ceases to exist. (p. 179) 
 
Plato’s argument beautiful typifies the premise of locality by describing the exclusive 
spatio-temporal dichotomy inherent to the conditioned [R]-element (the symmetrical 
[R]) – what is opposite cannot be the same, and what is the same cannot be opposite.  
Yet, as the study has demonstrated, this is exactly what the [I]-element prescribes!  
Thus the brilliant Greek mistake is basically a product of Plato’s non-
acknowledgement of the [I]-element, his non-exploration of the premise of non-
locality. 
 
In the form of the brilliant Greek mistake, the philosophy of Plato, with his emphasis 
on the [R]-element and his conceptualization of a grandiose metaphysical theory of 
‘separately existing’ forms (see section 4.5), substituted the reigning scepticism and 
relativism of the Sophists with a rationally animated metaphysical flavour of 
absolutism.  Hellenic thought, most fully embodied in the philosophy of Plato, has 
been extremely influential in the historical development of Western civilisation and 
still pervades the modern mind (Tarnas, 1991).  Consequently modern man has also 
inherited the brilliant Greek mistake, and now, at dawn of the third millennium, it has 
come back to haunt us in the shape of the post-modernistic question.  According to 
Tarnas (1991) the central prophet of the post-modern mind is Friedrich Nietzsche, 
with his radical perspectivism, his sovereign critical sensibility, and his powerful, 
poignantly ambivalent anticipation of the emerging nihilism in Western culture.  In 
the ‘Gay Science’ Nietzsche (1887/1974) wrote: 
 
What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun?  Whither is it 
moving now?  Whither are we moving?  Away from all suns?  Are we not 
plunging continually?  Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions?  Is 
there still any up or down?  Are we not straying as through an infinite 
nothing?  Do we not feel the breath of empty space?  Has it not become 
colder?  Is not night continually closing in on us? (p. 181) 
 
The agonizing character of uncertainty predisposes the post-modern mind to the 
infectious disease of absolutism and its multifarious mutating strains of pseudo-
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certainty.  The paradigmatic reprise confronting the understanding of ourselves and 
reality, poses the following question:  Are we going to repeat the brilliant Greek 
mistake?  Are we going to replace the current post-modernistic paralysis with some 
new species of absolutism?  Or: do we once again converse with Socrates, or 
conversely, allow Socrates to converse with us?  Will the disciples of the future be 
able to say – ‘I know that I don’t know’, and know what they mean?  Will we be able 
to replace the earth with the sun at the centre of the galaxy without unchaining the 
earth from the sun? 
 
At the end of his life, Carl Jung wrote the following (cited in Tarnas, 1991): 
 
A mood of universal destruction and renewal … has set its mark on our age.  
This mood makes itself felt everywhere, politically, socially, and 
philosophically.  We are living in what the Greeks called the kairos – the right 
moment – for a ‘metamorphosis of the gods’, of the fundamental principles 
and symbols. (p. 412) 
 
This study posits that if modern man clings to the premise of locality, he will animate 
the ‘metamorphosis of the gods’ with the violent breath of the will to power, he will 
religiously, without repose, continue to try and dominate and destroy his own mirror 
image.  He will not turn the other cheek. 
In the ‘Apology’, after being sentenced to death for impiety, E – Socrates8 (Plato, 
trans. 2003b) addressed the jurors and enunciated the following: 
 
Gentlemen of the jury – for you deserve to be so called – I have had a 
remarkable experience.  In the past the prophetic voice to which I have 
become accustomed has always been my constant companion, opposing me in 
even quite trivial things if I was going to take the wrong course.  Now 
something has happened to me, as you can see, which might be thought and is 
commonly considered to be a supreme calamity; yet neither when I left home 
this morning, nor when I was taking my place here in court, nor at any point in 
any part of my speech, did the divine sign oppose me.  In other discussions it 
                                                 
8 Apology is considered to be one of Plato’s early dialogues, hence Early-Socrates.  See Vlastos (1991). 
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has often checked me in the middle of a sentence; but this time it has never 
opposed me in any part of this business in anything that I have said or done.  
What do you suppose to be the explanation?  I will tell you.  I suspect that this 
thing that has happened to me is a blessing, and we are quite mistaken in 
supposing death to be evil.  I have good grounds for thinking this, because my 
accustomed sign could not have failed to oppose me if what I was doing had 
not been sure to bring some good result. (p. 68-69). 
 
Socrates implores us to listen to our little voice, to seek the symmetrical [I], to open 
up Schrodinger’s box in the experiment of life and not be perplexed or ashamed if we 
find a person inside the box knowing and not knowing at the same time, nor to reject 
or ignore the results if the box of the body reveals a ‘self and other’.  From power to 
will.   
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Appendix A 
 
A) Primary field of objectification experience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B) Secondary field of objectification experience 
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Appendix B 
 
Concerning reflection/parity invariance, the sketch below is taken from the book – 
‘Fearful symmetry’ (Zee, 1986, p. 32) – the author (of this thesis) wishes to 
demonstrate a possible argumentation error made by physicists concerning parity 
invariance.  To understand the sketch, the reader must be familiar with the procedure 
for defining the direction of spin for any spinning object.  The left hand must be 
curled around a given spinning object so that the fingers are pointing along the 
direction in which the surface of the spinning object is revolving.  The direction of 
spin is defined according to the direction the thumb is pointing.  Thus the spin 
direction is described as either ‘up’ or ‘down’.  Now apply this procedure to the 
sketch (Fig. 3): 
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The following is a direct quotation of the text that accompanied the original sketch: 
 
A spinning nucleus (represented as a large ball) ejects an electron (the small 
ball).  In our world the electron emerges more or less in the direction of the 
nuclear spin; in the mirror world it emerges in a direction opposite to that of 
the nuclear spin.  In the actual experiment the direction of the ejected electron 
relative to the nuclear-spin direction was tabulated statistically for a large 
number of nuclei.  If the electron emerges preferentially in the nuclear-spin 
direction (as suggested by the figure), then we can conclude that nature 
violates parity invariance because a physicist in the mirror world would see 
the electron emerging preferentially in a direction opposite to the nuclear-spin 
direction.  Our world and the mirror world would then be governed by 
different physical laws. (p. 32) 
 
The above process supposedly indicates an apparent parity violation due to the sketch 
demonstrating that in the mirror world the electron emerges in the direction opposite 
to the nuclear spin.  The possible logical error is due to the left hand being used to 
determine the direction of spin for the nucleus.  In the mirror world the left-hand rule 
becomes the right-hand rule!  Thus if the right-hand is now used to determine the 
direction of spin for the nucleus, the electron does not emerge in the direction 
opposite to the nuclear spin, and consequently reflection/parity invariance is not 
violated. 
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      Epitaph 
       In loving memory of our beloved locality. 
                                      May it rest in non-locality. 
 
399 B. C – 2004 A. D 
 
   
 
 
          
 
   
 
      
 
        
 
 
 
 
